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Wittgenstein* s Ontology in His Early Works
(December 1973)
Richard Mark Wolters, B. A. Hope College
Directed byt Dr. Bruce Aune
This dissertation centers on providing an extreme
nominalistic answer to the question, "What does Wittgen-
stein hold an object to be in the Tractatus?" Wittgen-
stein, I claim, holds that objects are absolutely bare.
Part I examines Wittgenstein* s Notebooks, 1914 -
1916 . Beginning with a brief look at his logical theory,
I quickly move to a presentation of his linguistic theory.
Both of these are preparatory to a discussion of Wittgen-
stein* s ontology in the Notebooks . Here, too, Wittgen-
stein holds that objects are absolutely bare, though I
do discuss several points at which he vacillates.
Part II is devoted exclusively to the Tractatus .
The first chapter argues that the notion of substance,
as Wittgenstein developed it, clearly shows that he is
committed to absolutely bare objects. Chapter II does
the same for the notion of form. The third chapter
criticizes three alternative positions, those of Copi,
Sellars and Allaire.
Experienced objects, however, are not simple, and
Wittgenstein does not claim that they are. In the last
V.
two chapters of my dissertation, I discuss experienced
complex objects . In the first, I discuss how they are
related to simple objects. In the second, I argue that
Wittgenstein's theory of complex objects actually implies
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What is an object or thing? This question has
occupied the attention of philosophers for two and a
half millennia* it is perhaps the central question of
metaphysics. In the following chapters I examine the
answer Wittgenstein gave to the question in his early
period, that during which he wrote his Notebooks. 1914 -
1916 and the Tractatus Logic o-Philosophicus . ^ 1 argue
that, in both works, he uses the word 'object* or 'thing*
ambiguously * on the one hand it means something absolute-
ly simple, having no qualities at all; on the other it
means a complex, something which does indeed possess
qualities.
Because the Notebooks and the Tractatus differ
vastly in style (and at times in content), I devote one
section of the following to each. Wittgenstein claimed
that his fundamental insights came from his theory of
logic, so I begin Part I with a brief examination of
that theory and the consequences it seemed to him to
carry for a theory of language. This leads directly to
the question of the nature of objects.
Since Wittgenstein' s philosophical thought changed
radically at least once, if not twice, the question of
2 .
the relevance of any one work to any other becomes more
pressing than with philosophers like Kant, whose later
works form an organic whole. In this case, however, the
worry is of little importance. The Notebooks are palpab-
ly close to the Tractatus . so close that often passages
from them are identical in wording, or nearly so, to pas-
sages in the Tractatus , There are points of disagreement
between the two works, of course. In the earlier, Witt-
genstein was developing positions which appeared in the
later as final or above debate. Naturally there were
some false starts, some faulty conclusions, in the earlier
work, and these he discarded. In nearly every instance
where he discards an old position or assumes a new one,
he gives reasons for his action, and does so more discur-
sively and clearly than in the later work,
A brief examination of the Notebooks prior to exam-
ining the Tractatus has therefore two advantages. First,
it allows us to witness Wittgenstein struggling with the
problems given final answer in the Tractatus ; by seeing
what he rejects and what he retains in this struggle, we
become more acutely aware of what was of the greatest
value to him in them. And thus, secondly, the reason
for the moves he makes in his struggle are brought to
light, reasons which, whether forgotten or suppressed,
are not evident in the Tractatus itself.
3 .
My examinat i on of "the Notebooks closes with a dis-
cussion of Wittgenstein’s developing ontology; my exam-
ination of the Tractatus opens with a discussion of his
developed ontology. In the first chapter I examine one
of the central arguments for the simplicity of objects,
that found in 2,021 - 2.0212. This leads to an examin-
ation of the concepts of form and substance. I then
turn, in the second chapter, to the notion of form, and
argue that it too commits him to the claim that objects
are bare, i.e., absolutely simple.
In order to preserve the continuity of the text, I
avoid comparisons with alternative views of Wittgenstein’s
ontology until the third chapter. There I criticize the
views of Copi,^ Sellars,^” and Allaire.^
The final two chapters of Part II develop the other
sense of the ambiguous term ’object', that in which it
means 'complex thing® . I begin the discussion by con-
sidering, in chapter four, a variety of interrelated
concepts; world, (complex) thing, properties and facts.
Here I also discuss the problem of internal and external
relations. The final chapter explicates what I call Witt-
genstein's Platonism. It is an unusual Platonism, so I
will not here anticipate my discussion of it there.
4 .
I
Wittgenstein complained that no one had successfully
read and understood his work; he felt that it was con-
stantly misunderstood and misinterpreted. The misunder-
standing he saw around him began with that of one of his
closest and most admired associates, Bertrand Russell.
Wittgenstein expressed his disappointment with Russell's
interpretation of the Tractatus in at least three of his
lecters. In the first, dated April 9* 1920, he writes,
"Ich bin mit so manchem darin nicht ganz einverstanden;
sowohl dort, wo Du mich kritisierst, als auch dort, wo
/
r
Du bloss meine Ansicht klarlegen willst." In the sec-
ond, dated May 6, 1920, he expresses his frustration at
Russell's misinterpretations even more sharply than in
the first t "Als ich naemlich die deutsche Uebersetzung
der Einleitung vor mir hatte, da konnte ich mich doch
nicht entschliessen, sie mit meiner Arbeit drucken zu
lassen. Die Feinheit Deines englischer Stils war naem-
lich in der Uebersetzung -- selbstverstaendlich — ver-
lorengegangen und was uebrig blieb, war Oberflaechlich-
keit und Misverstaendnis ,
"
{ Nor did he confine his com-
plaints solely to letters to Russell, for in a letter to
Paul Engelmann he wrote about Russell's introduction:
"Es ist ein Gebraeu mit dem ich nicht einverstanden bin,
5 .
aber da ich es nicht geschrieben habe, so macht das
nicht viel." 8
Russell had taken Wittgenstein to be interested
principally in the problems of logic, foundations of
mathematics, and logical philosophy — problems which
he himself found so absorbing. He felt that the main
value of the Tractatus lay in its attempt first to cor-
rect the errors Wittgenstein had found in the Principia
Mathematica
. and then to form a logically perfect lan-
guage. This logically perfect language, cleared of the
errors Russell had made, could then be used to find "on
all essential points, the final solution" to the philo-
sophical problems, as Wittgenstein claimed to have done.
Another of Wittgenstein* s close associates, F. P.
Ramsey, soon took issue with Russell* s interpretation.
He contended that Russell® s view of the Tractatus was "a
a
very doubtful generalization". Wittgenstein, he claimed,
was far more interested in ordinary language, and less in
logic, than Russell would have him be. As proof of this,
Ramsey could cite such passages as 5.5563 in the Tracta-
tus
,
where Wittgenstein claims thati "Alle Saetze un-
serer Umgangssprache sind tatsaechlich, so wie sie sind,
logisch vollkommen geordnet." Neither he nor Russell
managed, however, to argue for or against either position
convincingly, and the debate continues to the present day.
6 .
In fact this debate cannot be settled neatly in favor of
either position. It stems from the variety of problems
and interests, both implicit and explicit, which occupied
Wittgenstein as he wrote the Tractatus . Some of these
interests were easily apparent to all those familiar with
his work. One such was that in logic and the foundations
of mathematics. Indeed, it seemed obvious at that time
that this was his major interest. He had left Vienna in
1908 to study engineering at the University in Manchester,
England. His interest in engineering was more theoret-
ical than practical, and led him to study mathematics
much more deeply than before. He found the study of the
foundations of mathematics particularly fascinating, and
left Manchester for Cambridge and Bertrand Russell, the
leader in that field at the time.
Wittgenstein migrated to Cambridge in 1911, and very
quickly seemed to become wholly absorbed in philosophy as
it was practiced and taught there. This principally in-
volved developing his interest in logic and philosophy as
Russell represented it then. At the same time, he was
introduced to and influenced by the thought and method
of G. E. Moore. Moore* s '‘common-sense'* approach to philo-
sophy underwent a change at Wittgenstein* s hands, however
i
it was reinterpreted in terms of language. The result,
7 .
Wittgenstein* s thought as the Tractatus represents it,
was something which fit neither Russell’s nor Moore *s
approach entirely.
There is thus a tension in the Tractatus between
ordinary language, on the one hand, and logic, on the
other. Both Russell and Ramsey, as well as those who
have followed their interpretations, resolved it simply
by denying half of it.
Both sets of problems, those of logic and those of
ordinary language, arose through contact with his philo-
sophical contemporaries, but his method of combining
them and resolving the tensions that arose between them
was solely his own. For he accomplished this resolution
through his method, and that grew out of studies and in-
terests which he had pursued before coming to England.
In particular, they grew out of his fondness for, and
study of, Schopenhauer's works.
There is indeed no question about the deep influence
his independent study of Schopenhauer's philosophy had on
Wittgenstein's later work. He had read these works quite
early in life, well before he left Vienna. He returned
to them while in Manchester, and his Notebooks show that
he continued to read them even after he came under Russell's
influence. His interest in them even grewi by the time
8 .
of the last entries in the Notebooks
, it seems to take
precedence over, even to supplant, that in the works of
Russell and Moore, 11 These studies may or may not have
caused his interest in metaphysics. They certainly em-
phasized any leanings towards that discipline which Witt-
genstein may already have felt, and may also have awakened
in him the interest in ethics and aesthetics which is
visible in the later sections of the Tractatus .
There were then three major forces shaping Wittgen-
stein's thought during this period. One was that of
Mathematics,- logic and Russell's philosophy (as he inter-
preted it), and his contemporaries were clearly aware of
his interest in it. The second, while not so obvious,
was seen by at least some of his contemporaries! the in-
fluence of Moore and common-sense philosophy (as he inter-
preted it). The third, the influence of Schopenhauer's
philosophy, was not recognized at first, despite its cen-
tral position of providing him with the tools needed to
unify the other two. In ignoring Schopenhauer's influence,
his contemporaries also ignored the more metaphysical con-
cerns of his work.
Russell and Ramsey were at least partly responsible
for the two misinterpretations of the Tractatus we have
seen thus far. They did not deny that there is an
9 .
explicitly developed ontology there i they simply ignored
.it, misunderstanding its source and importance to Wittgen-
stein, Russell, at least, may well even have been some-
what sympathetic to metaphysics, if not to Wittgenstein's
particular variety. Epistemology, logic, and scientific
philosophy were not seen as contradictory to metaphysical
interests in the early 1900' s, for philosophy then was
metaphysical in tone and tendency. Russell, following
Moore's lead, revolted against an Idealistic metaphysics
founded on Kegel's work and dominated in England by
Bradley, Neither he nor Moore opposed metaphysics it-
self. As Warnock writes
i
12
(t)he idea that metaphysics is in principle
impossible, or 'meaningless', did not appear
until many years later, at a time when, in
this country (i.e., England) at least, old-
style Idealism was already moribund; and even
then, it was an idea which neither Russell
nor Moore either sponsored or accepted.
Both Russell and Moore added to or reinforced Wittgenstein's
interest in metaphysics. At the same time they made avail-
able to him the problems and tools of analytical philo-
sophy, which he reformed and reinterpreted, welding them
into his own highly original way of thought.
Another more serious misreading of the Tract atus
occured somewhat later, after Wittgenstein had returned
to Austria. In 1929, at the house of his sister in Vienna,
he met with Moritz Schlick, who had read the Tractatus
10 .
and had expressed eagerness to meet its author. Schlick
invited Wittgenstein to join a group of scientists inter-
ested in philosophical questions, a group later known as
the Vienna Circle. Though he refused to join the group
formally, he did attend a number of their meetings, and
soon was thought of as associated with them. The Tracta-
tu_s began to be considered a document of that school of
thought, i . e . , as embodying the principles of logical
positivism.
The logical positivists, however, denied any sem-
blance of intellectual respectability to any branch of
metaphysics, and Wittgenstein's concerns with those prob-
lems seemed utterly unintelligible to them. Unlike
Russell and Ramsey, they not only ignored, but denied
the very presence of, these problems in his work. Ru-
dolph Carnap, for instance, presented an interpretation
of the Tractatus , in his Per Logische Aufbau der Welt ,
in which he took a number of Wittgenstein's obviously
ontological claims and reinterpreted them as claims in
a meta-language about an object-language. By doing so,
he screened out all the metaphysics that was in the
Tractatus
,
and presented it as a work solely (or at
least largely) of logic and epistemology.
We can see how great the gulf is which separates
Wittgenstein's aims and methods from those of the
11 .
the logical positivists by comparing their views on
epistemology. Logical positivism was an epistemologi-
cal doctrine. Such interest as its adherents showed in
metaphysics was negative; part of their task was to root
out metaphysics and destroy it. Wittgenstein, on the
other hand, showed less interest in epistemology than
the positivists did in metaphysics. Such interest as
he did show was largely negative, for his primary con-
cern was to limit the importance it had had in philo-
sophy since the time of Descartes, Thus, for example,
when he discusses epistemology in the Tractatus , he re-
lates it directly to psychology rather than philosophy*
4.1121* Psychology is no more closely related
to philosophy than any other natural
* science.
Theory of knowledge is the philosophy
of psychology.
Elsewhere, in a letter to Russell, he again emphasizes
the close relation between epistemology and psychology
(to the detriment of the former as a philosophical dis-
cipline) * ^
. . ."But a Gedanke is a Tatsache* what are
its constituents and components and what is
their relation to those of the pictured Tat-
sache?" I don't know what the constituents
of a thought are but I know that it must have
such constituents which correspond to the
words of Language. Again the kind of rela-
tion of the constituents of the thought and
of the pictured fact is irrelevant. It
would be a matter of psychology to find out.
12 .
At least part of his aim, then, in his attack on epis-
temology is to avoid confuring two related disciplines,
philosophy and psychology. Y/ittgenstein felt, as did
Husserl, that the confusion between the two which re-
sulted from an over-emphasis on epistemology had penet-
rated deep into the logical and metaphysical studies of
his contemporaries. By de-emphasizing epistemology, he
felt he could allow both logic and metaphysics to play
again as important a role as they once had played, and
still deserved to play.
His disaffection with epistemology was by no means
hidden subtly in his work, and others have pointed it
out before, Anscombe, e.g., is well aware of it« she
points it out in her Introduction to Wittgenstein's
Tractatus
,
but errs by overstating the case. She claims
that "at the time when he wrote the Tractatus , ... he
pretended that epistemology had nothing to do with the
14
foundations of logic and the theory of meaning," and
that he "avoided making theory of knowledge the cardinal
theory of philosophy simply by cutting it dead, by doing
15
none, and concentrating on the philosophy of logic.
"
Neither the above quotation from the T rac tatus , nor thax
from the letter to Russell, can support the view that he
"cut dead" the theory of knowledge. As 4.1121 clearly
I
. 13 .
shows, he left a place for it (even if he chose not to
develop what should go in that place) — one roughly
parallel in philosophy to that occupied by psychology
in the natural sciences. From the fact that Wittgen-
stein did little or no epistemology in the Tractatus
,
it does not follow that he felt it to be useless, wrong,
or unnecessary; he simply considered it one philosophi-
cal discipline among many, but one which had received an
exaggerated amount of interest in recent philosophy.
II
In taking the approach I have to the Tractatus
, I
leave many important questions unanswered questions
such asi What is the ontological status of the self?
of the laws of physics? or those of ethics? I do not
consider these because to do so would involve me in a
work of intolerable length. I hope, rather, that I will
have presented clearly and cogently Wittgenstein's an-
swer to the most fundamental question of ontology
i
What is an object? If I have done this, the answers
to these other questions will not be of frustrating
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meine Arbeit hat sich ausgedehnt von den
Grundlagen der Logik zum Wesen der WeIt."
Wittgenstein, Notebooks 1914-1916
CHAPTER II
APPROACH TO THE NOTEBOOKS
17 .
Wittgenstein* s metaphysics revolves around his
attempts to provide satisfactory answers to three ques-
tions i (i) v/hat is the ontological status of the "ex-
ternal" world, the world of physical objects? (ii) what
is the ontological status of the self (or selves), of
the subject (or of subjects)? and (iii) What is the
ontological status of laws, particularly scientific and
ethical laws? The Tractatus provides answers to all
these questions, but it does so in the dark and oracula.r
style for which it is so well known. Reading it, one is
often mystified not only by the answers Wittgenstein
gives, but by the very questions they are supposed to
answer. At times one does not quite know what the ques-
tion is supposed to be; at times, though the question
itself may be known, it still seems to have at best mys-
terious connections with the passages which, surrounding
it, are supposed to bear on it. Thus to the initial dif-
ficulty of the philosophical thought there is added the
immense difficulty of the style itself.
The elements of abruptness and stylistic mystery
are at least partly dispelled by a reading of his Note -
books, 191** - 1916 . It is there that Wittgenstein first
18 .
raises many of the questions which he later answers in
the Iractatus; and there, too, that he first finds many
of the answers for them. Furthermore, the passages in
the Notebooks often lack his distinctive aphoristic style.
What the comments there lose by being either unanswered
01 (in the view of the Tractatus ) wrongly answered, they
gain in clarity due to the different style. Often, too,
since these thoughts have not yet worked themselves into
his theories, they are more simply, and thus more clearly,
put. In any event, witnessing the philosophical debate
Wittgenstein carries on with himself over them is in it-
self a great help in understanding what he is getting at.
One cannot, of course, simply assume that the Note -
books are philosophically continuous or close to the
Tractatus . Wittgenstein is notorious for having deve-




of the Tractatus and that of the Philosophical Investiga-
tions . When a philosopher is known to have shifted his
position once radically, only confusion can result by
ignoring the possibility of yet another such shift ,
2
Yet
as Anscombe and von Wright comment in their introduction
to the Notebooks
,
J "it does show clearly what problems
formed the context of Wittgenstein's remarks in the
Tractatus . . . " . There is even greater unity between
the two than this implies. Whenever the Tractatus
I
19 .
disagrees with the Notebooks, there is almost always a
reason presented already in the Notebooks for the posi-
tion later taken in the Tractatus
, This allows one ac-
tually to see Wittgenstein’s position change to that of
the Tractatus, and such passages are of special value
in understanding as exactly as possible what his posi-
tion is in that work. Another aim can also be served
by a sensitive examination of these early notes. They
present, more clearly than any other source, the influ-
ences acting on Wittgenstein at that time, These influ-
ences, which I have already enumerated, were not yet so
tightly unified as they became later. They are thus
easier to see, and to delineate in their relative impor-
tance in V/ittgenstein* s thought.
Unfortunately, most of Wittgenstein’s notebooks
were burned, on his orders. Those which we still have
from this period deal largely with the first of the
three questions which formed the pinions of his meta-
physics i the question of the ontological status of
physical objects, Even so, both in the notebooks we
still have and in the Tractatus we see that he was deep-
ly affected by his researches into two other areas
i
the nature of logic and of language. The problems
which arose in these areas, and the answers Wittgen-
stein gave them, shaped the problems he saw in ontology
20 .
(and, needless to say, the answers he gave them )
4
. The
IMelooks, for example, open with a comment on logic.
The thought of this opening phrase delineates a position
which forces Wittgenstein to find a philosophical method
different from that of his contemporaries (particularly
Russell), This he does as he discovers the form of lin-
guistic analysis that he uses in the Notebooks and in
llg-Cjatus, namely, the transcendental analysis of
language. This method leads him to certain conclusions
about reality, about the objective world. In the mean-
time, throughout the entire course of his work, he never
ceases to try to develop a technically sound logic. Thus
the Notebooks present us with two totally different faces
(as does the Tractatus ) . depending on whether we chose
to emphasize his logical researches, or his ontology.
As Kurt Wuchterl comments,
Es sieht aus
,
als ob Wittgenstein von der
Bestimmten Situation der logischen Grundlagen-
forschung zur Zeit der Princ.ipia Mathematica
ausging und eine Theorie der Anwendbarkeit“
logischer Systeme zu entwickeln suchte. Seine
Ontologie kann daher als Entwurf ad hoc ange-
sehen werden der die Bedingungen der Moeglich-
keit einer vorliegenden perfekten Sprache ent-
haelt .... Geht man jedoch von dem fertigen
Werk aus und laesst genetische Ueberlegungen
ausser Acht, so gewinnt man einen ganz anderen
Eindruck,
6
My examination of the Notebooks will try to present
one of those faces coherently, and in doing so to make a
21 .
case for my claim that that face is the more germaine to
Wittgenstein* s thought in general. I shall examine very
briefly his comments on logic, and consider how these
influence the development of the method he uses to set
and solve questions in metaphysics. This leads me
naturally to a consideration of language, and from there
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LOGIC AND ANALYSIS IN THE NOTEBOOKS
The very opening sentence of the Notebooks declares
the total independence of logic from all other disci-
plines t '’Die Logik muss fuer sich selbst sorgen ," 1
This realization represents both a central insight and
a central problem for Wittgenstein. It is an insight
which illuminates for him some of the essential traits
of logic, without thereby defining it* one of the first
conclusions he draws from the comment is that, in logic,
it is "in a sense" impossible to err. The comment is
nevertheless more important to him as a problem, for
it forbids, when taken seriously, a logic based on on-
tology and, conversely, an ontology derived strictly
through logical studies. The most that logic can do is
negative t it can tell one how the world cannot bej it
can help show the limits of the world, but never what
lies inside of those limits. That is to say, logic is
a pure discipline, free from any connection with any
other study or type of study. Thus a second conclusion
he immediately draws is that "die ganze Theorie der
2
Dinge, Eigenschaften, etc. ueberfluessig (ist)" for a
theory of logic such as that which Russell and Whitehead
had developed in the Principia Mathematica .
24 .
The negative sense of this passage, the sense in
which it poses a problem, leads Wittgenstein to an im-
portant clarification of the goals of philosophy. The
questions which are "in some sense" the genuinely philo-
sophical questions are, in his view, those which raise
the question of what exists. He himself raises it in
two ways. The first proceeds by considering an idea we
have, and asking whether anything corresponding to it
exists, as when, e.g.
, Wittgenstein asks, "Gibt es die
Sub jekt-Predikat Form?" 3 We may also begin at the other .
end; we may start with what unquestionably does exist
(in some sense), and ask ourselves what its nature really
is, as when Wittgenstein asks, "ist ein Punkt in unserem
Gesichtsbild ein einfa.cher Gegenstand . ein Ding?"^
Appearance perhaps to the contrary, Wittgenstein does
not confuse philosophy with science in either of these
two questions. When either question is asked by a sci-
entist, or within a scientific discipline, it has an em-
pirical answer, which can be confirmed or disconfirmed
observationally . As Wittgenstein asks them, however,
they are like any other philosophical question! empiri-
cal evidence alone cannot answer them. When he asks the
first, he is explicitly aware that no appeal to experi-
ence will answer him. He continues i "ist die und die
25 .
Tatsache von der Subjekt-Predikat Form?" and replies,
“wie koennen wir dies wissen? "Aus den Zeichen:” Aber
wie? Wir haben ja gar keine Zeichen von dieser Form." 5
The same considerations that prompt him to reject even
the conceivability of empirical evidence for the first
of these questions act upon him in the second too.
Thus at the beginning of Wittgenstein- s thought
stands an insight into the nature of logic which entails,
m his view, the sharp separation of three different
fields! logic, philosophy, and empirical sciences. In
separating logic from philosophy, he is moving towards
a conception of the latter very different from that of
Russell* s, at least as of that time. Russell accepted
logic as the main philosophical tool, and therefore, like
any other good tool, quite applicable to the tasks at
hand: for him there was no divorce between philosophy
and logic. It was in his view eminently possible to
draw philosophical ( onto3.ogical) conclusions from argu-
ments based on the properties of a system of logic (and
this procedure is, of course, the basis for his famous
paper, "On Denoting"). Because he accepted logic with-
out reservation, the questions it engendered became a
primary concern for him. In particular, the problems
connected with finding some example of a "fully analyzed"
sentence or proposition (in which, then, the true logical
I
26.
form would be immediately and unmistakably visible) be-
came of primary importance. Logic was the tool with
which he would unearth the answers to metaphysical ques-
tions - but for it to work well, it needed the proper
material $ it needed fully analyzed sentences to work on
Wittgenstein* s attitude towards this kind of philo-
sophical analysis (and especially towards the problem of
finding a fully analyzed sentence) was ambivalent until
the period of the Philosophical Investigat ions . We have
already seen that he begins the Notebooks by expressing
doubts as to whether a program which required one to
find examples of real subject-predicate propositions
could be fulfilled. In the same place he strengthens
his doubls? "bnd hier fragt es sich wieden gibt es so
eine vollstaendige Analyse? Und wenn nicht t Was ist
denn die Aufgabe der Philosophic *. The sharpness of
the question shows how important it is to him» behind
all the other questions in the Notebooks and the Tracta-
~tus stands this one. And behind it stands the realiza-
tion that logic must take care of itself, that logic is
independent both of philosophy and of natural science.
His questioning does not stop here, at his doubts
about whether there is a perfect analysis of sentences.
He continues with a question whether, even if a sentence
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of the real subject-predicate form could be found, this
discovery would be of any real philosophical value. His
answer « "Es scheint nein .'" 7 Later he goes even further
and declares that "auch der unzerlegte Satz spiegelt ja
logische Eigenschaften seiner Bedeutung-wieder " 8 -- it
is not even necessary, in other words, to find a perfect-
ly analyzed proposition in order to examine the real
nature oj. the world (the "logische Eigenschaften seiner
Bedeutung"). Unanalyzed sentences do so just as well.^
These doubts, however profound and fruitful their
consequences were for Wittgenstein* s later works, were
just doubts here. The beginning of the Notebooks is .
thus marked as negative and critical, in a philosophical
sense. He sees the problems of ontology as essential to
philosophy, yet he sets limits to the ways in which they
can be solved by removing them both from logic and from
the empirical sciences. Although interesting, what he
does here is not yet very original. It is in fact close
to Kant's critical limitation of metaphysics. Just as
Kant felt forced to separate logic from the natural
sciences and from philosophy, so Wittgenstein felt com-
pelled to separate them one from the other. This early
in the Notebooks
,
however, he had not determined a
method to systematize his thoughts* he is not yet
committed to any given reason why the three areas are
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sepai ace, as Kant was to the doctrine of synthetic a
££A PF-L truths. One of the most active forces guiding
him in philosophy was precisely thisi to find out why
and how the three were separate, and at the same time,
how to carry forth research in each without impinging
on either of the others.
What is new about the critical side of Wittgenstein*
s
thought as we see it here is that he turns it against
analytical philosophy as represented by Russell. The
attempt to find a genuine subject-predicate sentence is
not only temporarily stymied (as Russell thought); it is
worse i it is wrong. There is, as we have seen, no ex-
perience by which we could tell the difference between
a genuine subject-predicate proposition and an apparent
one. To attempt to find one is, on the one hand, to
violate the limits of philosophy, and confuse it with
the natural sciences in method. For this reason Witt-
genstein accuses Russell* s "Scientific Method in Philo-
sophy" of being "geradezu ein Rueckschritt von der
Methode der Physik".
1 ^ Scientific method in philosophy
makes no more good sense than philosophical method in
the sciences! each confuses two essentially separate
endeavors, two essentially different methodologies. On
the other hand, Russell's method leads to a confusion
between logic and philosophy. This in its turn brings
I
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into logic, the most certain of disciplines, uncertain-
ties of philosophy11 -- which, however germaine to philo-
sophy, are irrelevant to logic. Tentatively Wittgenstein
is forced to the conclusion that Russell's method, that
of logical atomism, is a philosophical mess.
The logical theory which Wittgenstein espouses in
the beginning of the Notebooks is obviously incomplete.
It- does, after all, represent only the beginnings of the
theory he later elaborated extensively. In some respects
it even seems to contradict some very important positions
he later developed. In particular, if logic ijs absolutely
independent of the world, how can he speak of "logischer
Raum"
,
or of the logic of our language, or any other such
concept, many of which he uses in the Tractatus ? Such
concepts seem at least to overstep the boundary between
logic and the empirical sciences, if not that between
logic and philosophy as well. These problems, however,
must be postponed, and faced later. My presentation
has been aimed at bringing out some of the implications
Wittgenstein saw in the early stages of his theory, par-
ticularly the implications of that theory for methodology
and the rejection of Russellian logical atomism. Even
though he rejects this theory, holding fast to his "very
important" insight into the independence of logic, he
remains tempted by it, as I pointed out. He replaces
I
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Russellian analysis — the analysis which was based on
the methods of logic developed by Russell and Whitehead
m their Principiajlathematica — with a type of language-
analysis to which 1 turn in the following chapter. This
analysis, as we shall see there, is by no means of clear
significance to Wittgenstein at firsts indeed, it is
part of the interest of the Notebooks , that we can see
clearly how and why this new method replaced the older
for him. In one sense, perhaps, this change I shall
chronicle in Wittgenstein's attitude toward analysis is
one of the most significant portions of the Notebooks .
It allows us to find one method of unifying the entirety
of his philosophical thought and works, works normally
held to be of totally different, and even inconsistent,
approaches to philosophy and its problems. Let me
sketch, briefly and perhaps somewhat dogmatically, the
lines along which such a unification would proceed.
In the earliest works, such as the "Notes on Logic"
(of 1913)* Wittgenstein was most deeply impressed and
influenced by Russell and the program of logical anal-
ysis. (Even here, however, an effort to remedy what
Wittgenstein saw as certain defects is present,) The
Notebooks shows the decisive turn away from Russellian
logical analysis to linguistic analysis. In the
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Phjj^sophische Bemerkungen . Wittgenstein* s principal
concern is with essential linguistic structures. By
the time of the Blue and Brown B ooks
, which announced
the i inal version of his method, he had ceased to pick
out any given structures as essential. He was now con-
cerned with clarification of all ordinary linguistic
structures whatsoever. But — to return us to the
present work -- we are now to be concerned with his
early version of linguistic analysis, one still over-
shadowed by the hopes and fears of logical atomism.
32 .
FOOTNOTES
1. Wittgenstein, L. » Notebo oks, 1914 - 193.6 (ed. and
translated by Anscombe, G. E. M. and von Wright,
G. H.), Harper and Row, New York, 196I; p. 1.
2. Ibid.
3. Ibid., p. 3.
4. Ibid. I will later argue that there is a close
relation between Wittgenstein* s philosophical out-
look and Kant's. It is interesting to note, in
view of this, the similarity of attitude between
these two questions, on the one hand, and two kinds
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sein wie die Logik eines wirklichen?"
9. Wittgenstein strengthens this position in the Trac-
tatus . In 4.1274 he maintains that "... the^
question, 'Arc there unanalysable subject-predicate
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LOGIC, LANGUAGE, AND ANALYSIS
The doubts that bother Wittgenstein in his critical
phase or mood can quickly be summed up, as he himself
sums them up when he asks of the question of philosophy,
"welche Evidenz koennte so eine Frage ueberhaupt ent-
scheiden 1
. Logic carries with it its own proof, or
rathei-, the proofs of or in logic are proofs, not propo-
sitions which stand in need of some other proof. The
empii ical sciences at least give their practitioners a
relatively clear idea of what constitutes a proof there,
and intelligible directions as to where to find it for
their claims. Only in philosophy does one find the prob-
lem of where to look for evidence.
The answer is provided even before the question be-
comes clear. Wittgenstein writes,
Also, wenn alles, was gezeicht werden braucht,
durch die Existenz der subjekt-predikat SAETZE
etc, gezeigt wird, dann ist die Aufgabe der
Philosophie eine andere, als ich urspruenglich
annahrn. Wenn dem nicht so ist, so muesste das
Fehlende nur durch eine Art Erfahrung gezeicht
werden, und das halte ich fuer ausgeschlossen.
2
Throughout the Notebooks
, Wittgenstein affirms again
and again that everything is shown by the existence of
subject-predicate Saetze (but not of course subject-
predicate Saetze in a technical or Russellian sensei—
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Wittgenstein means the Saetze of our ordinary unanalyzed
language). Thus the analysis of the Saetze of language
is the sufficient tool for philosophy. Were there any-
thing not expressable in its Saetze . it would still have
to be made available to us through experience — but ex-
pel ience about which we would necessarily remain silent,
about which we could not speak. This he dismisses as
impossible. (He does not argue for its impossibility here,
or anywhere in his works until his arguments against pri-
vate language in the Philosophical Investigations . ^
)
But what are these Saetze ? To ask the same thing in
another way, how would one translate the German word
Satz 1 ' into English? Should it be rendered as "proposi-
tion" or as "sentence"? "Proposition", as it would be
used here, means "meaning of a sentence". As Quine de-
fines it, it is "the cognitive meaning of an eternal
sentence; that is, just as much of the meaning as affects
the truth value of the sentence and not its poetic quality
or its affective tone." Such sentence-meanings, what-
ever they may be or be held to be, are not sentences of
or in any language. Their whole raison d’etre would be
defeated by reducing them to the same kind of thing as
are sentences. So the question of whether to translate
"Satz" by "proposition" or by "sentence" comes to the
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question of whether one wishes to commit oneself to the
claim that Wittgenstein held that sentences and their
meanings both exist somehow independent of each other,
or the claim that he held that meanings do not exist
independently of sentences.
Some passages in the Notebooks seem to demand the
translation of "Satz" as "proposition” . Thus, e.g.,
"All dies setzt natuerlich schon die Existenz der ge-
saraten Satzwelt voraus . . ." 5 From this we get a pic-
ture of Saetze as abstract entities, existing indiffer-
ent to their use or disuse by man. The view implied in
this passage, in short, throws Wittgenstein open to all
the advantages and disadvantages which attend the assump
tion that there are propositions. It is of excellent
use when dealing with his logical theory and his work on
negation. Thus Anscombe, for whom this area of Wittgen-
stein's thought holds especial interest, uses "proposi-
tion" to translate "Satz".
On the other hand, certain passages in the Notebooks
seem to forbid such a translation, and demand that "Satz
be translated as "sentence", as Stenius has translated
it. Propositions are not bearers of meaning! they are
meanings. They do not gain meaning (or a different
meaning) from anything any mere mortal could do with
them. They always have the same meaning, no matter what
I
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sentence expresses them, no matter when or in what lan-
guage they are embodied. Such is not the case with
Wittgenstein* s "Saetze". A Satz has neither meaning nor
reference until employed by someone, until or unless a
key of interpretation (so to speak) is given with it.
Such a "key" is, or can be, very complicated i "Ein Satz'
wie
’ "dieser Sessel ist braun" scheint etwas enorm Kom-
pliziertes zu sagen . . is an early realization of
what he expresses more strongly ini "Die Abmachungen
unserer Sprache sind ausserordentlich kompliziert .
"
8
But however complicated, the key must be given.
Neither of these considerations is absolutely final,
partly because both English words are used as well in
totally different ways. Ultimately here as elsewhere
in translating one must choose between two sets of am-
biguities, and hope for the best. The English word
"sentence" seems to fit the majority of contexts better
than the word "proposition" { so, despite the problems
this translation raises with a statement of his logical
theory, I use it. The best that can be hoped for is that,
with frequent use, a sense that will approximate Wittgen-
stein's German meaning will develop.
Sentences, and with them spoken language, have thus
become the focal point of Wittgenstein's analysis. He
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has accomplished what Bergmann calls "the right linguis-
tic turn
t though he has done so in a way which is as
yet not clear, even to himself. He has at any rate left
Russell and the logical analysis of propositions behind,
but the fact that there is confusion and uncertainty as
to how to translate the word "Satz" demonstrates the lack
of clarity of this "right" turn. Nevertheless, language,
sentences, and through them language, have become the
center of philosophical analysis and have replaced extra-
linguistic propositions in importance.
ihe language which occupies Wittgenstein's attention
in the Notebooks is written language, and he makes little
or no explicit attempt to extend his treatment to spoken
language. We have already noted that his "right linguis-
tic turn" presupposes that an analysis of language will
suffice to solve philosophical problems, and that Witt-
genstein himself does not argue directly for this pre-
supposition's truth. A parallel lack occurs here, for
he never tries to justify the position that written
language can represent every state of affairs, and so
serve as the model for language in general. He is aware
that this claim underlies his method, for he writes
explicitly,
Man kann sagen, wir haben ja nicht die Gewissheit,
dass wir alle Sachverhalte in Bildcrn aufs Papier
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brmgen koennen, wohl aber die Gewissheit. dasswir alle logische Eigenschaften der Sachverhaltem einer zweidimensionalen Schrift abbilden
koennen. 1U
By the end of the Notebooks he had already begun to feel
the need to justify this assumption? in the Tractatus
he again gives at least one indirect argument for it,
based on the nature of the picture theory of language.
Even there, however, he seems unaware that a proof that
language can represent all states of affairs does not
thereby demonstrate that any given language can or does.
The pivotal position of written language remains unjus-
tified.
The symbols ( Zeichen ) or "words" of a language lead
a dual life. On the one hand, they are themselves inde-
pendent things with their own characteristics. On the
other hand, they can and often do refer; in doing so
they are unlike other things and dependent on something
extraneous to themselves.
The traits which symbols have on their own are of
two types. They have incidental traits, such as that
*x* has no occurence in a word on this page, or that
'p' is used by some people to represent the sound for
which others use
‘ly' .
The only linguistic significance11
Wittgenstein attributes to this kind of characteristic
is that it has no significance at all.
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groups of symbols, however, possess a set of
characteristics which come from the fact that these sym-
bols are part of an actual language. That means that
the symbols are governed by definite rules of syntax,
and may thus oe said to have syntactical characteristics.
For Wittgenstein, the most important unit of language is
a sentence (as the most important unit of the actual
world is a fact). The sentence, he remarks, "konstru-
iert eine Welt mit Hilfe seines logischen Geruestes . , . M^
The kind of world which the sentence constructs (or better,
designs) is independent of any success or failure of the
referring function of the words? indeed, words which we
know do not refer are nevertheless fully capable of hel-
ping to design it. For the sentences themselves are a
complex situation, as a model airplane is a sort of com-
plex plane; taken together the set of sentences forms a
model world. Each sentence fits into the scheme of
things in the sentence-world, even without further analy-
sis. Just as, in the world experienced by man, there
can be no unique experience wholly different from any
other, so in the world designed by sentences, the sen-
tence-world, there can be no sentence of a unique, wholly
different type. This Wittgenstein expresses by saying
that there is a general form for sentences! that there
is such a form " sagt nichts anderes alsi Jedo moegliche
Satzform muss sich voraussehon LASSEN. The parallel
between the sentence-world and the actual world is com-
plete, for Wittgenstein justifies his confidence that
there is a general form for sentences with the claim
that, if not, "das wuerde heissen, dass wir eine neue
Erfahrung gemacht haetten, die erst dieser Satzform er~
moeglicht hat." 1^
The nature of the model world designed by sentences
depends largely on the caprice of the person who is
using the sentences. Like logic, however, it is the
case that "die Sprache fuer sich selbst sorgt",'1'^ That
language must "care for itself" is another theme which
does not fully mature in Wittgenstein's work until the
Philosophical Investigations . By it he does not mean
that sentences (the elements of language) are somehow
complete in themselves, i.e., that they are propositions
which have (bear) meaning eternally, with or without
human meddling. People give sentences meaning, even
where there was perhaps none before j
Frege sagtj jeder rechtmaessig gebildeter Satz
muss einen Sinn haben, und ich sagei jeder
moegliche Satz ist rechtmaessig gebildet, und
wenn er keinen Sinn hat, so kann das nur daran
liegen dass wir einigen seiner Bestandteilen
keine Bedeutung gegeben habep. Wenn wir auch
glauben, es getan zu haben.
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Wittgenstein maintains here (and in the Tractatus )





by forming an ill-formed sentence,
even though it seems we can. All that can happen is
that we fail to give meaning to the elements of the sen-
tence, Eli or in language is possible only through human
incompetence — or, rather, through ceasing to speak a
language at all.
What Wittgenstein did mean by claiming that language
too must care for itself is brought out especially clear-
ly by one of his comments on definitions. "Die Defini-
tion ist eine Tautologie und zeigt interne Relationen •
zwischen ihren beidern Gliedern.
"
17 Each sentence has
its own unique logical characteristics. To define one
sentence is to replace it by another, where the logical
traits of the second are supposedly more clear than those
of the first (most often, more clear because more expli-
citly articulated). In addition to clarifying, the de-
finition presents us with a tautology. Wittgenstein
offered a now famous definition of tautologies in the
Tractatus
, as empty propositions, propositions which,
characterizing all the universe, characterize no parti-
cular part of it (4.46 - 4.461 and 2.0122). Here, how-
ever, he relies on another definition of ’'tautology 8',
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one which is independent of the concerns of logic, A
tautology here is any statement of the subject-predi-
cate form, where both subject and predicate share the
same specific logical form, 18 On Wittgenstein's view,
definitions can occur only between sentences i "There
exists a bachelor" means (is defined as) "There exists
an unmarried male". Here, Wittgenstein would claim,
There exists a bachelor" has the same specific logi-
cal form as "There exists an unmarried male", and so the
latter is a definition of the former. We do speak of
defining words; ultimately, however, it is the word in
the context of a sentence which is given meaning through
definition. The sentence, i.e., is defined by giving
the word clear (articulated) meaning in that context.
Wittgenstein clearly realises one consequence of
his theory of definitions. Language is strictly inde-
pendent of the world; definitions occur only in language.
Hence ostensive definitions are merely ostensible defin-
itions, Under certain conditions one can be driven to
an ostensive definition, 1 ^ but this is not a real defin-
ition, If it were — if the sequence of definitions
could or would need to end in an ostensive definition
then meaning would depend on truth, i.e., one sentence's
meaning would depend upon another sentence's having
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successful reference to the actual world. But as he
often points out, even false sentences, sentences which
fail across the board to have reference, have meaning.
Thus meaning cannot be reduced to any reference which
can fail or succeed, and the phrase of traditional
grammar, ""ein Wort bezieht sich auf ein anderes ,# wird
hier beleuchtet ". 20 The words of a definition are
bound to other words, not to things in the world.
Our examination of the sentence-world has brought
out two important traits it has. The first is that it
is independent of that to which its sentences refer*
success or failure in referring, or even lack of intent
to refer, does not affect the facts of this world, the
sentences, at all. Likewise, of course, it is indepen-
dent of the world of objects or things, that is, it can
and does have meaning without them. In this respect it
is like logic and must care for itself. But, secondly,
we have seen that the sentence-world is not independent
of man, of language speakers. Man is a created being
in the world of objects, and therefore, Wittgenstein
notes, subject to the feeling of the presence of an alien
and more powerful will. But he is a creator of the sen-
tence-world? he sets up the (syntactic) rules of that
world and can do with them as he pleases. The sentence-
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world, in other words, is dependent on man, but only
on man,
Wittgenstein's -right linguistic turn" thus helps
him escape the difficulty he felt at the very beginning
of the Notebooks. Logic and its problems cease to be
of central philosophical importance for him. Language
takes its place ~ language which, while independent of
the world, depends still on man to use it, and is there-
fore amenable to philosophical analysis.
If Wittgenstein were interested solely in linguistics,
or even linguistics and epistemological problems, he
could have stopped here. He was not. He also, even
principally, held that the questions of metaphysics are
important. Since metaphysics asks questions about the
world, and yet language is independent of the world, a
major problem recurs again herei what method can one
use in philosophy to answer metaphysical questions? By
what method can one justify a move from language to the
independent world of things?
With that question we once again run afoul of Russell
and his philosophical method, for the obvious way to do
so, to one acquainted with the philosophy of the early
twentieth century, would be analysis, either of the form
Moore gave it or in that of Russell. And indeed, it had
.
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already enjoyed what appeared to be considerable success
at the hands of both these philosophers. Yet we have
already seen that, despite its successes in their works,
Wittgenstein was dissatisfied with the tool, and felt
the need to revise it. He was nevertheless impressed
by it, and did not want simply to reject it out of hand.
Analysis could be saved, he felt, if it could be correc-
ted so as to fulfill two requirements. It must not be
allowed to overstep the boundaries of what can justifi-
ably be done in philosophy, and it must show clearly the
necessary connections amongst the things which are ana-
lyzed (in his version, these are sentences, of course).
One type of analysis fulfills both these require-
ments. "Es ist doch klar, dass Bestandteile unserer
Saetze durch Definitionen zerlegt werden koennen und
muessen .... Jedenfalls gibt es also einen Prozess
21
der Analyse . *' ‘ Here, in the underlined sentence, Witt-
genstein finally achieves a clear view of the method
which sustained his work through the Tractatus . Analy-
sis by definitions stays, as we have seen, completely
within the realm of language, so it cannot confuse or
overstep the boundaries of what can justifiably be done
in philosophy, as Russell does in applying logical ana-
lysis to the world. And definitions are tautologies,
4 ?.
each side of which (the definiendum and the definiens)
has the same logical form. In this way the necessity
of the connections between the two parts is preserved.
So Wittgenstein does not feel impelled to give up analy-
sis as a philosophical method. He simply learns and
takes much from Russell and Moore, but also excludes
much from each, replacing it by his own original method.
Wittgenstein's method shows further traits which, if
not absolutely unique to him, were certainly used in his
own way. The first of these is that, though definitions
must always be tautologous
,
the definiens must be more
complex than the definiendum. That is, the "zerlegte
Satz redet von mehr als aer unzerlegte" . The require-
ment is of course necessary in order to account for the
clarity gained in definitions. A difficulty with it
arises from Wittgenstein's claim that the subject and
predicate of a definition share the same specific logi-
cal form (see above). A full solution to the problem
must await our discussion of internal relations (Part II,
Chapter IV), but a sketch of it can be offered here.
Following Russell, Wittgenstein would hold that any un-
analyzed term or phrase would have a hidden logical form
which analysis can bring out. The subject of a definition
is unanalyzed (or not fully analyzed)! it thus has a
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more complex form than it shows. The predicate simply
shows that form explicitly (or, more explicitly).
A full analysis of the second of these traits must
also wait, for it involves us in problems of reference.
Briefly, howeveri "Zerlegung"
, analysis, cannot be end-
lessly complex. It must stop somewhere, or we could
not use it. When the process stops, we are left with
simple sentences, which are themselves composed of ele-
ments (words). It has been argued that, at least for
the Tractatus , these simple sentences are comprised of
nothing but names in immediate conjunction with each
other. And one could argue that late in the Notebooks ,
at least, Wittgenstein ought to have taken a similar
position. He does not do sos instead he introduces an
entirely original element, one not found in any other
theory. He claims that sentences-analysis leads to an
"Urbild" which "ist dann wirklich kein Satz (hat aber die
. 24Gestalt ernes Satzes)", The Urbild (as Anscombe trans-
lates it, the protopicture) appears in the analyzed sen-
tence as unanalyzed. Even though it appears in the an-
alyzed sentence in an unanalyzed form (and is therefore
strictly unanalyzable ) , it must have some structure.
That Wittgenstein held the Urbi ld to have structure is
shown by his debate over whether it is the Urbilder or
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the sentences themselves which actually picture facts.
In order to picture facts, the pictures must, he claims,
have some structure. If, therefore, he can even con-
sider Urbilder , racher than sentences, as the real pic-
tures, he must be thinking of them as complex. This is
also why he claims that they have the form of a sentence
even though they are not sentences.
All this still leaves Wittgenstein far from the
central philosophical goal towards which his thought is
aiming? the metaphysical analysis of what there is.
He is still faced with the problem of what there is.
He is still faced with the problem of the move from lan-
guage (sentences or proto-pictures) to objects or the
actual world. In the Tractatus
, of course, he handled
this problem in large part through the famous, if not
infamous, picture theory. There is some development of
it in the Notebooks
, too, but far from the detailed ex-
position allotted to it in the later work. Rather than
trying to piece together the bits of what is obviously
an as yet undeveloped sketch, I shall develop several
claims which give us the foundations for the picture
theory -- a proto-picture-theory, the theory Wittgen-
stein works with in his Notebooks. He holds that each
meaningful sentence has a Bedeutung , which we may
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translate as reference or referent. 2 -^ Between the
sentence and its referent there is a logical identity
of form, though the referent may be and normally is
more complex than the sentence. In addition, a meaning-
ful sentence may also successfully (or unsuccessfully)
refer to the real world, to what actually exists. When
the logical form of the sentence matches the logical
form of some portion of the real world (Wittgenstein
says, when it "besteht" ), the sentence is said to be
true. When, although the speaker intends for there to
be such a match, there is none, the sentence is said to
be false.
Before substantiating my claim that this is indeed
Wittgenstein * s position, let me present two reasons in
favor of his maintaining so complex a theory of the re-
lation between language and reality. The first is lin-
guistic. There are many groups of words, phrases or
subordinate clauses, which one calls, in perfectly or-
dinary German, "Saetze", which nevertheless do not
have independent meaning. We today might not be willing
to glorify them with the name of "sentence", certainly
not in English. Wittgenstein had no such scruples.
One normally would have called them "Satz"
,
so he did.
Such Saetze as "While John was washing clothes" or
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"Although Mary can press 350 lbs." do have meaning,
though they are misused when uttered alone. They can-
not be said to picture the world when used without a
principal clause, it is a reference the Satz has whether
or not it obtains ( besteht ) in the world, and can thus
picture it. When completed it may also have another
reference, this to the actual (bestehende) world, gained
without losing the first.
Furthermore, a perfectly ordinary sentence can have
two or more different meanings depending on how its user
uses it. For example, "Every man loves his wife" can be
taken to mean that someone has a wife whom every man
loves, or that each man loves his own wife. Either of
the meanings is fully intelligible by itself without
connection with the real worlds what it refers to is
complete in either case, even though the reference to
the actual world may either be intended and present, in-
tended but absent, or neither intended nor present. It
too can be gained, without loss of the original reference.
In any case, many sentences do manage to refer to
the world. There are, to put it another way, true sen-
tences. And in the account the Notebooks gives us, it
is not the sentence alone which refers, but the sentence
along with its meaning which finally refers to the world
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and is true or false, 2 '’ So meaning is a function of
reference! the meaning of a sentence is its referent.
But this does not mean that the meaning of a sentence
is the world, or that part of the actual world to which
it might refer (which, so far, is simply that which
makes a sentence true or false). Whatever the refer-
ence of a sentence is, it must be separate from the
world, in order to preserve the ability of a sentence
to mean without being true.
So the next section will have a relatively straight-
forward task, I shall show first that Wittgenstein
actually does hold in the N ot ebooks that the meaning
of a sentence is its reference. Then I shall show that
"reference" has at least two distinct meanings for Witt-
genstein. Reference^ has nothing to do with the actual
world (even though it is the reference of the sentence).
Reference^ is the reference of the sentence to the world,
the reference which makes the sentence true or false.
Interwoven with these two senses of "reference" is, of
course, the kernel of the picture theory, and I will
try to bring out, in passing, how the earlier leads to
the later. Then in conclusion I shall discuss the
nature of reference in general, or that which both
reference-^ and reference^ have in common, which allows
53 .
them both to be significantly seen as varieties of the
same action or process. This will then give us a fairly
complete view of what I have called the proto-picture-
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FROM LANGUAGE TO REALITY
does seern to present a theory of
reference. Wittgenstein distinguished between 'Sinn*
and 'Bedeutung' ('sense* and 'reference', respectively)
in that work, following Frege though modifying the lat-
ter's v/ork to fit better with his ovm approach. As
Anscombe comments*
Wittgenstein follows Frege in the use of the
words ^Bedeutung* and 'bedeuten*. Generally
in the Tractatus
, they ought not to be ren-
dered ... by ‘'meaning* and 'mean*, but
rather . by ‘reference* and 'stand for*. Witt-
genstein's conception of sense may be called
the same as Frege's, if we are careful to add
that Wittgenstein had different theses about
• its for he held that names had no sense but
only reference, and propositions no reference
but only sense i and also that propositions
could not have sense without being either true
or false. Further he uses the sense of ‘dir-
ection* that is contained in the word 'sense', , , M ,
A careful reading of the Tractatus shows Anscombe to
be correct, in general* he does indeed limit ' Bedeutung '
and ' bedeuten * (and their derivatives) to names — with
two very important exceptions. 'Sinn' and its derivatives
are limited to sentences (Anscombe called them 'proposi-
tions'). If one assumes, as I do, that the Notebooks and
the Tractatus do not contradict each other on this point,
such usage in the later work throws the entire purport
58 .
of this chapter into question. For here I propose to
show that, in the Notebooks, Wittgenstein held that the
meaning of a sentence is its reference or Bedeutung :
while in the Tractatus sentences cannot have Bedeutung .
but are limited to Sj-nn, sense.
Wittgenstein* s usage of the word 1 Bedeutung * in
the Tractatus is not as straightforward as Anscombe makes
it seem, however. If we translate it as 'reference' (and
in general I agree with her in doing so), we must be
aware that the term is a technical one of Wittgenstein's
philosophy, and by no means the same as * Bedeutung ' in
common German or ’reference* in common English. The
'
mere fact that Wittgenstein so consistently restricts
his use of the word to names should alone make this clear,
for the normal usage in neither language is so restricted
(i.e., one can properly ask, "Was bedeutet dieser Satz"
or "What does this sentence refer to"). There is another




and their derivatives. They occur 54 times in the Trac -
tatus ; of these only 8, or 14.8% are uses of ’ bedeuten *
and its derivatives (i.e., verbs or verbal forms). In-
stead of saying of a word that it refers to something
( * es bedeutet * ) , he constantly uses the expression, 'it
has reference’, ' es hat Bedeutung * . While there is
•59.
nothing grammatically incorrect about this, it is odd,
and should again warn the reader that he is using the’
word in a technical manner. A third, final, indication
that the words do not mean the same as their ordinary
language counterparts comes in the two exceptions to
the general rule that 'Eedeutunp 1 is correlated with
names alone. In 5.6 Wittgenstein writes, "Die Grenzen
g&rache bedeuten die Grenzen meiner Welt". Not
only is the correlation of ' bedeuten 1 here not (at
least not obviously) with names, but it would be most
strange to translate the passage as "The limits of my
language refer to the limits of my world". Limits, or
boundaries, do not after all refer to anything, words,
perhaps, or sentences or people can refer, but not
limits. 'Bedeuten* here is better read another way (as
also in 5 . 62 , which is a similar statement).
So we can use ‘reference* as a translation for
'Bedeutung* only if we so to speak flag it as a terminus
technicus of Wittgenstein* s philosophy (and the same
holds of course for * bedeuten * and all derivatives of
the two words) , It might even be preferable to drop
the term entirely
, and thus avoid any misinterpretations
which may result from confusing the technical with the
non-technical senses of the words. For the Tractatus
6o.
despite its agreement by and large with the Notebooks ,
does not develop a theory of reference, at least not in
any traditional sense,
Wittgenstein is prevented from developing anything
like a traditional theory of reference by considerations
we have already seen, His first insight was that logic
must take care of itself, and therefore cannot become
entwined in philosophical issues. We have also just
seen that he maintains that language too must care for,
itself i that is, language must somehow function inde-
pendently of what is or is not the case. The independence
of language, like that of logic, is an ontological inde-
pendence, and is shown clearly by our ability to know
what a sentence means without knowing whether it is true
or false » "We assume t £ is NOT the case* what then
does it mean to say, "it is good, that p"? We can quite
obviously say the state-of-affairs p is good, without
knowing whether "p" is true or false ." 2 A little later,
his language strongly implies not only that our know-
ledge of the truth-value of the sentence, but even the
actual truth-value itself, is irrelevant for its being
a meaningful sentence* "The sentence designs (konstru-
_iert) a world with the help of its logical framework,
and that is how one can see in the sentence, how everything
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logical would be, if it were true, one can draw conclu-
sions from a false sentence, etc ." 3 In brief, the inde-
pendence of language means the independence of meaning
from truth or falsity, i.e., the independence of lan-
guage from things in the world. This is why, in his
final and most consistent presentation of his theory (in
the Iraptatus ) > the picture theory replaces anything
like a theory of reference.
But although the picture theory stands proxy for a
more ordinary theory of reference in the later work, the
where Wittgenstein's thought is still develop-
ing and changing, gives us a different view. In the
earlier work he still tries to approach the problem as
one of reference, even at times speaking of the refer-
ence (Bedeutung ) of sentences: "That the sentence is a
logical picture of its meaning ( Bedeutung ) is obvious to
the unbiased eye."^ The importance of the theory of
reference, very great at first, is progressively lessened
as he pruned it to take the shape the rest of his theory
requires it to take, but he still feels the need to
speak of it throughout these notebooks. The beginnings
of the picture theory are exactly what Wittgenstein's




That Wittgenstein actually intends that the meaning
of a sentence be its reference is shown by his use of
the word 'bedeut en' (and its derivatives). It also can
be shown by five arguments.
A
Consider the following passages from the Notebooks !
(i) Die triviale Tatsache, dass ein vollkommen
analysierter Satz ebensoviel Namen enthaelt als
seine Bedeutung Dinge ... .5
(ii) Man kann geradezu sagem statt, dieser
Sabz hat . diesen und diesen Sinm dieser Satz
stellt diesen und diesen Sachverhalt dar. b
(iii) Der Gegenstand, von welchem die allge-
. meinen Saetze handeln, ist recht eigentlich
die Welt.
7
Now, there are only two words which philosophical German
uses, or can use, for the English word 'meaning' — 'Be-
O
deutung * and ' Sinn ' . The first of these quotations
shows that ' Bedeutung ' is used in the sense of 'refer-
ence', the things to which the names in the sentence
refer being its Bedeutung . The second quotation shows
that ' Sinn ' is used similarly. For 'this sentence has
this sense* is said to be replaceable "right away" by,
'this sentence presents this state-of-affairs' j and
states-of-affairs
,




tatUS-’ consist of thi"es in conjunction with each
other. Hence no matter which term we see fit to use to
translate -meaning-
. the meaning of a sentence lies out-
side the sentence itself, in its reference.
One might still feel inclined to object to this in
a way which often disturbed Wittgenstein himself through-
out the Notebooks. It may be true for sentences which
purport to refer to individual objects that their mean-
ing is their reference - but what about sentences which
purport to be general, i.e., not to refer to individual
objects or states-of-affairs? The third quotation above
simply serves to remind us that even for general sen-
tences, the meaning lies outside the sentence in its
reference. In their case, as the quotation shows, the
reference is the world in general.
There is a direct argument for the identity of
meaning and reference, along the same lines, from later
in the Notebooks «
When I say, this watch is shiny, and that which
I intend by "this clock" changes the way it is
put together ( seine Zusammensetzung ) in the
slightest
, then not only the sense (Sinn) of
the sentence changes according to the content,
but also the statement about this watch also
changes its sense immediately. The entire
form of the sentence is changed.?
64 .
A little later he adds* "It is thus clear to the un-
biased mind, that the sense ( Sinn ) of the sentence, "the
watch is lying on the table" is more complicated than
the sentence itself". 10 While it is unquestionable
that the Bedeutung either of a sentence or of words
lies oucside the sentence or words, these two quotations
show the same for Sinn even late in the N otebooks . The
second shows also that the Sinn of a sentence is more
complex than the sentence itself, and must be indepen-
dent of it. The first quotation then links the Sinn
directly to the meant object ("that which I intend by
"this clock""), claiming that as the reference to that
object changes, so does the Sinn
, and as the Sinn changes,
so does the entire form of the sentence. As soon, in
other words, as the reference of a sentence changes,
absolutely nothing in it, not even its form, remains
the same (compare Tractatus 2,021 and 2.023).
C
We can derive a third argument from a problem which
puzzled Wittgenstein throughout the Notebooks i "A pic-
ture can present relations which do not exist!!! How is
this possible?"
11 Why does this seem a problem to him?
Surely there is no mystery about how a picture can
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can
"present relations which do not exist" — the artist
paint them, the writer tell about them - even the photo-
grapher, by pasting together two pictures of what does
exist, can present a relation, a connection between them,
which does not in fact exist.
In all these cases, the picture can do so because
all it presents is simply itself. Its meaning (insofar
as one can speak of the meaning of an art work) is inde-
pendent of its having any actual reference. If the same
were true of sentences, in Wittgenstein' s theory, there
should have been no difficulty. Nevertheless it is an
obvious problem for him. That can only be because the
meaning of the sentence lies outside it, as its reference.
To present relations" entails having those relations
exist — but then they cannot not exist.
In fact two problems which occupied an overwhelming
amount of Wittgenstein' s time and interest can be traced
directly to this identification of meaning with reference.
These are the questions of the nature of negation and of
false sentences. Negation becomes a problem for him this
way. If meaning is reference, then what is referred to
by a negated assertion (and thereby said not to exist)
obviously somehow must exist if the sentence is meaning-
ful. Falsity is a problem for much the same reason.
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If meaning is reference, then if the false sentence is
meaningful, it must have a reference. Yet this, on
Wittgenstein's theory, is forbidden, sentences are
false when and only when they have no reference. As
we shall see below (Section IIA), his theory of negation,
coupled with his concern with the referent of a sentence,
is instrumental in his affirmation of the existence of
negative facts.
D
We can demonstrate a weaker point, too, about sen-
tences and reference, namely that, (1) an appropriate
reieience is a sufficient condition for meaningfulness
of a sentence
,
and (2) reference is a necessary condition
for meaning.
(1) That an appropriate reference is a sufficient
condition for a sentence's having meaning follows from
comments Wittgenstein makes about how sentences get
their meaning. The earliest passages about this are*
A possible sign must also be capable of sig-
nifying. Everything that is possible at all
is also legitimate. Let us remember the ex-
planation why "Socrates is Plato" is nonsense.
That is, because we have not made an arbitrary
specification, NOT 'because a sign is, shall we
say, illegitimate in itself, 13
Frege says: Every well-formed sentence must
make sense; and I sayj Every possible
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sentence is well-formed, and if it does not
make sense that can only come of our not
having given any meaning to certain of its ,
,
par us. Even when we believe we have done so, " '
(ihese two passages are reflected in Tractatus 5.^73 and
5 .^733 , respectively.) Since, in order to give a possibly
meaningful but i actually meaningless sentence meaning,
all we must do is to correlate the referenceless elements
with some "arbitrary specification", reference is a suf-
ficient condition of meaningfulness.
(2) That reference is a necessary condition of
meaningfulness can be seen by examining Wittgenstein’
s
conception of the task of a sentence. "In the sentence
we put together things -- so to speak — as an experi-
ment, as, however, they do not need to be related in
reality . . . This we can do "only because objects
are arbitrarily coordinated with its elements”. 1 ^ These
two quotations speak of sentences prior to a discussion
of their meaningfulness, truth, or reference. They des-
cribe simply what it is to be a sentence, and show that
that requires having a reference. So a necessary con-
dition of being a sentence is having a reference.
E
Not only language and linguistic concerns offer us
evidence of Wittgenstein's identification of meaning
•68 .
with reference. We can also see the position from the
role he ascribes to philosophy, the way philosophy is
supposed to fill the role it is to play. We have seen
that he rejects both Russell’s and Moore's methods of
doing philosophy, but that he still clings to some ver-
sion -- his own of analysis. This begins with analy-
sis through definitions. In order for this kind of
analysis to achieve its goals, he claims, "the chain of
definitions must indeed once have an end. 1,1 ^ Where must
analysis finally "have an end"? "Analysis makes the
sentence more complicated than it was; but can and may
not make it more complicated than its meaning ( Bedeutung )
was to start with. When the sentence is as complex as
its meaning ( Bedeutung ) . then it is entirely analyzed." 18
Philosophical analysis, in this version of it, presupposes
as an end, that poiiiu at which the sentence fully reflects
its meaning ( Bedeutung ) by being just as complex as it,
and no more so. That, of course, entails that meaning
be something independent of the sentence, which the sen-
tence can match more closely, less closely, or not at
all, in complexity.
II
The work in which Wittgenstein is involved in the
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Notebook s is predicated on the belief that the meaning
of a sentence is its referent. Yet that belief, like
his original insight into the nature of logic, was more
problem than solution to him. We have already glanced
at three of the issues it raised, how can negation or
denial operate, how can a sentence be false and yet
meaningful, and how can a sentence represent relations
which do not exist. Close to the last two was yet another
question. Meaning must be independent of truth and fal-
sity, yet how can it be, since meaningfulness is refer-
ence? Reconciling the independence of cleaning with the
referential view of meaning he held proved a challenging
task, one which he did not complete until the final1^
version we have of the Tractatus .
The beginnings of the reconciliation do appear in
the Notebooks
, of course. They take the form' of a dis-
tinction between two types of reference which a sentence
may, or perhaps must, have. Every meaningful sentence
certainly must have one reference, which I call "refer-
ence-^’
,
which serves as its meaning. Perhaps every sen-
tence, but certainly every actually true or false sentence,
must have another reference, "reference^" . This second
reference, which is to the actual world, is what makes
the sentence true or false. It is independent of the
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first reference.
In this section I shall examine reference^ The
examination falls into three main divisions. The first
shows that there is such a thing as the reference of a
sentence which nevertheless is not a part of the actual
world. In the second 1 examine the development this
reference undergoes in Wittgenstein's thought. Here I
concentrate on two changes which took place in the Note-
books. The first chronicles the change in ontological
status of negative facts, the second the changes in the
ontological status of reference^^ itself,- then, in the
third section, I examine briefly the idea, from late in
the Notebooks, that the world is somehow uniquely my own
world, 1 here I point out that his idea is simply a
straightforward development of his earlier thought on
reference
.
I must make two warnings before I begin. Wittgen-
stein does mention the picture theory in these notebooks,
and even develops it to some degree. In the subsequent
discussion (particularly in the first part) it may often
seem clear that what is actually being discussed is that
theory, and that I am needlessly muddying the waters by
not directly saying so. In fact that is not the case.
As 1 remarked earlier, the picture theory is not fully
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developed until the Tractates. What we will see developed
in the Notebooks
, is a proto-picture-theory, a line of
thought which will later culminate in the picture theory,
but is not yet that far advanced.
Furthermore, clarity of presentation forces me to
oversimplify a little as I present this theory. I com-
pensate for this principally in the second portion of
Section B. There, after we have first developed the
rudiments of the theory, we have a chance to stand back
and look at it from Wittgenstein's point of view, to see
what he felt needed to be done with it.
A
.Exploring the function or role of a sentence led us
to the conclusion that meaning is reference. It leads
also to the conclusion that meaning is a reference that
is independent of the actual world. Three quotations
from the Notebooks will make that quite clear.
(1) In the sentence a world is put together experimen-
tally. " 21
(2) "In the sentence we put together things — so to
speak -- as an experiment, as they however do not have
to be related in reality." 22
(3) "The sentence designs a world with the help of its
logical framework .... •. 23
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Quotations (1) and (2) belong together^
the second developing the first. In the first „ittgen-
’
stein expresses the idea that in a sentence we put a
world together experimentally Thi<- wo a >y ‘ lnis e ao by putting
words Which stand for things together experimentally in
a way in which the things for which they stand need not
he. So we end up with two independent worlds, that put
together experimentally in the sentence, and the actual
world, which may or may not be different. Yet this so
far leaves the two worlds at least possibly connected in
this way, the elements of one (presumably, the actual
world) might be used to build the other. The total in-
dependence of one world from the other still needs to
be demonstrated.
The third quotation begins one demonstration of this.
From its central thought, that of designing a world, come’
three arguments for the independence of the referem^
from the actual world. The first of these is based on
the notion of designing (kqnstruieren ) . and shows only
a partial independence, though one greater than we have
yet seen,
Anscombe translated " koristruieren " as "constructs"
rather than designs". In fact it has a meaning midway





, an architect plans a house,
(to use Wittgenstein's vocabulary) con-
ducts a world, the house-plan. In doing so. by means
of the logical structure of those plans, he is at the
same time designing a house. There are then not two
separate acts involved here - making or constructing the
Plans, and then realizing that they do design a house,
ty doing one we do the other, it is, so to speak, one
act under two different descriptions. The same is true,
of course, for language. In linguistically constructing
a world we design a world - one act, two descriptions
Of it.
But if this is so, the design itself must be inde-
pendent of the designed. To deny this would be tanta-
mount to claiming that we construct a house in construc-
ting the design of the house. Thus the very notion of
design (Kon^truier^ Wittgenstein uses leads to the
conclusion that although the elements of the design and
the designed may perhaps be of the same world, the ele-
ments of the design are not the elements of that which
is designed. (This is strengthened by the realization
that our two-dimensional sentences design the three-
dimensional actual world.) And that the elements of
the design may — or perhaps even must — be part of the
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same world as that of the desip-n^n <sig ed is a position Witt-
genstein held even in the Tractatue (see 4.03ll, and
2.141 pius 3 , 3.14). Nevertheless they equally well
*ust be part of something different, in Wittgenstein’s
terminology, a different world.
A fourth quotation, however, gives us sufficient
grounds to claim that reference.,. must be of a totally
different type from the actual world. (4) ..The sentence
is coordinated with a hypothetical state-of-affairs.
This state- of-affairs is given through its description." 24
The problems here stem from the fact that, as the last
section showed, the sentence is correlated with some-
'
thing, its reference, as its meaning. Here Wittgenstein
explicitly tells us that this reference is not an actual
but a possible ("hypothetical") state-of-affairs. What
exists in the actual world exists actually, not hypo-
thetically, but the reference of the sentence is a hypo-
thetical state-of-affairs. Wittgenstein then reinforces
what he has said by telling us that we do not experience
this state-of-affairs. It is given to us through its
description — through the sentence.
Our conclusion then is that Wittgenstein* s theory
of what is involved in designing or modelling the world
shows that he postulated the existence of a world inde-
pendent of the actual, experienced world. This world,
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which wc construct in constructing the reference of our
sentences, is coordinated with them, not to make them
true or false, but simply to make them meaningful. Argu
ments based on two other considerations lead us as well
to the total independence of reference from the actual
world.
The first of these is the relation Wittgenstein
posits between meaningfulness on the one hand and truth
and falsity on the other. He develops three arguments
on this basis. The first (which appears also in the
Tractabus) begins with what he claims to be the prere-
quisites for being able to say anything at all. "in or-
der to be able to make any statement at all, we must —
in one sense -- know how it would be if the statement is
true (and this is precisely what we portray (copy, ab-
hi_ld^n) . " Wittgenstein points out three things which
are necessary to make any statement at all. The first
is a sentence, the second the thing which we represent
(copy or portray, abbilden ) . i.e., the state of affairs
which exists if the statement is true. The third, of
course, is that we need to be able to understand the
second adequately, i.e,
,
to really be able to compare it
with the actual world. If we deny that reference is
independent of the actual world, we are forced to admit
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one of two things. We might he forced to admit that
the referent is identical with the actual world - but
then we are simply saying that all sentences must be
true, if they have any reference at all. This> as we
saw in the immediately preceding section, Wittgenstein
rejects. Or we might be forced to claim that there sim-
ply is nothing literally to compare with the actual world
as this quotation requires us to. Either way we violate
what Wittgenstein himself says here (and often elsewhere
in the Notebooks - e.g., "it is clear that the most
exact examination of the sentence-sign can not yield
what it expresses - but indeed, what it can express .") 26
The second argument on this basis stems from Witt-
genstein's use of 'Sinn’ and ' Bedeutung ' . the two words
he uses for 'meaning'. Both, we have seen, mean also
'reference'. If they mean reference to the actual world,
however, Wittgenstein would be forced to admit some un-
desirable conclusions. He would be forced to conclude
that a sentence has meaning if and only if it is true
(but he explicitly rejects this). And he would be forced
into the position that the truth-value of a sentence is
prior to its having meaning -- another conclusion he
explicitly rejects, Meaningfulness is independent of
truth or falsity, and since meaning is reference, so is
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reference independent of what actually is the case
.
ThE ar§Ument 1 WU1 S-e to buttress my conclu .
sion that, for Wittpenstc i n >,Q -r
' • -Terence is independent of
the actual world, is b
™
* ased on the nature of philosophical
(Wxttgensteinian) analysis. I have argued that meaning
must be reference for him because as the meant object
changes
, so changes (and must change) the entire form
of the sentence. In the following passage he clearly
separates the meant object from the actual object (in
terms of the example to follow, the watch as I mean it
from the watch actually on the table )
,









? '+ V Wheel whioh is in the watch,not m the storage room, for perhaus I din
, not know at all, that a wheel was in the
~
"this ’watch" °a
ld thT al?° not have meant ^
occwsTt?
coraplex
- m which the wheel “
In other words, whatever object I mean (one is tempted
to say, intend) may well not be like the object in the
actual world which it is assumed to resemble, for I may
not know the latter well enough to mean (intend) the
necessary parts. This does not change the fact that the
intended object is the reference of the sentence, there-
fore the meaning. Nor does it change the fact that that
meaning is and must be complete, i.e., bestimmt . sharp
or definite. It simply implies that, for Wittgenstein,
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there is a realm of meant or intends • ,ended objects between
e sentence and the actual world.
B
This talk, m the last paragraph, of intensional
objects, a meant world of hypothetical states-of-affairs,
reaches beyond safe limits, however. Wittgenstein did
content with his theory in such a simplistically
Platonic form. It changed perceptibly, and its change
03,1 ^ S6en in thS IMobooks by observing Wittgenstein's
development of two problems, that of negative facts,
and that of the relation between sentences and reference
.
The former occupied his mind for a while but had defin-
1
itely ceased to bother him by the Bemerkunaen (traces of
it, mainly terminological, remain in the Tractatus ). The
latter did not come to a conclusion which really satis-
fied him until he worked out the philosophy of his last
period. Still, his struggles with it in the Notebooks
are themselves very interesting, and it is on their
basis that his method in his last period is developed.
1. Wittgenstein's belief that meaning is reference.^
early made negative facts attractive to him. Though he
himself gave no reasons for asserting their existence,
one can easily see why he would do so. A straightforward
79 .
or affirmative sentence refers to a straightforward fact
A sentence which contains a negation then would seem to
refer to a fact which contains a negation - a negative
fact (this fits in with his earl* theory of logic, as,
e.g., "Roughljr speaking, before any sentence can make
sense at all the logical constants must have reference.
This is naturally very different from his later theory
of logic.)
..28
That he simply accepted the existence of such facts,
on an equal footing with regular or positive facts, is
shown in several places in the Notebooks
. He comments,
e.g.: "One could also present a negative fact in a pic-
ture, in presenting what is not the case." 29 Yet by the
time of the Tractatus nothing was left of this accep-
tance but the use of the words "negative Tatsache" (as
m 2.06). He had by then come to reject the existence
of a separate type of fact, negative facts, even though
he continued to use the term. His reasons for rejecting
them form one of the clearest examples of the develop-
ment of his thought, and are of especial importance in
understanding how he treated his identification of
meaning with reference.
He has three reasons for rejecting the actual ex-
istence of negative facts. The first of them arises
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from his insight into the nature of logic. As we saw.
negative facts presuppose that the negation sign repre-
sents. a position which he first accepts and later re-
jects. as he realizes the inconsistency of it with the
insight that logic must fend for itself. The negation
sign does not represent, it has no reference. If a neg-
ative fact is really negative (and not just called that),
it must be a fact with negation, so to speak, built into
it. But this cannot be the case, if logical constants
do indeed not represent or have any reference. Thus
Wittgenstein’s commitment to the independence of logic
from ontological problems commits him to the denial of
negative facts.
•
One reason explicitly stated in the Notebooks sur-
vives into the Tractatus . His first statement of it isi
"In order for there to be the negative state-of-affairs
,
there must be the picture of the positive. Here, as
is apparent, he still accepts the existence of negative
facts, but what he is beginning to realize (and what
appears again in Tractatus 5.5151) is that he has no
reason for doing so. Everything one says, including
negative statements, is said using positive sentences
(or as in the passage above, positive pictures). To
that all we need to add is the negation sign, which does
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not represent. No new fact, or new kind of fact, is
needed at all, (But of course, Wittgenstein did not
reach this conclusion immediately. Three weeks later,
for example, he still accepts the existence of negative
facts, and is still bothered, albeit unclearly, by this
same argument against them, "Must the sign of the nega-
tive sentence be built with that of the positive? (I
thonk, yess'I) Why should one not be able to express the
negative proposition through a negative fact ?.'")^ 1
These two arguments are reinforced by an "insight"
into the way in which a sentence is constructed. He
expresses this perhaps most clearly ini "The feared
dualism between positive and negative does not exist,
for _(x)^x, etc,, etc. are neither positive nor nega-
tive, That is, according to this way of viewing sen-
tences, they are divided into two componentsi a) a
neutral central component which can be either affirmed
or denied; b) an affirmation or denial, i.e., an affirm-
ative or negative component.
This can perhaps best be clarified through an
example. Consider the sentence 1
(i) All knights wore shining armor.
Is it positive or negative? Neither, according to this
"insight"; it is neutral. (i) becomes positive when
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amr,”ed ’ negatiVe denied
. ** Prior to affirmation
or denial is neither. Thus,
_
(ll) U 15 indeed the oase that all knights wore
shining armor.
is positive and on the theory of the Notebooks has a
"positive fact" as its reference. Likewise,
(in) It is not the case that all knights wore
shining armor.
is negative. It can also be said to have a "negative
fact" for its meaning. But the claim would no longer
prove disturbing to Wittgenstein, for "negative fact"
has become merely a convenient way of speaking about a
fact (i.e., (i) ) , which in itself is neither positive
nor negative.
2. The struggle with negative facts ends by reduc-
ing Wittgenstein* s ontology sizeablyi one entire type
of fact, negative facts, is dismissed. The problem of
the relation between reference, and sentences, on the
other hand (see above, p. 77), even throws into ques-
tion the need he felt for a certain kind of positive
fact. In the course of his work in the Notebooks . Witt-
genstein periodically questioned the existence of that
kind of fact that made up reference^. As I pointed out,
he did not pursue this line of thought to its conclusion,
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but it is intriguing to examine where his work could
have led him.
At several points in the Notebooks, Wittgenstein
seems to speak as if sentences lack a reference,. That
is. he seems to claim that there is nothing which (a)
serves as the referent for sentences, (b) exists inde-
pendently both of sentences and of the world. At those
points where he seems to deny the existence of reference
however, he does not simply replace it with reference^
and leave the meaning-is-reference theory intact.
^
Rather, he joins reference, to the sentence itself, thus
in a way destroying the sense of the very theory with
'
which he had started. As he says at one such point,
Tins theory treats of sentences exclusively, so to
speak as their own world and not in connection with
that which they present. Although he does not ex-
plicitly reject reference, here (indeed he still seems
to be committed to it, since that which they present
(darstellen) would still have to be independent of what
makes the sentence true or false), he comes close to it.
For if sentences can be treated so radically "as their
own world”, there should be no need for the middle
realm of reference
JL
to give them meaning.
Wittgenstein even gives a clear indication of how
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the sentences would have (or gain) meaning under this
new theory. »The reality, which corresponds to the
sense of the sentence, can indeed not be anything else
hut its elements, for everything else indeed we do not
know." ' The sentence, then, must somehow be its own
meaning. This, of course, foreshadows thr* lui bn a e course Witt-
genstein took later, first in his Blue and Brown




as to one thread of continuity amongst all his
works, the slow development of meaning from referenee
1to the use of sentences alone.
.Be that as it may, neither the Tractatus nor the
Notebooks does more than merely hint at such a course.
In these earlier works the conclusion of his thought
was quite different. For both developed the position
Wittgenstein called "solipsistic" i the world is my
world alone. Indeed, most of the last 21 pages of the
Notebooks proper are devoted to an exposition of this
theme and its ramifications.
That the world is my world seems a very puzzling
thing for Wittgenstein to maintain, at first glance.
For one expects that what is my own is somehow subject
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to my own control, obedient to my own will or power.
Yet in the very passages where he presents his doctrine,
Wittgenstein stubbornly refuses to lose track of the
fact that the "world is independent of my will-,35 or>
as he puts it a little later, "the world is givln to
’
me, that is, my will approaches the world entirely from
outside, as something finished. "3 6 In view of these
passages and those like them, it seems clear that we
are the world’s, not the world ours: how does Wittgen-
stein manage to reverse things?
The clue lies in one of the most famous passages he
ever wrote. "Die Grenz en meiner Sprache bedeuten die
Grenzen meiner Welt. "37 The world which ig mine . g ^
world of my language — my sentences together with their
reference-^ their meanings. Another way to phrase this,
and a very important one is this. The world is mine,
insofar as I construct for it a plan, as I design ( kon-
struiLer^n) it. This I can do only in language. It is
reference^ which is most properly called my world, for
the actual world, which makes my sentences true or false,
is independent of me and therefore is not mine.
Perhaps the first question faced by any theory em-
bracing a non-actual world (or at least, non-actual ob-
jects) is "Where is it?" Plato of course faced this
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question, as far as we can tell without giving more than
a highly symbolic answer. Meinong did iargely the same>
Wittgenstein, perhaps alone in philosophy, provides an
explicit non-symbolic answer for it, one which he deve-
lops more in the Tractatus than in the Notebooks . Sen-
tences and the world of reference (so goes the limited
answer in the portion of his notebooks we have) are
found in logical space. "The logical framework around
the picture (of the sentence) determines the logical
space." 38 Any sentence must determine a place in logi-
cal space. -"In order for a statement to be possible,
the logical coordinates must really determine a logical
place , u ^9
• logical space is a complex one, which
I develop more fully when considering the Tractatus .
Here what we see is that it, like sentences themselves,
is made of two elements, one constituted by the sentence,
the other by logic. This is implied in the first pas-
sage quoted above, and more explicitly stated ini "What
the devil is this “logical place"? The sentence and the
logical coordinates, that is the logical place. in
logical space as a whole the sentence picks out coor-
dinates, creating a logical place. (Wittgenstein does
not explain what he means by these 'coordinates' in the
87 .
Notebooks, that too is left for the Tractatus
. ) S o my
world, the one governed by my sentences, is in some
Place in logical space, and it is the sentences (i.e.,
the meaningful sentences) which carry in themselves the
coordinates necessary to make up logical places.
Another question which always rears its ugly head
for abstract-object theorists is that of the relation
between the abstract world and the actual concrete world.
To this, too, Plato seems to have given no viable answer
at least if we trust Aristotle's criticism of the choris -
mos or gulf between the two realms. Wittgenstein, how-
ever, for whom the problem seems more complex to start’
with, did. The problem is more complex in his philosophy
because it is double. Not only must he relate the ab-
stract world to the actual one, but, within the abstract
world itself, he must relate one segment, sentences, to
a segment of a different type, reference^ Here again,
what he does in the Notebooks is somewhat different
from what he does in the Tractatus . And since the next
section, on referenceg, concerns relating meaningful
sentences to the actual world, I shall here briefly con-
cern myself only with the relation between sentences and
reference-.
,
His solution seems simple. Sentences are related
88
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' he l0gi ° al ider“tity of symbo i and symbolized
consists of this, that one may get no more and no less" the SyMb01 than in symbolized
.
De spite doubts
(Page 19. for example) and some changes (see also page
19) , this answer remains fundamentally the same through-
out Wittgenstein’s early works. The chorismos with which
Aristotle faulted Plato is avoided by the claim that the
sentence and its reference, are logically identical, in
some manner! that is, they have the same logical form
(as Wittgenstein puts it in the Tractatus)
. This does
not mean that a sentence and its meaning are, strictly
speaking, the same thing. As two things, a sentence and
its meaning are nevertheless in some way identical. In
what way? This remains a mystery in the Notebooks ,
though, as I shall show in Part II, Chapter V, Wittgen-
stein could answer the question.
III
Wittgenstein himself suspected that the nature of
truth and falsity was very closely related to his work
on reference^ or meaning: "In the sentence a world is
put together experimentally. (...) From that the




blind) '" HiS suspicion proved true. Just as meaning
is reference^ so the truth-value of a sentence is deter-
mined by reference - but a different reference, a refer-
ence to the external world. It is precisely the same
sort of relation as that obtaining between the sentence
and its reference^ The most important difference be-
tween the two is that in each case the objects to which
the sentence is related are different. The similarity
of the relations makes them easily confused, as Wittgen-
stein himself acknowledges. "We readily confuse the rep-
resenting relation which the proposition has to its refer
ence, and the truth relation. The former is different
for different propositions, the latter is one and the
same for all propositions."^ However such the former
may change while the latter are unable to, they remain
essentially the same kind of relation.
It would be useless repetition to show here that
the truth-relation is really different from reference^
the meaning-relation. We have seen this clearly sup-
ported in the section in which I established the exis-
tence of reference-^ The arguments lead Wittgenstein
to a conclusion which, by itself, sounds unexcitingi
"Truth is only the actual existence (Bestehen) of a
44relation." This is why, while the meaning relation
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changes from sentence to sentence, the truth-relation
stays the same for all sentences, and why, too, the truth
relation as it is in the Tr^ctatus is, in a sense, simple
and inexpressible. We can express any relation — but
the truth-relation is precisely not a different relation
from the one we express. It is a relation which we find
not only in our thought but actually in thw world as well
Another way of expressing this (one closer to Kant’s) is
that in saying of a relation that it is true, we add
nothing to it, change it in no way. If the problem of
truth should be stated asi what kind of relation do
true sentences have to the world that false ones lack,
then the problem of truth vanishes from the Notebooks .
;
We saw that Wittgenstein slowly moves away from the
theory that the meaning of a sentence is its reference,
though he does not complete the move until well after
he wrote the Trac tatus . Here we see a parallel move,
involving truth rather than meaning. Truth is no longer
any relation, not even that of correspondence. It is
the bestehen of a relation, of any relation* and the
bestehen of a relation is not a new relation.
So the first move Wittgenstein makes to avoid chor -
ismos between the abstract and the non-abstract — or,
in terms more suitable to Wittgenstein’s philosophy —
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between reference-, and reference i c h *1 It: e2 — s to deny that
they are different sorts of things, m a sense he even
denies that there is anything to be different, truth,
as a special relation, does not exist. The same rela-
tion, any relation, may be true (bestehend) or not (nieht
bestehend ) . But what is thic? i'c or,-^uXb xnis Bestehen emer Relation",
or actual existence of a relation? Is it not simply
another word or phrase under which the same old diffi-
culty, the same chorismos, subtly reoccurs? Does this
theory not leave the relation between our sentences and
that which makes them true quite as mysterious as it
was, giving only a surface appearance of clearing the •
mystery up?
,
It WOuld d0 Precisely that if Wittgenstein were
trying to smuggle in a new kind of relation under the
term bes_tehen. He is not* instead, the picture theory,
with its reliance on the notion of identity of logical
form between the referring and the referred to takes its
place. (And identity is not relational as far as Witt-
genstein is concerned.) Because the picture theory is
so prominant in the Tractatus . the temptation to think
that he is developing a theory of reference is less there
than in the N otebooks
. In the earlier work he is just
developing his theory and the terminology he needs to
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express it, his thought is cXo„r to a relation^ theory
of truth and confusion is easier. The first step of his
development is the conclusion that reference is not a
unique act or thing, hut that it is of the same type as
meaning. Instead of needing and developing both a theory
of reference and a theory of meaning, Wittgenstein relies
on the latter alone. The former is then replaced by his
answer to the question, What is it to mean truly? This
too conflicts with the theory that meaning is reference -
but is only resolved much later.
To the question, “What is it to mean truly?" Witt-
genstein might well reply as follows. To mean something
is to say something. What we say is the meaning of our
sentence. Thus saying (sagen, aussagen
, ausdruecken ) is
the linguistic presentation of the linguistic world (that
of reference^)
. But we accomplish more in or by saying
something than merely presenting an item from the lin-
guistic world (merely accomplishing a reference-^. Even
to be able to say something, we must know what the world
will be like if that statement is true . 45 But obviously
I cannot say that! my saying anything at all presupposes
it. I do not say it, I show it. Showing ( zeigen ) is
thus the presentation by the linguistic world of what
lies beyond it. Of particular concern here are objects.
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I can, as Wittgenstein says at one point, 46 talk about
(s£rechen von) them, but I cannot express ( aussprechen )
them, I can and do express, or say, what I mean, i.e.,
the reference^. By doing so I show what the objects
must be like, if my saying is true, and I do so through
the logical form of what I can say. When 1 also find
precisely that logical form in the actual world, 1 can
say, e.g.
,
the relation is true, it actually exists, es
besteht .
Thus Wittgenstein manages to avoid any difficulties,
which might arise if there were a gulf between two worlds
here, Sentences with their meanings (reference-^
,
on the
one hand, and non-linguistic facts in the actual world,
on the other, are all facts which can share logical form,
i * e • * have 'the same logical form. Both, however, exist;
the important difference between them (in this context)
is that we can say ( aussprechen . sagen ) our sentences
with their meanings, but not non-linguistic facts. The
sentences show us what extra-linguistic facts can be like
(and hence are said to design a world), through showing
us ( z e igen ) a logical form. When and if we recognize
that form in the actual world, we can say the form also
exists actually
, es besteht . The difficulty vanishes,
and we see that the theory does not amount to simply
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another phrase under which thp <>
.
e sarae Problem sneaks back
-Li 1 #
As this last paragraph points out, sentences with
will b
etm *neS ar ° alS ° fa°tS - Their facticity (which
0 dlscussed again in the next \
... chapter) puzzled
Wittgenstein, for fart <5c s (or, more broadly, things in
general) just do not have many of the properties that
sentences have. For example, it makes perfectly good
negate a sentence, but it seems to be nonsense
to speak of negating a picture. Yet on his theory sen-
tences are pictures, how can it be that it makes sense
to negate them, as it must?
To this I Will indicate only the beginning of witt-
Stem s reply. The oddities of sentences make sense
and are possible because of the fact that they are made
up of two parts, as it were. That is, Wittgenstein be-
lieved that every sentence is built of two elements dis-
function. The first of these we may call the
Picturing, the second the affirming, function.
We have already seen briefly what I here call the
Picturing function of the sentence, Wittgenstein calls
it the Urbild (proto-picture). It alone is not a sen-
tence foi one reason, it is neither true nor false as
it stands. Nevertheless it does, as we have seen, have
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the form of a sentence. To paraphrase this, merely
looking at what we suppose to be a sentence cannot tell
us if it is a sentence or the proto-picture of a sentence.
But the proto-picture cannot be negated or affirmed, as
it stands, and in that is more like regular pictures, it
is, like a painting, merely what it is, and does not push
beyond itself as sentences do.
In part the proto-picture is a linguistic entity.
Wittgenstein speaks of the proto-picture as occuring in
a sentences ''Although all logical constants already
occur m the simple sentence, its own proto-picture must
also occur in it entire and unanalyzed. And laters’
"In the sentence we place a proto-picture onto reality. " /|8
Since the proto-picture is a linguistic entity it can be
spoken (ausgesagt ) and become part of a sentence. That
is accomplished by what I have called the affirming func-
tion, i.e., the activity of saying a given Urbild . To
it it adds one important things it says, this is the
way things are. With that simple addition, the proto-
picture, without changing its visible (i.e., written or
audible, etc.) form, becomes a sentence.
This, however, reflects back on the distinction
between showing and saying, as I have developed it so
far. It points out quite clearly that something is
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lacking in my presentation of it w B na 1X * We can only say, or
speak, an Wild, for it is a linguistic entity, as is
shown by its having the form of a sentence
,
4? and be-
cause it can be spoken or said, it must show something
which cannot be said, namely its logical form. Earlier
it seemed that the full answer to the problem of truth
and falsity lay in that simple thought, and that the
idea of truth as a relation could be replaced satisfac-
torily by that of the identity of logical forms. Now
we can see that that is not entirely true (at least, not
for Wittgenstein's theory). The proto-picture must have
the same logical form as that which will make it, when
turned into a sentence, true. But it, nevertheless,
cannot be true or false. The problem of truth, the prob
lem of meaning truly, requires something more to answer
it than the logical identity of forms.
It is at this point that the analysis in the Notebooks
breaks off, though Wittgenstein carries it further in the
Tract at us. The attempt to explain how we can say true
things about the world, without recourse to the notion
of referring, brought Wittgenstein to the distinction
between showing and saying. We may say sentences, but
not the facts of the actual world which make them true,
yet both sentences and actual facts can show the same
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logical form. Yet to say this is still not enough, for
statements can purposefully be said and yet not have any
relation at all to the actual world, have no concern with
truth or falsity (as, e.g., an assumption in a logic
problem). Wittgenstein would hold that such a statement
would not be a genuine sentence, something must be added
to it to make it one, and thereby able to be true or
false. What is added to them we will see first in the
Tractatus. Until then, the problem of how we can mean
something truly must remain in its present unsatisfactory
state.
IV
. My goal in this chapter has been simple j to take
Wittgenstein up to the point where he can develop his
ontology within the confines of his method and the stric-
tures he establishes in the Notebooks . This I have done.
After showing how the independence of logic is guaran-
teed (and thus introducing his first stricture, that
logic cannot be used to solve ontological problems) I
considered language. Language too must fend for itself
(a second stricture); that it can do so is guaranteed in
the Notebooks through the use of reference^ a reference
separate from the actually experienced world, as meaning.
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This leads to the conclusion that the world is my world
and the problem of relating my world to the world in
general, to the actual world. Wittgenstein accomplishes
this relation by using reference,, - and at the same time
shows, without, it seems, being explicitly aware of it,
that he no longer has any need of a theory of referencl
at all, if this theory is viable. But it, as it stands,
has genuine weaknesses which he does not correct. Over-
looking these, however, Wittgenstein can at last allow-
himself to work on the genuine problems of philosophy,
those of ontology. For while logic, language and reality
may be independent of each other, may each have to care
for itself, the last two at least are able to show the
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49. We must distinguish between " Gestalt 1 and 'Form',
102 .
as Wittgenstein uses theint if not what tis nonsense. Both word- r>nr, > „ ?;; 1 say here
but mean quite different n •
transla 'te b as "form"
Physical or sound ^h i ngS ' A CestaIt is the
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The genuinely philosophical questions are the
metaphysical and, particularly, the ontological ques-
tions - such in brief is Wittgenstein's position in
the Notebooks (and in the Tractatus. as well). However
genuine and philosophical these questions might seem to
him, his approach to philosophy, bordered with the many
stringent requirements we have seen, left precisely these
ontological problems in limbo, without any apparent way
to find answers for them. Not only did there seem to
be no convincing way to answer them, as was also the
'
case with Russell's philosophy, but they seemed to lack
even the necessary prerequisites of receiving an answer,
for they seemed to be nonsense. Thus one of the first




. . . name-y is one 1 is a point m our field of vision
§
simple, object, a thing? Up till now I havealways viewed such questions as the genuinely
philosophical ones -- and that is indeed whatthey are, in a sense — but once more, what evi-dence could decide such a question?!
And this same doubt is reflected many times throughout
the Notebooks t "The expression, "not further analysable"
t°° is one of those which, together with "function",
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thing"
, etc. are on the Index",* and even later> „Again
and again the question seems to make sense, Are there
simple things? And yet this question simply must be
senseless
!
By the time he compiled the Tractates from his
earlier notebooks, he had settled these differences, he
knew how to ask ontological questions and how to answer
them. In the Notebooks he is simply in the process of
working out justification for his procedures, a justifi-
cation which cannot simply be shrugged off as Russell
tried ten
all r witJ t • 13 the fact ^t, after
tl




1sceptical reader that possibly..there may be some loophole through a hierarchylanguages, or by some other exit Thewhoie subject of ethics, for exampl^, isplaced by Mr. Wittgenstein in the mysticalmexpressable region. Nevertheless^ he is
’
capable of conveying his ethical opinions.^
That he was “capable of conveying his ethical opinions"
was certainly true and acknowledged by Wittgenstein; it
did not serve as a "loophole" (or the sign of one) but
was fully explained by his theory. One is even justified,
in view of what we have seen so far, in reading the Trac-
tahius as, in part at least, precisely the attempt to jus-
tify this, and, e.g.
,
the third passage above as asking
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thS qU6Sti0n! h °W iS * ** one can convey Ms ethical
opinions when the sentences conveying them are and must
be nonsense?
His answer was known to, but not appreciated by,
Russell and is recognized by most other commentators on
the gractatus , we convey those opinions in nonsensical
sentences which show what they cannot say. But Russell
found that answer unsatisfactory - and so did Wittgen-
stein, at first. It posed a question to him as great as
that which it served to answer, m concluding the second
quotation above he writes, \ . . how will that be shown,
which we wish to express through it?" We show what we
cannot say - but how in the world do we manage to show
anything? The genuine problem of ontology, as Wittgen-
stein sees it, is not found in a question such as "What
exists?" or "Are there simple objects?" (although he an-
swers these questions, too). It is rather. "How is it
that we can understand, and be understood, when making
nonsensical statements about objects?" The most press-
ing metaphysical question is therefore not strictly
metaphysical, but transcendental.
Although this is, so to speak, his root question,
he does not answer it explicitly, but rather through
the way in which he answers the more concrete questions
106
.
e also asks. After our immediately preceding examina-
tl0n °f hiS thSOrieS ° f^ and language. we can easily
foreshadow his answer to his basic question. There is
no way at all in the world by which we can show what
cannot be said. Showing, in this sense, literally takes
Place out of the world. What is shown, in other words,
is shown transcendentally
, and for Wittgenstein as for'
Kant, transcendental statements literally are nonsense.
It is (if I may anticipate something which becomes clear
only later, in the Tractatus) precisely because these
statements are nonsensical that they are able to serve
as means to ease our discomforts about ontology. Non.
transcendental arguments simply add to our original dis-
comfort because, even if they seem reasonable or sensible,
they are not. So in examining the arguments Wittgenstein
educes in this field — particularly concerning the much-
discussed one of the nature of objects — I shall direct
my attention to the transcendental arguments he constructs.
Thus my work here may well look even less like tradition-
al interpretations of the Tractatus than what I have done
before. At least, if it is not traditional, it has this
virtue i it is precisely the kind of nonsense Wittgen-
stein wrote.
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Before actually examining the arguments, we will
look at how he uses two of their key terms, "thing"
(or "object" - "Objekt", "Ding" or "gegenstand"
) and
"simple". The more approachable of them is "object",
so I shall begin with it.
In his early thought - and, as 1 shall show later,
in the Tractatus — the words "thing" or "object" refer
to three fundamentally different types of object. 5 The
.difference in reference is, however, systematic, and
one can distinguish three fundamentally different uses
for the words, each of which is exclusive of the other
two. The first two are given us in a contrast between
what Wittgenstein might well have called 'scientific ob-
jects’ and ordinary objects. The distinction is made
quite clearly in the followingi
Yes, the mathematical sciences differentiate
+,“Ve ? ;f>rorn non-mathematical in thisthat the former treat of things about whichthe ordinary language does not talk, while the
known^^^
abou1; things that are generally
This contrast, though it appears again in the Tractatus
.
is not developed further in the Notebooks . He speaks of
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it explicitly in fact in only one other m ,Place (pages 66
67), and has nothing decisive to say about it there,
elther
‘ 1 WlU f °ll0W M,
\ in Wing ^ant attention to
•L o f
The third kind of object (orJ0 (° third use for the word
3eCt " ^ alS ° b6St tbtroduced through a contrasting
Pair, though it is harder to pin a name to. On the one
side of the contrast stand ordinary objects again; on
the other stand simple objects. Under the rubric "or-
dinary objects" Wittgenstein understands a vast array
of things - everything, in fact, which has ever been
or could ever be called an "object"u x
• Complex spatial




, which can mean both8 ), even the
movement of physical objects, 9 can all be called "thing"
and, he often affirms - are really things. Of the last
case, in which he claims we are entitled to say that the
motion of an object is also itself an object, he has an
interesting comment, "Here it seems clear to me, that
in this reification (Vej^g^ nothing else is
present but a logical manipulation — the possibility
of which, at any rate, could be highly significant."
What he is saying here is this. Our ability to
reify or to accomplish this Verdinglichung is most
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important - and also entirely unlisted. Absolutely
anything can be made, or seen as, a thing or object,
and it is never wrens to do so, any putative object
is indeed an object. But our very ability to do this
is founded on "nothing but a tlogical manipulation", not
an ontological characteristic of tto k- ,bi the objects (processes,
thoughts, etc.) themselves. That is to say, we manipu-
late these things into being objects not because of what
they are, but because of what we are and can do.
That any complex object has its status as an object
'
as the result of such a manipulation can easily be seenm the fact that we can equally well deny that it is an
object
. (Here the word "manipulation- should not be
taken in a negative or perjorative sense, or to imply
that the results of such are not really what they seem
to be. As I have just stated, and as becomes clearer
throughout this section, they are really objects — the
only objects, in fact, which we have in our experience.)
On the other hand, there are objects which have that
status even without our manipulation. These are the
simple things or objects, the existence and simplicity
of which Wittgenstein makes so much effort to prove. We
can, and often indeed do, identify them with the other





it seems to me entirely pos^ibln +\ *.in our field of vision ainl i’ th^t sPecks
ticularly since we never i)P r!!-
le ob Jects, par-
ol these specks seoara+niv ?
lve a single one
Of stars even seem certa^'to'brsiSpl^lO
1068
Yet all such identification he ultimately rejects, he-
cause of the nature of simplicity.
B
All of these share the name of "object" or "thing”.
To some it belongs, as it were, intrinsically, apart
from anything we might do to give it to them (the simple
objects), to others it belongs as the result of a native
and highly important human faculty (all complex objects),
and to some amongst these it is given as a result of
highly complex theories (scientific objects), m view
of this difference in reference, a question naturally
arises, is there a basic sense to the word "object"
which makes this variety of uses philosophically signif-
icant (unlike e.g.
, the ambiguity of the word 'division')?
Or is it unimportant — or is it, perhaps, to borrow a
phrase from Wittgenstein's later thought, merely the re-
sult of family resemblances amongst the terms, but with-
out any common core sense to them all?
There is indeed more than a family resemblance
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amongst these various uses of tho
_
U e word "object" here.
r ' ^ -*u—^ - concept o, the object(Gegenstands)
.
"-11 m h). me best one could sav is, itm+u . , . y means,
ich lo (or appears to be) given", that which is
or appears to be independent of our will. The world Qf
course, not only appears to be
, but is> independ(;nt ^
ur will, as we will see more in detail shortly, "object"
by itself picks out that which appears tQ be g . vgnas independent, while "simple object", the object which
Ires outside any possible description we could give it.
Picks out that which is really independent of our wills'.
fojec", again, in all three cases, refers to that
which is, or is assumed to be theorv Car,-. un y (description- or
language-) independent, and free of our will.
There is a problem involved with his notion of an
object, of which Wittgenstein seems to be unaware - that
is, he is unaware of it as a problem. We ordinarily say
we can and do learn about ordinary objects. If (to anti-
cipate the example in the forthcoming quotation) we do
not know what watches contain springs (or that a certain
watch does), we would say that we can learn that it does
indeed contain a spring. The object itself remains one
and the same, despite the change in our knowledge of it.
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For Wittgenstein this is by no means clearly the case,
not *”in
S
-t he ^storage roL^t thi " "<*<* ^
ily LOGICALLY FOLLOW from that that fTT'which is in the watch, is not in^ a "heel *room, for I perhao- dirt f the st °rage
there was a wheel in thn ~ ^11, that
not have meant by "this watch" 'n
&nd C0
V ld
which the wheel occurs?12
complex in
If we take this suggestion seriously, each time we learn
or forget something about an object, or each time the ob-
ject itself changes in such a way as to change what we
think of it, it ceases to exist, and we are faced with
a new object. Taken to its logical conclusion, this
line of thought leaves us with a thoroughly Heraclitean
ontology, but one with a new twist, it involves only
'
objects of the first two types, of ordinary languages
and scientific theories. Real objects in the actual
world, being totally independent of us to start with,
would not be affected by it.
And, so far as I can see, Wittgenstein develops no
way out of this puzzle, at least in the extant notebooks.
Perhaps because he did not explicitly recognize this as
a difficulty, he provided no explicit solution. At any
rate, the important case in both the Notebooks and the
Tractatu s is that of simple objects — those objects
which really are theory-independent
. Once we have
understood that Wittgenstein is using "object" in this
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way. much of what he says becomes much more clear We
gain, for example, a definition of » s irapucity .. u lg
that which is literally not describable, because it neces-
sarily lies oulsidc any posaib'i^y P sible conceptual scheme. Or-
dinary objects are simple too in - ,Pi , a sense (and Wittgen-
stein often reminds us of this) in + u- — in the sense that they
are, so to speak, the last outreaches of + hitd n i t e conceptua]
scheme within which they are objects, they lie precisely
at the point where the conceptual scheme, reaching out
to the world, vanishoo i. T+„ . .es. its composition
( Zusammenset?-
un£) becomes entirely Indifferent. It disappears from
our eyes.' The complexity of ordinary
from our eyes; actual object*- rnmi « nAl „ . ,jecio, genui e y simple objects,
never had that complexity to begin with.
Another point that becomes more clear now is a dif-
ferent side to Wittgenstein's transcendentalism. Since
genuinely simple objects must lie outside any possible
conceptual scheme, and can not be described in it, how
can one talk about them? Again, one simply cannot. We
know that there are simple objects (for we know that the
world is independent of our wills) but we know equally
well that it is nonsense to say that there are, because
of the nature of simplicity
.
14
The only way we can talk
of or argue about them is the way which avows nonsense
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(as Wittgenstein did in the Tractatus)
, transcendental
.
"Thus,. although a turn of speech is nonsense (unsinnig)
,
one can indeed still use it •• 1 5
• • • •
There are times in the Notebooks when • object-
clearly refers to only one of these three types of ob-
jects, and there are many other occasions in which Witt-
genstein himself seems unclear about which reference is
intended, On page 6?, e.g.
, he writesi "The analysis
of bodies into material £oints, aS we have it in physics,
is nothing more than the analysis into simple elements ."
Here he clearly means a theory-dependent sense of "simple".
Whereas on page 69 , "The simple sign is essentially
sim£lc. It functions as a simple object
( Gegenstand 1
.
(What does that mean?) Its complexity
( Zusammensetzunv l
becomes entirely jji^ferent. It disappears from our
eyes." A confusion he felt between two unclarified
senses is apparent, as it also clearly is in a slightly
earlier passage:
What is my basic thought, when I talk aboutthe simpie objects7 In the final analysis,do not put-together objects' suffice pre-cisely for the requirement, that I apparentlypiace on the others? If I give this book aname N and talk then of N, is not the re-
^ * put-together object', tothat form and content, essentially the same
as 1 thought only between name and obiect
( Gegenstand )? 16
J
11 5.
The unrecognized complexity of the phrase ••simple
object in the Tractates has done much harm to discus-
sions of Wittgenstein' s ontology there. Having seen it
clearly in this earlier work, we will be better prepared
to find and compensate for it in the later. Now, how-
ever, we will turn to the arguments he advances in the
I!2iebooks specifically for the existence of genuinely
simple objects. These arguments, as one could expect,
break into two parts, and Wittgenstein often handles
each independently. The first we can treat as assuming
that there are objects of the third kind, i. e ., in the
actual world and not dependent on our conceiving of them.
These arguments then show that those objects must be sim-
ple., Then there are arguments of a second kind which
actually attempt to prove that there are objects inde-
pendent of our conceptual schemes. The most striking of
these, as Black pointed out, 17 is the argument from the
definiteness of what we mean, an argument which demon-
strates both that there are objects independent of our
languages and that these objects are simple. There are.
also, three other proofs of the existence of these objects.
The natural order for me to take would of course be
to prove first that there are objects independent of our
conceiving of them, and then prove that these objects
116 .
^ SlmPle
‘ 1 reVerse this ^der. My primary reason
for doing SO is that the argument from definiteness of
-nse is by far the longest and most complex argument I
shall have to deal with, and it is both easier and more
intelligible if presented after, and therefore with the
basis of, the others. And for the sale of onh •K cohesiveness,
the other arguments for the existence of objects are
left until that point.
II
A
1. The preceding section already hints at several
arguments for the simplicity of actual objects. Here I
shall review one of them to make it more clear, more co-
gent, as the first argument in this section. To begin
it clearly, we need two premises*
(i) The world is independent of my will, and
(ii) Language (i. e .
,
sentences with their meanings)is dependent on my will, ^
That Wittgenstein actually holds both of these should be
clear by now. The first one he states directly, "The
world is independent of my will." 18 And the second,
that language is dependent on my will is clear now from
the arguments advanced in the second chapter.
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That the world is independent of one's will means
that one cannot effect a change in it simply by willing
that change. Objects and events or occurences in the
actual world (assuming there arcc> 16 e such ) are what they are
whether we will them to be or not. objects, however
which gain their object-status through our language or
theory — through, in general rri, a given conceptual scheme
are dependent on our will for their object-status, for
by deciding to change our way of seeing them, we can
change what they are. Thus only language-dependent ob-
jects can be described in language; real objects cannot
be described (as they really are ) in any language or
given through any conceptual scheme.
^P e 0j- argument reminds one strongly of what
Kant says about the "Ding an Sich" in the Critique of
Pure Reason. it is open, too, to the same kind of ob-
jections. That such objects cannot be described in
language does not entail that they are simple. The argu
ment needs something more, something to the effect that
all qualities are indeed language-dependent. In Kant's
version of the argument it seems that this premise, or
one like it, is sometimes simply assumed. Wittgenstein,
however, explicitly states precisely what is needed.
That is, he supplies us with an argument that all
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qualities are language-dependent. "And one can say, all
types stand in hierarchies. And the hierarchy is possible
only through being built up (den Aufbau ) , through the
operation. (...) The hierarchies are and must be
independent of reality." 1 ? A11 types> then> anything
which is a type, whether of color, sound, shape, etc.,
"stand in hierarchies" which "are and must be independent
of reality
. They exist because we bring their, into exis-
tence, because we perform the operations from which their
existence arises and on which it depends. But since all
types depend on our will, the objects which really exist
independently of our conceptual schemes (and thus of our
wills) can have no traits, no characteristics. They
must therefore be of no type whatsoever. To say they
are of any type, to attribute any quality to them, is
nonsense. The only thing we can say of them isi they
are simple (and this is not to type them but to declare
their independence of any types). For any form of com-
plexity leads us right back into the hierarchies and
"types 01 our conceptual schemes or languages.
To sum up this argument briefly
i
(i) The world is independent of my will.
(ii) Language is dependent on my will.
( iii) Therefore linguistic objects and actual
objects, if any such exist, are different.
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a°^Uad °b3eots ha- traits or
For those who still would feel tint * o+ +1 xna a statement like (v)
IS too strong, it might be rephrased as.
Iv '’
In faCt> th0Ugh 1 believe to be too strong. I see no
reason to think that Wittgenstein did.
2. A second argument can also be developed against
the background of (i) and (ii). Par t of the force of (i)
can be expressed in the Humean claim, also explicit in
Wittgenstein's works, that we cannot predict with any
certainty the course of events in the world. The world
goes its way, independent of any characteristics or laws
by which we might try to bind its course. As a result,
no scientific theory is metaphysically any better than
any other. All of them are equally on the surface of
reality, equally far removed from the actual world and
necessarily bound to thought and language. As Wittgen-
stein himself comments
i
At bottom the whole Weltanschauung- of t.hp
moderns involves theTIlusion that the so-
called lav/s of nature are explanations of
natural phenomena.
In this way they stop short at the laws of
nature as at something impregnable as men of
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former times did at God and fate.
And both are right and wronp Theare indeed clearer in +v,t older ones
^n»i^
IhiSS had a foundation.1o
‘° look as lf
Wittgenstein thus denies, in the notebook as well
as later in the Tractatus, that states of affairs in the
world are necessarily connected (see Tractatus 5.1361 -
5 . 1362 ). it follows that the future cannot be predicted
(with certainty, by logical means) from the past. In
this Wittgenstein finds’ himself close to Hume (Enquiry ,
sect. IV, part II), nature, for them both, is strictly
unpredictable. But Wittgenstein goes beyond Hume, at
least by implication, in the above passages. The "laws
of nature" do not explain phenomena, they are no better,
as explanations, than "God and fate" of the "men of for-
mer Limes" 1 indeed, they may even be inferior. Since
"both are right and wrong", I believe that Wittgenstein
intends to point out here what one could call the ulti-
mate metaphysical equality of all explanatory systems
(of natural phenomena). That is, all systems which pur-
port to explain do so by pointing out necessary connec-
tions, but there are no such things in nature. Ultimate
ly all systems of explanation are metaphysically (i.e.,
as far as reality is concerned) equal because they all
121 .
are wrong.
On the other hand we can predict what we can say.
Put in parallel terms, the actual world cannot be known
advance, the linguistic world can be. We know the
latter because, "The fact that it is possible to erect
general form of propositions means nothing but,
every possible form of proposition must be FORESEEABLE ." 21
This implies that, while the objects of the actual world
cannot be foreseen, predicted or known a priori , those
objects which depend on language or conceptual schemes
can, indeed must, be. This in its turn simply means
that everything which allows the latter to be predicted
or known a pr i or i must be absent from the former. What
we know a priori is of course what we construct our-
selves, items or elements of the linguistic world also,
a° we have just seen, qualities, characteristics and all
types. Therefore again, those objects which are indepen-
dent of our conceptual scheme have and can have no quali-
ties. They are simple.
This argument can be summed up as follows i
(i) The world is independent of my will.
(ii) Only what is dependent on my will, through
being constructed, can be predicted or known
a priori
.
(iii) Therefore the world cannot be predicted or












a priori. - D u or know it
(V) Therefore it has nothing constructed (by us)
(vi) Therefore it has no properties.
B
The above argument might be called the argument from
what we cannot do. We cannot predict the course of nature
Another argument can be developed from looking at what
we can do. This argument from what we can do concerns
more particularly the notions of ability versus inabil-
lt;y * rathe) than those of foresee?))-}! li-Hr „luxioceaDii ty versus unfore-
seeability which concern the above.
;
What can we do? As is clear by now, we can build,
change or destroy types and hierarchies of all sorts. I
can do anything my language allows me to do; as Wittgen-
stein expresses it*
We represent the things, the relations and thecharacteristics
( Eigenschaften ) by means ofvariables and in doing so show that we possessthese ideas, not out of particular cases whichhappen to us, but rather somehow a priori 22
So ideas of things (whereby he obviously means "thing"
in the first or second sense), relations, and character-
istics (qualities) are possessed by us "somehow a priori",
and because they are ours in this manner, we can do with
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them as we like,
of us.
without being bound by- something outside
And what can r not (in'? .
£ JS equally clear by now
from the above section, I cannot construct
_ controli ^
diet or know a Eiori the actual world. -j cannot direct
the happenings of the world according to my will, but
rather am entirely powerless. So we are faced with
the same kind of contrast we have seen above. I can
create and know a priori the Mfienschaften (traits, char-
acteristics, qualities) which 1 attribute to the world.
But 1 cannot know the objects in the actual world (if
there are any) in this manner. So such objects must be
simple, since they can possess no qualities at all.
.As Wittgenstein develops this argument, he also
hints at another version of it. It is not only possible,
but unavoidable, he claims, for one to use what he calls
"individual forms" 2
+
in logical notation. These forms,
such as "x" or "z", are not themselves necessary or es-
sential to logic. But our ability to use them in writ-
ing out logic problems is essential. Yet if "the indi-
vidual forms are, so to speak, given me in experience,
then I surely can't make use of them in logic; in that
case I cannot write down an x or a ^>y," The simplest
reason behind this comment is this* if the individual
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forras are experienced, then the signs representing them
are, in effect, names. Then the signs will have refer-
ence, as all names do. But then either logic represents
something, and we can properly use that representing
notation, or it does not, and we cannot use such symbols.
Logic, on Wittgenstein's later logical theory, does not
refer or represent anything, and we do unavoidably use
the symbols. So the premise must be wrong. Individual
forms are not and




can not be given to us in experience,
we can use the forms in logic, it
do not characterize experienced reality,
is given to us by something other than
.Needless to say, it does not follow from this alone
that actual objects have no forms at all. All this argu
ment has shown is that they lack a certain type of form,
logical form (and that despite Wittgenstein's comments
on the logical form of facts, logical space, etc. —
comments which must remain largely untouched until we
reach the T ractatus ) . A parallel argument can be devel-
oped, however, to include all qualities of which we can
speak. It is based on the independence of language,
precisely as the above argument is based on the indepen-
dence of logic.
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Consider a statement of the form*
(i) a (an object) is red.
The purport of this argument is to show that that form
cannot characterize actuality, and allowing redness to
be synecdochical, no form can. At first glance such a
purport seems, if not nonsensical, at least confused.
After all, (i) is a statement, its form is a linguistic
form, while red itself is not. No one pretends that
purely linguistic forms characterize reality. It is
less bewildering, however, if we recall what it is for
a. sentence to be truei
(n) Any sentence S is true = the logical form of S
is identical with that
of something found in
the experienced world
‘ (one which besteht )
.
So for Wittgenstein, (i) either has or, in some sense, is
a form which can characterize the actual or experienced
world.
But can it therefore characterize actual objects,
the objects which exist independently of language or con-
ceptual schemes? The answer to that is "no". The form
given in (i) is linguistic; as such it is dependent on
one’s will (as we have just seen). It is therefore of
a totally diiferent type from any forms which could char-
acterize the actual v/orld — or, as I said before, actual
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objects are simple. To claim that the form given ^ ( . }
characterizes actual objects is. in effect, to make the
actual world dependent on our sentences and thus on ourwm. But Wittgenstein has no inclination at all to put
forward any such claim as this
.
25
Wittgenstein's position here does not seem to be a
comfortable one. and he does not pretend to himself that




as he puts it. - are complex objects.
We can never experience the simple objects. Precisely
this observation, while the source of much of his dis-
comfprt, is also the source of a short proof of the sim-
plicity of objectsi a proof as old as Zeno, criticised
by Aristotle, and adopted in another version again by
Leibniz
.
From experience, then, we know ( kennen . are directly
acquainted with) complex objects. We can also know that
they are complex. For if we analyze them, each part may
be more simple than that whole of which it is a part —
but it too is still complex. Ultimately, Wittgenstein
maintains, in order to make sense of the notions of
complexity and simplicity, we seem forced to sayi there
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are simple things which I do not perceive - yet X know
that they do exist and are simple. The example which
Wittgenstein gives:
though simpler, etcT










that WS - for ^ple - see
S-ffii §11 the joints of a surface are yellow
~
wi Lhout seeing any given single point^oTTh \ «*surface? It almost seemS-I^7 3
We may overlook the tentative "almost" of this conclusion.
This was in fact Wittgenstein's position, even though he/
was not, as 1 said, fully comfortable with it. If we do
so, 1 uhink we can learn from a comparison of this argu-
ment with the similar argument of Zeno's which Aristotle
criticizes in his Physi cs . VI, 2, 233
a






r or severally to come in contactwith infinite things in a finite time. Forthere are two senses in which . . . anything
continuous (is) called 'infinite': either inrespect of divisibility, or in respect of
their extremities,^
So Zeno, arguing against the possibility of change,
begins with the fact that everything is infinitely com-
plex, He continues with the assumption that complexes
must be made of simples, which, he assumes, are actual
simples . Wittgenstein seems to make precisely the same
moves (though not, of course, in arguing against change).
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Every perceived thing is complex, and complexes are made
of simples
, despite our lack of experience of such.
It would thus seem that Aristotle's reply, if effec _
five at all against Zeno, would also he equally effective
against Wittgenstein here. That reply would be that he
(Wittgenstein) confuses what is actual with what is poten-
tial. Objects are potentially infinitely complex, but,
since we are finite creatures and the objects are our
objects, they are actually only finitely complex. He
might even point out that Wittgenstein himself seems at .
times inclined to agree with such a thought — at such
times as he seems to maintain that "our simple ISi the
simplest that we are directly acquainted with ." 29 Beyond
that it sometimes seems that Wittgenstein feels nothing
more is, or should be, needed.
But something more is needed. The simples we know
are not real simples. They can and do change their
status as we change the way we look at them. If these
were the only simples, then anything would change as we
change the way we view it. But something does not change.
Reality is somehow independent of us, and its objects
really are what they are no matter what we may think.
These simple objects, however, should be called neither
actual (in Aristotle's sense) nor potential. They lie
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outside our conceptual schemes and our experience
therefore cannot he called anything at all.
and
D
The above argument is close to another argument
which Wittgenstein develops more thoroughly, one we could
call the argument from the complexity of analysis. "An-
alysis- (to review briefly) does not mean logical analy-
sis a la Russell, nor yet linguistic analysis as it was
later developed by, e.g.
, Ryle or Malcolm. It is tran-
scendental analysis, and therefore fitting that out. of
it should come an argument which attempts to prove the
simplicity of transcendental objects. The first appear-
ance. of it is very early in the Notebooks
, page eight,
though a better statement of it comes on page 50
1
But this too seems certain, that we know theexistence of simple objects, not from the exis-tence of certain particular simple objects, butmuch rather know (kennen) them as the end re-
sult of an analysis — so to speak through
their description — which leads to them.'
But what is this process which leads to simple objects




The insight on that comes later (page 60 ) . To quote
the essential passage first j
130 .











ned in ^“ c^lex^i he idea of analysis, and in such a way




e ° b ” ~ ~ as a ^al
So it looks as if the
objects were related
ones as the sense of
the simple object is
in the complex.
existence of the simple
to that of the complex
p is to the sense of ps
prejudged
( prae judiziert )
But what is the relation of p to p here?
We have already seen that one of the reasons Witt-
genstein rejects the existence of negative facts is that
they are not needed to explain meaningful false state-
ments or negations. His reasoning there is that the
sense of the negative statement includes that of the
positive, adds to or subtracts from it nothing at all.
lhe negation simply changes, so to speak, the way in
which we read the sentence, without thereby changing its
content. The negative statement ^p is related to the
positive, p, let us say, as clay is to a container! the
negation sign or the container shapes the content, with-
out being either new content or part of the old content.
It is not part of the content at all.
This is precisely the relation between the complexes
which are analyzed, and the simple objects reached at the
end of analysis. And that is also why simple objects are
said to be prejudged in the idea of analysis. Complexes
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are, to speak metaphorically, the containers which give
shape to simple objects! the visible (or otherwise per-
ceptible) result of this shaping are the complexes, which
we can then, if we will, name and think of as simples.
Yet any such experienceable simple is already actually
a complex, precisely because made up of form and content.
Form, however, is found in our creating it, not in real-
ity independent of us. To be really independent of us,
then, the actual object must be simple (free of qualities),
as, to be independent of ontological implications, the
negation sign in '~p* must be free of any objects which
could constitute p.
Ill
The four arguments above all presuppose that there
are actual objects, objects which depend on no concep-
tual scheme, language, special theory, etc, for their
existence as objects. The next four arguments do not
involve this presupposition: they try to demonstrate
that there must be such objects, and then that they must
be simple. While the first three of them are fairly
straightforward, the .last one is very complicated; it is
also the most important.
132 .
A
The first proof of the existence of external objects
is directly connected with the last two proofs above of
their simplicity. These arguments rest on Wittgenstein'
s
fundamental insight that logic and language both must
care for themselves, and that therefore no kind of anal-
ysis can lead directly from either to the actual world,
no matter how far the analysis is taken. Our analyses,
to use the terras above, lead us from one shape of reality
to another — but never to what is actual in itself. That
has no shape to which analysis could lead us; if it is
at all, then it must be simple.
So our philosophical tool, the analysis of language,
can settle no ontological problems directly (and in this
its independence is like that of logic). Unlike logic,
however, our language proceeds by talk of objects.
People speak in terms of this thing and that. Thus any
analysis of language, despite its ontological impotence,
will show this mucht the notion of things that exist
independent of us and our language is prejudged ( prae -
judiziert ) in any language and in thought (which is a
form of language) as well. Thus not only the simplicity
of actual existences, if there are any, is prejudged in
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language. Their actual existence is, too.
the form of this argument given in Section II
does show that the idea of simples is a-Linpie indeed prejudged
in our language, then we can argue in yet another way
that their existence also is. All the objects with
hich experience or direct vision
( Anschauung ) acquaints
ns are. as Wittgenstein points out again and again (cf.
II c), complex. Nothing simple in the relevant sense
occurs within the empirical world. Yet analysis shows
that there is a demand built into the very nature of
language
; but their existence cannot be the same as. that
of everyday physical objects. They must lie outside any
possible experience of them.
B
The first three arguments for the existence of
things independent of language, the one above, this and
the following, are transcendental in this sensei they
all argue that such objects are presupposed by one or
another element of our experience, and cannot be denied
without making unintelligible that element. In the
above, the argument was that analysis and ultimately
the nature of thought in general presupposes (Wittgen-
stein's word, of course, is "pre judged" ) actual simple
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objects. This second of his arguments reflects X B, and
is based on the nature of objects in general.
The important passage, again, i s this one, "That
which seems to us a priori' is the concept, This. ..
Identical with the concept of a thing
( object ) . "3° As
we saw. this means for Wittgenstein that "object" rep-
resents or picks out that which appears to exist inde-
pendent of our language and the descriptions we give it.
"Object", though a word in a language, leads to the .
boundaries of the language and points beyond it to some-
thing which is simple and given extralinguistically.
What happens if we then deny that there are actual
objects? 31 We deny that the word "that" ultimately has
the ..demonstrative force we otherwise attribute to it.
We claim that the "that" of pointing ends at language,
without pointing beyond it at all. This amounts to deny-
ing that a whole family of terms, the demonstratives, has
any sense. That alone might not be so terrible, but more
is involved. For the word "object" certainly has a demon-
strative sense, even if we do not consider it to be as
close to demonstratives as we have seen that Wittgen-
stein does. So if we deny that demonstratives make
sense, we deny also any sense to any talk about even
ordinary objects. But we do in fact make sense when
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we talk about such objects
things, living things, etc.
jects, objects independent
presupposed by our ability
objects at all.
physical objects, red
That there are actual ob-
of our conceptual scheme, is
to make sense of talk about
C
The third proof is
second.
closely connected with this
The world is given to me, that
finished^
^ °utsid is my will enters
i as something
From that we have the feeling
pendent on a foreign will. 32
that we are de-
This one might call the proof from feeling or the proof
from the nature of our will, it i s stated beautifully
again in one sentence at the end of the above passage,
"There are two deities, the world and my independent I.
We undeniably feel that we are independent of the
world, and that the world is independent of us. The
most immediate manifestation of the independence of both
of these comes with our will. As Descartes long ago
realized, we can, in theory, will anything, only our
ignorance limits our ability to will. Even this is no
hard-and-fast limitation on us, for it even seems that
we can transcend the bounds of intelligence or even
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intelligibility, and will nonsense or the impossible.
Our will makes us a divinity,
Cut, as Descartes also reali
7
p^j-ized, the case is entire-W different when we come to action. Our experience tell,
us that we can will anything but that the world goes its
way perfectly independently of such mere willing. Action
at least is necessary, and translating the will into ac-
tion can be treacherous. Even when we act, it is often
not sufficient to change the world. The world too is a
divinity as independent of the I as the I is, in its
ability to will, from the world. This then is the way
we feel about the world (to emphasize one form of the
argument). If there were no world at all independent of
us, such a feeling would have no. source (and might well
thus be impossible). For then everything would depend
on us and our will; there would be nothing to run its
own way, so to speak, apart from or contrary to our will.
To emphasize another form of the argument. if there
were no actual world, the nature of the will which we have
would be senseless and impossible. For the will as we
have it has two principal qualities. It is unlimited
in its sheer ability to will, but severely limited in
its ability to accomplish what it wills. If there were
nothing independent of me to serve as a limit to what
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"y will can accomplish, such limitation would not only
hot make sense, it would plainly be impossible. For if
there were nothing but the I, there would be nothing to
hinder the existence of whatever it would wish.
Die Forderung der einfachen Dingen ist die Forder-
ung dor Bestimratheit des Sinnes." 33 "Man koennte die
Bestimmtheit auch so forderm wenn ein Satz Sinn haben
soil, so rnuss vorerst die syntaktische Verwendung jedes
seiner Teile festgelegt sein,"-^
In this section we shall examine one of the most
important, yet most seldom mentioned, concerns Wittgen-
stein had both in the Notebooks and the Tractatus . This
is the concern for demonstrating that ordinary language
makes sense - or rather, his concern for justifying
philosophically the perfectly obvious truth that ordin-
ary language is (somehow often) intelligible. In par-
ticular, we shall examine why he felt that the require-
ment of definiteness of sense is the requirement for
simple objects.
We shall do this in two parts. In D 1 we will con-
centrate on language as spoken and as used in scientific
theories. This involves objects of types one and tv/o,
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the concept-dependent objects. We could well call this
ordinary definiteness, definiteness that suffices for
ordinary, non-critical purposes. Then in D 2 we shall
examine what could well be called metaphysical or tran-
scendental definiteness, that which is sufficient for
critical, philosophical justification of the first, it
involves us, of course, with simple or concept-indepen-
dent^ objects
, and, if we accept Wittgenstein- s reasoning,
provides full iusti f i pp-t- i -pJ l cat on for our ability to understand
one another.
1. The keynote of the first section is expressed in
this thought, ..An that I want is indeed complete anal-
ysis of my sense (Sirmes)
; ;
"35 ^ ^ only tQ ^
dicate the vagueness of ordinary sentences, for it lets
itself be vindicated.'.36 Ordinary sentences, for Witt-
genstein, are the sentences one uses in ordinary circum-
stances, the sentences of the individual alone. The
intersubjectivity of language, which he considered an
essential feature of it in his later philosophy, has not
yet made its appearance here. The problem, then, can be
recast in this subject-oriented form, how can 1 justify
my personal confidence that my sentences have a perfectly
definite meaning?
There was no doubt at all in Wittgenstein's mind
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that our sentences
, our ordinary sentences, do indeed
have meaning. As he says,
x his is indeed clean f'hn+ +w,_ ,




a sense (Sinn) exactlv si ',
t; l ese will have
wait firsFTw- ! 1* y as lhey are and not
sensed'/
future analysis to contain a
And furthermore
, he felt equally certain that each one
had a full meaning, "Every sentence that has meaning
(Sinn), has a COMPLETE meaning
. .
.".38 At ^ ^
time, he is acutely aware of the potentials for ambigu-
ity, vagueness and misunderstanding found in language.
Let rne present just one early expression of that aware-
ness as an example here:
A sentence such as, "This stool is brown" seem-®ay something enormously complex, for if we"
.
wanted to express this sentence in such a wavthat no one could raise objections to it whichspring from its ambiguity then it would haveto become endlessly long, 39
But how can he reconcile these two sides, the complete
and definite sense of the ordinary sentence, and, at the
same time, its ambiguity?
Wittgenstein’s solution returns us to something we
have already seen (in I B)
,
but there as a problem. My
sentences are as definite as are the objects of v/hich I
speak. But each sentence, as we saw there, has its own
object, fully determined within the context of that
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sentence. It may indeed be the case that not every
tence is fully determined when we look at it inter-
subiectively - Wittgenstein often implies that this is
the case, that no sentence is full* unambiguous. But at
the same time, looked at from the standpoint of the sub-
let, every meaningful sentence is fully determined, in-
solar as its own particular meaning goes. Wittgenstein
sometimes uses the simile of black dots on white paper
To illustrate this thought one might extend the simile
to that of a paper with black, -white, and gray areas.
Any sentence means something subjectively definite - it
quite distinctly. At the same time, there are certain
things a meaningful sentence clearly does not mean and
these too are distinctly marked, as the white areas. But
Wittgenstein adds, each sentence also has certain things
it neither quite means nor quite does not mean. These
grey areas are indefinite - but the sentence makes clear
and definite also which areas these are. Thus a sentence
may bo ambiguous yet its meaning nevertheless clear and
sharp because it unambiguously marks out its ambiguities.
This is the line of thought which lies behind many
comments on meaning in the Notebooks.
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meaning of a sentence, as we have seen, is its refer-
ence. A sentence has a clear or ••sharp- meaning, i e
a definite meaning, if it has a clear, sharp or definite
reference^ Every sentence does, every sentence has a
fully determined object to which it refers. Wittgenstein
seems unaware of the ontological problem here, that
neither object nor knowledge of object could change and
still leave us with the same object. Thus in the example
we have seen of this, if I say
, -this watch is on the
table", I may not necessarily mean or imply, -Some spring
is on the table," for I may not know that the watch has
a spring. In spite of its problems, it does allow Witt-
genstein to defend definiteness of sense the way he
wishes to defend it. The meant object or reference-, is
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fully determined as I mean it, whether T mn xn 1 mean it to have
a spring, not to have a sarins' f' j- K — or even whether, hav-
given it no prior thnurrVi+ tP ought, I neither mean it to have
^ nor not to have a c, r)ri no- T°pnng. Let me put the point
in terms characteristic fnr win , •u genstein much later, jyjy
conceptual map is alwavs ativ. y least a map, even if it will
not guide me out of d iff 5 pin t i <a iiioul es (or even if it guides
me into them).
The upshot of this is not surprising, considering
Wittgenstein's theory of meaning as reference,. The sense
of my sentence is definite if its reference, is. Wittgen-
stein's analysis goes further however, in attempting to
answer the next question which is, when is the reference
determined? It is fully determined, he says, when “the
syntactical employment of each of its parts" is “settled
advance. I 0 i s
, e.g. , not possible only sub-
sequently to come u£on the fact that a proposition fol-
lows from it." 42 m terms then of the objects themselves,
they are fully determined when it is not possible to find
out later that they have or do not have certain properties,
that certain sentences are or are not true of them. The
complete fixity of the objects of reference, is presupposed
by the definiteness of our ordinary language or our sci-
entific theories.
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So far we have dealt with objects of types one and
two, those dependent for their object-status upon some
conceptual scheme. In doinp- ua mg oo we have seen how Wittgen-
stein felt he justified the perfectly definite sense ofK sentences, the sentences of my language (or even idio-
lect), without appeal to intersub jective criteria. The
justification has followed the over-all pattern of many
transcendental arguments. We begin with a known, if
puzzling, fact, one which must somehow be accepted and
explained, and we ask. How is this possible? Our
known fact is. we do mean something definite when we
speak, our sentences (to take an example) have a definite
sense. But how is such a definiteness of sense possible?
What guarantees its possibility? That guarantee, for
Wittgenstein, is provided by the definiteness of the
objects about which I speak.
2. This obviously does not guarantee the definite-
ness of sense in general. Yet that too is a basic fact
about the world in which we live, a fact needing perhaps
skilled philosophical justification, but undeniably a
fact. For all the difficulties we often have in doing
so, we do understand each other, we often know what
another person is talking about, and can agree or dis-
agree with him. Even when two different languages are
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being spoken, we can frequently understand each, other.
But the justification of the fact that my (subjective)
sense is clear to me entails little or nothing to help
us see how such interpersonal and even inter-linguistic
communication can be iusti-fioH r?j fied. For precisely what seems
clearest and least ambiguous to me may seem full of am-
biguity to another, and often does. We then are faced
here with the same problem as just occupied us, only on
an inter-subjective scale, how can we justify the fact
that, on the one hand, sentences are full of vagueness
and ambiguity with the fact that, on the other hand,
understanding and being understood requires full defin-
iteness of the sense of our sentences?
,
As we would expect, Wittgenstein turns for a solu-
tion m the same direction as he turned before: to ob-
jects. This time, however, the kind of objects he con-
siders above can be of no aid. For those objects are
such precisely because they are given the status by a
language or theory, and we are now concerned with com-
paring languages or theories. But actual objects are
independent of language: this enables them, at least
f>rima fac le
, to serve for inter-subjective or inter-
linguistic purposes, but seems at the same time to strip
Wittgenstein of the tool he used to get at the other
1^ 5 .
objects (and the only tool hp boo ny 1 be has allowed himself )
i
language.
ihe deprivation is real but i+c ^D lt s importance only
apparent. For his ardent is transcendental and strives
to examine, not language, hut the roots'of language ; not
so much what language is (which is a matter for some fac-
tual science or another), but what is presupposed by
(H^lHdiziert in) language. The proof of the claim
that if there were no objects in the world there would
be no definiteness of sense needs to use language only
as something to wonder at, only as part of the question,
not as part of the solution. Each sentence we use vacil-
ates (^.onwankt) in its meaning, ana does so at our
command. As we have seen, it can do this only as its
meant objects also vacillate. If this were all there
were, these subjective objects open always to change at
the subject's command, the idea of a known steady world,
one which does not itself vacillate as do the objects
of our sentences, would make no sense. But we are faced
with the fact that it does make sense, and that its mak-
ing sense is derived in part from our certainty that we
do communicate with others. If nothing could or did set
limits to the changes of meaning constantly occuring in
language, the (or one) presupposition of our ability to
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understand each other would he lacking p
u-
-acKmg. Por we wouldhave no way to check on how the object, of th
u.ert W 4-p . J “ O e sentencesy he other person are chanp-in/rangmg, compared with thpway our own might be changing w ,e g. Ue could not possibly
dVG mutual understanding p
,, „
a omg. tven more than^ ^idea of mutual understand i rwrng would be nonsense.
Ihere must then be nn+noi •0 jects independent of our
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qualities or characteristics, we have seen Wittgen-
stein claim, stem from language. Since actual objects
must be free from language in order to fulfill the role




A study of the Notebooks is itself interesting and
profitable, but its main value lies in the connections
we can make between them and his much more mature dis-
tillation of them (and others), the Tractatus
. The pre-
ceding chapter has given us much important background
with which to approach and better understand his picture
theory in the later work, m this chapter I have brought
out three main points which characterise both works.
The first is the way in which Wittgenstein uses the
word ••object" (Objekt, Gegenstand, Ding). lt is ambigu .
ous, used in three significantly different ways. All of
these are important to Wittgenstein in the Tractates
and confusing two senses or failing to realise that 'there
are these three senses can lead to serious error in in-
terpreting its ontology. Ai ong with this we have also
seen that, as "object" is ambiguous, so is "simple".
Its less important senses (for ontology, at least) are
found in speaking of simple perceptual objects. Its on-
tologically important sense is transcendental, in speak-
ing of actual simple (though never perceived or experi-
enced) objects.
I have also pointed out, secondly, that Wittgenstein
develops his position in ontology by means of an argument
which divides into two main portions, each of which may
be treated independently as I have done here. The first,
though 1 have presented it second, is the existence of
actual objects. The second is the argument (or arguments)
for the simplicity of such objects. Almost independent
itself of all his other arguments is that from the defin-
iteness of sense, which I examined last. While some of
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these arguments are not found word for word in the
Tractatus, their general form, the way in which Wittgen-
stein presents and develops them, will be repeated there.
Last, and perhaps most important, 1 have brought out
the transcendental character of the arguments. That too
is not only found in the Tractatus
. but determines the
nature of the arguments there. Having made these points
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5 2^2 only determine a form . .ug the theory of the Tractatus and that of theNotebooks agree in large part, that of the later workis more complex. The problems raised by these pas-sages are a mark of that increased complexity, andd ° 5
^
1 sturb the Notebo oks. Since this section ison the Notebooks, I have set these problems asideuntil we deal directly with them in the Tractatus
This also poses another difficulty for the theory
of the Tractatus. A bestehende relation, e.g.
,
is
most naturally taken to be one which exists amongst
actual objects, yet by this argument, it cannot be
taken in that way. These two difficulties -- this
one and that raised by 2.02 - 2.0231 -- receive
little or no attention in the Notebooks . Their sol-
ution is hinted at but not developed adequately
until the Tractatus ; that is why I have postponed
any more than a mention of them until later.
Wittgenstein, Notebooks
, op. cit.
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SUBSTANCE AND SIMPLES IN THE TRACTATUS
Three propositions underlying Wittgenstein- s approach
to ontology in the Tractatus have already come to light in
our examination of his notebooks
. They are,
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Gnd °f the sages weo j language is not related to the
wor. m any straightforward manner. No
theorv of l
efJrence . ?at . least no traditional •iy reference, 2 will be or can be ade-quate to relate language to reality.
3. We are, Wittgenstein felt, forced to the
conclusion that objects which have no quali-ties at all3 ~ absolutely bare objects^ --must exist.
This specifically ontological proposition occupied
us last in our examination of the Notebooks ? it will be
our central concern with the Tractatus . It is also,
chronologically at least, Wittgenstein's first major
concern there. Appropriately enough, however, he does
not begin by telling us what his ontology is: he shows
it to his readers without comment. Propositions 1 - 1.21
of the Tractatus have one principal airm to present a
sketch of the ontology which he then develops much more
154 .
fully throuehout *<**, but especially in the eariy
Th° °f thiS * devoted to a small
.
°f argUments
- 2 -°* - 2.02X2. for the existence of
simple objects. In order, however, to fix these argu-
ments more preci^piv in +uy n the general context of Wittgen-
stein's metaphysical thought, I shall begin with a pre-
sentation of his own sketch of his ontology in 1 - 1-21>
There are three terms which play a key role in Witt
genstein's ontological theory, and he introduces all of
them by the second proposition of the Tractates,




iS the t0taUty °f fa0tS
’
World, facts and things are thrown together here more
closely and more starkly than anywhere else in the Trac-
tates, and in spite of the unclarity necessarUy inyolved
m a beginning passage, where nothing has yet been defined
or explicated, we can already see quite clearly that no
ordinary metaphysics is in the making.
Proposition 1 is not only striking, it is also gram-
matically odd, if not simply ungrammatical .
6
"Der Fall
sem" (like the English "to be the case") is ordinarily
used with a subordinate clause beginning with “that" (dass)
155 .^ WUh 3 Si^ as subject, xt is thus
grammatically proper and normal to say,
a) It is the case that Pegasus exists.
It is grammatically odd i r y,~
+
y
’ 11 not grammatical, to say,
b ) Pegasus is the case.
Wittgenstein, however' V
’ intends more than just this
grammatical point here, as such propositions as 2 .02h
3.142, 4,024, and 5.13 6 2 show. "Der Fall sein", on the
l3.sis of these dpi rmo nP sages, can provisionally 7 be read as
"exists". In reading it so, we avoid trivializing 1 and
1.1. Proposition 1, then, can be more simply restated a:
l’i The world is all that exists,
(As yet, of course, we do not know clearly how Wittgen-
stein uses the words "world" and "things". Both become
clearer as we read further, but a brief thumb-nail sketci
of the kind Wittgenstein gives us here is no place for
detailed clarification of these concepts.) If we read
the "is" as "is identical to" (and the text seems to bear
no other reading), 1.1 becomes,
:L ' :L,,
not mngs!
1^ 5 iS ^ t0tality of fac^-
Two more important undefined terms are added - "facts"
and "things" — and an important puzzle comes to light.
Why does Wittgenstein say, "is the totality of facts"
s" or "are the facts"?
rather than "are fact
156 .
.
PUZZl6S aSide> thS tW0 Passages make two points clear.
Objects (or things, Din^e, Objekte, or Gegenstacrdc l are
not an the world, and, not being in the world, do not
exist, our world is (or is comprised of) facts, which
are all that exist; obiects arP ii +oy,J x " e laterally out of this
v/orld
.
Propositions 1.11 through 1.21 then briefly indicate
a few consequences of this fundamental position, hinting
at some of the more important points Wittgenstein will
develop later. Thus, for example, 1.11 and 1.12 together
preclude the possibility of what one might call super-
facts, and might be restated as
i
lai '' faats are the Pacts is notitself another fact.
With this Wittgenstein also hints at his rejection of
Russell's theory of types as a useful philosophical tool
(3.331 - 3.332), as well as at his (Wittgenstein’s)
theory of universal quantification (4,1272), Likewise,
proposition 1,21 seems to express what many consider to
be Wittgenstein's logical atomism, and seems to be ref-
lected throughout the Tractatus in such passages as 2.061
or 2.062. But these details, important as they are to
an adequate picture of Wittgenstein's ontology, are
merely mentioned here in passing. The fundamental con-
clusion one can glean from Wittgenstein's own sketch of
157 .
his ontology is this*
4
- ZllluTiTAUl11 - t.ie
(somehow) different from .-
uny°’ "ll.‘ lch are
the world, and do not exist?
3
' 116 °Utside
The hard, dogmatic sound of his outline is, however,
deceptive. Our examination of the Notebooks has already
shown that, however counterintuitive his conclusions are,
they are preceded by much incisive analysis. His pre-
sentation of that analysis is far from straightforward,
and differs from that of most subsequent analytical
philosophers in three ways which severely complicate
the Tractatus
.
1 . concentrates almost exclusively on thehighlights of the argument, leaving outimportant details, (What is left out theNoteb ooks fill in to some extent.)
Even these. highlights are stated aphoris-tically with little attempt to interrelatethem. As a consequence, the exact bearing-one argument may have on another is often"
obscure and exasperatingly difficult to
perceive clearly.
3. Instead of beginning with what is prior in
the argument, Wittgenstein often begins at
his conclusion.
.
As we saw in the Notebooks
he arrived at his ontological position
through reflections on his theory of logic
and language. In the Tractatus . although
the theory and its reasons are ’basically
the same, the order of presentation is re-
versed, and we proceed from ontology to
language and from there to theory of logic,
Wittgenstein realizes with a vengeance his threat
that this book will be understood only by someone who
has himself already had the thoughts that are expressed
an it - or at least similar thoughts." 8 To understand
the beginning, the reader must already clearly understand
the v/h o 1 e book,
One could scarcely explicate the entire Tractatus
m a work of less length than Max Black- s Companion to
Wittgenstein's j'ractatus (386 pages of text alone), and
I do not propose to write anything of that length. We
•mist, therefore, settle for less than absolute compre-
hension of his ontology. I shall aim for a clear, though
not entirely adequate, exposition of the basic themes
that constitute his ontology. Its main features will
thus be brought to light, though many of their consequences
or reflections in other areas (most importantly, in the
theory of logic) will either be left unexplored or be
touched on inadequately.
Unlike many examinations of Wittgenstein's ontology
(including the two that are book-length, A. Mueller's
Ontolo^ie—jfL -Vittgenstein' s "Tractatus * 1 and H, Finch's
Wittgenstein — The Early Philosophy9 ). I shall begin
with the problem of what Wittgenstein meant by "object".
There are two major reasons for choosing this as the
starting point. The first, and lesser, is that this is
159 .
where Wittgenstein himself begins The , •6 i second is that
many of the problems in interpreting n-his ontology arise
from either an unsympathetic or on inc.r-r- •
J_.
a ^sufficient consider-
a ion of what he meant by the term. Once this point in
his theory becomes clear, many apparent confusions vanish
and the rest of the theory becomes far more easily
accessible.
Because this question has received much attention
in the literature on the Tractatus, and my answer to it
is different from any of the positions normally assumed,W11 d6V0te three chapters to presenting it. m the
first two I develop my own views, with relatively little
attention to the views of others Tn +h* Tuxn . i this way I can pro-
ceed in a much more straightforward manner, avoiding ex-
tensive (though necessary) tangents. The third is then
devoted to a criticism of three main opposing views. 10
II
A
Any attempt to discover and clarify Wittgenstein's
use of the word "object" in the Tractatus must acknow-
ledge a fundamental fact, Wittgenstein uses the word,
throughout his entire work, to refer to several funda-
mentally different types of things. This alone would
160
.
not be a severe problem hut
' seri °usness is compounded
by the fact that Wittgenstein n-r+^v,wx xem often seems unaware that he
uses the word in more than one sense, and he seldom gives
his readers a clear indication when he changes senses.
Although he acknowledges that changeableness in one place
st least (4.123), in general he slides from one use of
the cord, m which it refers to objects with some sort
of complexity, to the other, in which it refers to things
totally without any complexity, namely, absolutely simple
objects
.
thus, on the one hand, many of Wittgenstein- s comments
throughout the Tract^tus seem unintelligible unless ob-
jects are the sort of things which have some sort of
structure, and hence some sort of complexity, built into
thorn, As examples, one could quote such passages as:
2.012t In logic nothing is accidental* if athing can occur in a state of affairs
the possibility of the state of affairs
must be written into the thing itself,
or i
2.0123j If I know an object, I also know all
its possible occurences in states of
affairs, (Every one of these possibil-




On the other hand, Wittgenstein seems on other
occasions io state flatly that objects have no structure
or complexity at all. He writes*
161
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2.0^'j Objects are simple.
Ho does not claim hero that objects are simple in com-
P loon to this or that, or simple by reference to one
rather than to some other standard; he claims that ob-
jects are simple without a^mcation. 11 And, of course,
much of what he argues in the section from 2.02 to 2 0272
’
(for example) either aims at proving, or depends on the
assumption, that the objects there referred to are ab-
solutely simple. Yet obviously an object cannot be both
simple (as this and related passages demand) and complex
(as many propositions from, e.g., the 2,01's, including
those above, seem to demand.) In a sense, the key to the
solution of the entire problem of Wittgenstein' s ontology
lies in the resolution of these contrasting and apparent-
ly contradictory passages. If objects are absolutely
simple, how can we speak of something being "written
into the thing (object) itself"? Yet if they are complex,
what does Wittgenstein mean when he explicitly calls them
"simple" and states no reservations at all to that claim?
It is "object" in this first sense, the sense in
which it refers to objects which are simple, which will
occupy me in this chapter. I shall argue that several
passages strongly support the conclusion that "object"
often referred to something absolutely bare, something
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with no qualities at all j n• I d01r,g 30 I shall postpone
any consideration of •• object" <„ +>,“e in the other sense, that^ WhlCh °bjeCtS ai' e Said * complex
, until after I
developed my arguments and considered their alter-
natives.
Throughout this and the following chapters, I shall
principally use the word ••object-, though occasionally
'•thing-. They are
, for me as for Wittgensteini synotxymou;
There is, therefore, no significance attached to changes
between terms in English or in the German text. Indeed, •
for Wittgenstein "Objekt"
,
"Gegenstand " and "Ding" all
share the different referents pointed out above (as do
"object" and "thing" as I use them here.)
B
The first, and certainly one of the clearest, sec-
tions in which Wittgenstein argues for the simplicity of
objects is the sequence of propositions which begins
with 2.02 and ends with 2.0272. In 2 - 2.0141 — the
section immediately preceding 2.02 — several proposi-
tions imply the irreduceable complexity of objects. Yet
m 2.02 Wittgenstein, as if starting afresh, states that
"objects are simple". He immediately argues for his
in 2.021, 2.0211, and 2.0212 he gives us his
c3aim»
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first, and perhaps most important, argument for it.
2 • 0211
Son?f
S VP the substance of thew rld That is why they cannot becomposite
.




n Whether another proposition
2 . 0212 i In that case we could not sketch out anypicxure of the world (true or false).
The argument, as is clear at a glance, follows the in-
verted order of presentation I have already suggested as
characteristic of the Tractatus
. It could be rephrased,
with great gain in simplicity, ass
2.021*1 Objects are simple because they make
up substance.
2. 0211* s There must be substance because
* otherwise sense could not be fully
independent of truth.
2.0212's If sense were not fully independent
of truth, we could not make pictures
(truly or falsely) of the facts.
Thus only the first of these passages directly argues
for the simplicity of objects? 2.0211 and 2.0212 support
it. In explicating the argument, I shall follow Wittgen-
stein's order.
The central notion of 2.021 and 2.0211, and thus of
the whole argument-chain, is that of substance. The
whole argument, in fact, rests on the peculiar interpre-
tation Wittgenstein gives the notion, and my primary
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task win be to make that clear. But. before that can
bS d °ne
' lt 13 necessary to consider two possible „,is-
interpretations of this ardent, arising from alter-
native (and wrong) views of the role substance plays in
lt * °ne °f these would misinterpret the notion in a
fairly straightforward manner, and the other (represented
by Max Black in his ComEanion to Wittgenstein's Tractatusl
would simply ignore it.
1. The argument compressed into 2.021 lends itself
particularly easily to misinterpretation based on a mis-
understanding of the meaning of "substance". It is
natural to assume that Wittgenstein, whose philosophical
training and interest concentrated on philosophy since
Descartes, would mean by it what it had come to mean in
that tradition. Locke’s definition
(Essay II, 23, 2) is
particularly clean




lon of pure substance in general, hewill find he has no other idea of it, but onlya supposition of he knows not what support ofsuch qualities which are capable of producing
simple ideas in us; which qualities are com-'
monly called accidents. The idea, then, to
which we give the general name substance,
being nothing but the supposed, but unknowrn,
support of those qualities we find existing
which we imagine cannot exist sine re sub-
'
stantie
, without something to support them,
we call that support substantia / which,
according to the true import of the word, is,
in plain English, standing under, or upholding.
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I't follows from this thot qhKc.+-t oubstance cannot be or have^ qualities (at least nnt 1
1
L
’ o in the sense in which an
object is said to have them) precise]
v
i r-L o iy because its en-
tire function is to underlie, to tie together, all
qualities. it is, therefore, for Locke (who continued
to accept its existence) something totally qualityless.
assume that Wittgenstein understood "substance"m this manner, his argument becomes both clear and simple,
though probably fallacious Obicot- h* •‘ UDjecfcs
’ he claims, "make up-
(bilden) the substance of the world. That substance it-
self must be qualityless
, therefore, the objects which
">ake it up must be qualityless as well - else the sub-
stance would have at least those qualities possessed by
the objects. 12 Whatever the merits and lacks of such an
argument are (or would be if further developed), it will
not do for Wittgenstein. Its fundamental assumption,
that Wittgenstein means by "substance" something very
similar to what Locke meant by it is wrong. On Locke's
theory, form and content are traditionally viewed as
opposites; substance is identified with content, i. e .,
that which has form, or that which is formed or shaped.
It can not, therefore, be form. Wittgenstein, however,
identifies both form and content with substance i
2.025> It is form and content.
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Ihus we must abandon any effort tn ini* 11 interpret Wittgen-
stein's substance along Lockean lines.
2. Perhaps
, however, it is possible to avoid the
apparently dimcult question of what Wittgenstein meant^ "substance", at least at this point.' One might at-
tempt to construe the argument without recourse to the
notion of substance at all. Max Black, in fact, does



















C °mpleX cofrtin '
mate objects iA d^it^oSeriorjitS
0^ 1-
e°' could say anW^at’an!'
ob Veits ^hfr 2 ' 0 ? 1! • • • if there "were no
plexitv of a J 1U °n 0f the aPParent com-
' terminus





oi^some other sentence S?(affirming the existence of a complex aooar
wSuld
";entl °ned in si) and the sense o/s?o depend upon the truth of some other^S-aand ^ so on without end. This would be a
' ^
’
ipj^ous regresst. we could never know whate sense of^a given Si was without first
£££ lHigoss_ibile, knowing an infinity of otherpropositions to be true. 13
y xn
This indeed is a tempting interpretation. It is simple,
avoids the problem of the meaning of "substance", and
seems at first glance to fit the text smoothly. Yet,
whatever its virtues are, it is not the argument Witt-
genstein gives us here. Wittgenstein was not needlessly
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verbose (quite the opposite'). • 4.. ; his introduction of the
word "substance" at this noint < , .S p 13 n ot without reason;
substance has a vital role to play in Wittgenstein's
argument which Black's construal of it ignores. The
way Black continues the passage quoted above shows how
far his conception of the
"More simply
t unless some
argument is from Wittgenstein's,
signs are in direct connection
the world (as names are when they stand for objects)
no signs can be in indirect connexion either." Black
has us arguing from a presumption about language to ob-
jects in the world. Wittgenstein, on the other hand,
simply asserts that objects make up substance, and argues
from the independence of sense from the truth of other
sentences to the necessity, not of objects, but of sub-
stance. It might be defensible to construe this argu-
ment as concerning objects rather than substance, as
Black does. But even if it is, he makes no defense at
all of the move, he scarcely seems aware that he makes
such a substitution. Furthermore, Black seems committed
by his argument to an indefensible misinterpretation of
Wittgenstein's notion of an object. Wittgenstein, as we
have already seen in our brief look at propositions 1 -
1.21, has explicitly denied objects a place in the world,
yet Black equally explicitly accords them a place there.
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Thus Black- s version of the argument, whatever merits it
may have as an argument in its own right, does not repre-





’ d °eS "ittgenstein mean by "substance"'
According to 2.0211, substance is that which enables a
Proposition to have sense (Sinn), regardle ss 0f whether
"another proposition" (which must be taken here to mean
"any other proposition" 14
) were true. The substance of
the world is thus connected somehow with the sense of
sentences, but not their truth. As Wittgenstein expresses
it slightly later*










at su»sists inde-ly f what is the case.
We catch echoes here of the ontological independence, not
only of logic, but as well of language, which Wittgen-
stein has discussed in his Notebooks
, substance relieves
any given sentence s
2 from any dependence for its sense
on the truth of any other sentence s
2 .
Thus in the Trac
tatus the notion of substance ceases to be a purely meta
Physical one, and becomes tied to language. As in many
other cases, what Wittgenstein does here is reminiscent
of what Kant does in the Critique of Pure Reason . Much
as Kant took the traditional, metaphysical definition
of "substance" and reinterpreted it as one of his cate-
gories, Wittgenstein makes it necessary for language
169 .
rather than, as it had traditionally been thought of,
necessary for things. Thus, just as for Locke things
have properties (which other things can be said to share)
which inhere in substance, so for Wittgenstein sentences
have a sense (which other sentences may also quite proper.
ly be said to share) which requires a substance which
itself has no sense at all.
This way of looking at substance seems to fit the
view of the l^actatus well, but it leads to puzzling,
even startling, consequences if taken seriously. Con-
sider the sentence*
a. Some cats are black.
According to Wittgenstein, this sentence has sense even
if no other sentence is true. The minimum that he in-
tends to accomplish by this claim seems quite clear. The
sentence has sense, at least, even if such apparently
integrally connected sentences asi
b. There are some cats.
are false. Again, one of his most important aims here
is to do justice to our belief that we understand false
sentences (and that they therefore have something which
we are able to understand, i.e., sense). Most discussions




Wittgenstein, however seemc? + ~ m. ms to mean more than just
this. His claim also entails that a's having sense is
independent of the truth of Euch claims ag(
o. Black" is not a number-word,
(S'o"S)“* °f thinS «»*• on be black
*'
“-""‘S.' Sf.f;r‘;rS3
the falsity of c, d, or e would involve, not the
falsity of a, but rather its nonsense, its simply not
having meaning. For if c were false, a would have no
more sense than?
f# Some cats are four.
Likewise, were d false, we would be faced with a parallel
toi
g. Virtue is black.
Were e false, a would perhaps sound like
j
h. Hana ha cat —
i.e., strictly nonsense. These three cases can be de-
rived from the negation of a single more general claim,
which one might well feel must be true if any sentence
at all is to have (make) sense. One way of phrasing it
would be*
i. For any sentence S to make sense, all sentenceswhich are (or express) its presuppositions mustalso make sense.
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Thus i would seem to be a c i Pa r
, .
C "‘e exc eption to the claimWhich Wittgenstein wants to establish.
''ittgenstein himself seems to point out another
exception to his thesis when he speaks of the ..general
Propositional form" s
5'*7" SUSW.WSSK f“ “ ,h*
Later he even tells us what +v,„the general form for propo-
sit ions is
i
S^reral form of a t-m+K -p , •





of l proposition^ general form
.
6 ' 0011







of the operation N(|T
Positions
So it would seem to follow that, for a proposition to be
a proposition (and therefore able to make sense), some





either elementary, or the
one or more elementary^ences. }
If A is false, then S is meaningless simply because it
is not a sentence: its meaningfulness (having sense)
depends therefore on the truth of j (or a claim like it),
and we are faced with another possible exception to the
claim I attribute to Wittgenstein.
No sooner have we arrived at the notion of substance
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in the Tractatus, than we find it has given rise to a
severe difficulty. To review the above briefly, the
P blern is this. Wittgenstein wishes to argue that ob-
jects, which make up substance, are (must be) simple
Precisely because of what substance is. To understand
the argument, therefore, we must first understand what
he means by “substance- - a task in which Wittgenstein
imself is not very helpful, since he uses the word in
only five places. ? Yet those passages show fairly
clearly that Wittgenstein’s meaning differs markedly
from the traditional. It also shows that substance is
that which enables sentences to be meaningful (have sense),
even though no other sentence at all is true. But this
now_is seen to be too strong a claim. There are, it
seems, at least two exceptions to it, and it would also
seem that Wittgenstein is committed to acknowledging
both — those we have seen in i and If i i s not ful-
filled, then the linguistic prerequisites of the sen-
tence's making sense would not be fulfilled (as, e.g.,
when a category mistake occurs). If is not fulfilled,
then, for Wittgenstein, the purported sentence is not a
sentence at all. That is to say, the sense not just of
some, but of all sentences seems to depend on the truth
of at least i_ and
173 .
.
4 - °ne Way °Ut 0f thiS difficulty for Wittgenstein
qtuclcly suggests itself
_ We couid Um . t <gajif (which
is translated as 'proposition' i n +v v.m the above quotations)
here to mean 'elementary sentence' or 'elementary propo-
This is similar to what many feel tempted to




a ^ rS ^ “dependent of
Here, the argument would go, it is surely impossible that~ StatSS °f affairs are ^dependent of one another. My
mg in my office is, e.g.
, not independent of my beingm Decatur, Georgia, the town in which my office is
located, m view of this kind of difficulty, one feels
tempted to interpret 2.061 to claim independence for
atomic (elementary) states of affairs only.
(There are
,
of course, similar passages elsewhere in the Tractatus .
See, e.g., 1.21, which seems, prima facie at least, to
be simply another, more mysterious, way of stating what
2 . 06l states,
)
Whether such a move is correct for the interpretation
of 2.061 and similar passages or not, it is at least not
sufficient to answer the problem the present passages
seem to raise. The independence of all (and only) atomic
states of affairs from each other may be a thesis of
Tractanan metaphysics, 18 but to claim that meaning is
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independent of truth for all and onljr elementary sentences
is Plainly inadequate. Wittgenstein wants and needs the
independence of the sense of ordinary. C ompl ex sentences
from the truth of all other ordinary, complex sentences.
His concern here ic- wi-t-hs i the sentences of ordinary lan-
guage, and with our ability to understand them even when
they are false or their truth-value not yet fully deter-
mined.
Even if Wittgenstein's interests allowed one to
interpret "sentence" here as "elementary sentence", the
difficulty would not be overcome. For both i and j would
still have to hold true, even for elementary sentences',
if they were to have sense - i vacuously, and of course
only the first disjunct of j. Thus they would still seem
to constitute objections to Wittgenstein's thesis even
reinterpreted to hold for elementary sentences only.
It would seem then that there is no way to avoid the
exceptions to this claim pointed out in i and j. Perhaps,
in other words, it could be seen to say that all sentences,
simple or complex, are independent of the truth of any
other sentence, except for precisely those sentences (or
types of sentences) seen in i and j. Here we limit, not
the type of sentence (as we tried to do above), but
rather restrict the range of independence of all sentences.
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In doing so
, of course, we make Wittgenstein's original
claim much less startling, and bring it more in line
with the way Wittgenstein's intentions are normally seen.
This kind of solution, however, leaves far too much
to be desired. It seems, first of all, entirely ad hoc,
and thus very clumsy. Even if there were direct textual
evidence that Wittgenstein meant to restrict his claim,
this way of doing so bears so little resemblance to the
eruioe sharp, piecise thought of the Tractatus that
it becomes suspect on that ground alone. But there is
no visible textual evidence that he intended to allow
the possibility of such exceptions. Even though j is
based directly on passages from the Tractatus . Wittgen-
stein did not seem to see it as an exception to the claim.
5. Our puzzle and our inability to provide a solution
to it have both arisen through the consideration of mean-
ingful sentences. If we cannot provide a solution that
way, perhaps we can if we change the approach: what is
it that, according to Wittgenstein, makes (what appears
to be) a sentence meaningless? Both in the Notebooks
and in the Tractatus he gives the same answer: a non-
elementary sentence can be defective (lack sense) through
our failure to give some of its components meaning (i.e.,
reference, see 5.^733). That is, it is a necessary
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(though as 3.1h - 3.24 show not a 8U„. P ,^ sufficient) condition
of a proposition* s having sen oP +u 4g oe that each of its element
or names, have a reference Thr> fa • i
t „ ,
' Phe failure of what appearsXo be a sentence to actual lvy be one, and thus to have
meaning, i s not, that is n
’ failure on the part of the
- it is a failure on our part, we fail to do
something (even if we think we have done it). „ we do
our job, then all the components of the sentence have
reference, and the kind of failure i (or something simi-
lar to it) points out cannot occur The, i presuppositions
of a sentence, in other words, are actually part of that
sentence. To use a Tractarian phrase (as in 2.012),
they are prejudged in the sentence. Or, looking atit
another way, the sentence has no presuppositions exter-
nal to It to Which i (or something like it) could refer,
if it is a meaningful sentence it contains its presup-
positions as part of itself. To generate c through h,
we must think of the presuppositions of a sentence as
somehow independent of the sentence itself, Wittgenstein
however, refuses to do so. on his theory, the chain of
presuppositions culminating in i could not even have
been begun, for to begin it would have been nonsense.
The criticism brought forward by j, however, remains,
and cannot be entirely disposed of here. It is a
177 .
Huguisl'ic law
, and its rpi o+irelation to sentences is much
g sam0 as "tlio rpl i n>^ rv-p ime e at on of a law of physics to physical
Phenomena. Exactly what that relation is must await
further discussion, but we can see immediately that it,
like all alws on Wittgenstein's theory, is nonsense,
strictly speaking. It cannot, therefore, be affirmed
of sentences strictly or in any straightforward manner,
and thus cannot constitute a genuine objection to the
claim above, which can be directly or straightforwardly
sfi- irmed of sentences.
Thus our apparent exceptions are not exceptions! each
sentence is fully independent of any other sentence, and
it still is (according to Wittgenstein) substance which
enables them to be thus independent. In considering the
objections raised by i and j, we have come to realize
that sentences, as Wittgenstein thinks of them, are very
different entities from what we ordinarily hold them to
be. Each sentence has, built into it, its own form and
presuppositions, these are, so to speak, integral and
inalienable parts of it.
6. With this understanding of what Wittgenstein
meant by "substance" and "sentence", let us return to
a direct consideration of the argument involved in
2.0/.1 - 2.0212. Each of these propositions requires
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and will receive further discussion but thatu c discussion
v-ill not touch on two vital ptoutv- nr . .v-Locu. gr ups of questions which
underlie the argument-chain. The first of thoi x 01 ese centers
on the problem of the relation between objects and sub-
stance. It involves such questions as. Why are objects
necessary
, m addition to substance? Must there be a
Plurality of simple objects, and, if there must, does
i-his not violate Leibniz 1 principle of the Identity of
Indiscernables (or would Wittgenstein care if he did
violate it)? Some of these have been discussed and
, I
think, already correctly answered - as, for example,
the problem of Wittgenstein 1 s acceptance or rejection
of Leibniz* principle, 19 others, such as the question of
the reasons for claiming the existence of a multitude of
objects, have not even been raised, let alone discussed.
The other important but undiscussed group of questions
affecting this argument-chain involves our ability to
make pictures, does Wittgenstein's concept of picturing
make sense, and is his claim that we make them justified?
Both groups of problems lie beyond the chain of the ar-
gument, the one on the one side, the other on the other.
7 . Ihere are two ways to understand 2.021.
2.021i Objects make up the substance of the
world. That is why they cannot be
composite.
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Our selection will dpnpnH ^epe d on our interpretation of -make
up" (“Widen"), and this wiu în turn affect our under-
standing of the central notion in th» »».l e argument, that of
substance
.
The simpler of these two ways is based, again, on
the. attempt to understand Wittgenstein's notion of sub-
stance in as Lockean a manner as possible. As I have
out above, Locke's view of substance is very dif-
ferent from Wittgenstein's. Nevertheless, if we begin
with that view, we may be better able to understand Witt-
genstein's actual position more clearly, by way of con-
trast. That is, by Showing why we cannot accept for
Wittgenstein what the Lockean view would imply, we will
more clearly understand what Wittgenstein actually accepts
and why he does so.
On this approach, we would interpret "make up" in
an ordinary manner; nothing is implied about the way in
which elements make up something. As substance must be
simple for Locke, so also (it would be argued) for Witt-
genstein. But if objects are complex, then if objects
make up substance, substance would have at least that
degree of complexity which could be attributed to the
objects, and could not be simple. The objects, therefore,
must be simple, not composite ( zusammengesetzt ) -- and
180
.
6d abS °1Utely Simple
" for oven the most elementary
quality would preclude substance from being^
guarantees sense of every sentence, independently of the
truth of any other (precisely as having any quality
would prevent Lockeian substan^Dstance from serving as the
substitute for all other qualities).
As before, however, the simpler interpretation does
not do full justice to what Wittgenstein actually in-
tended. The word translated here as "make up", bilden .
is used later in the Tractates in at least ten passage! 20
(where Pears and McGuinness translate it by "construct"
and its derivatives). Two of these propositions, 5 . 501
and 5.503, express very clearly what Wittgenstein in-
tended by the word in these later uses*
5,5 °1‘ ^e can distinguish three kinds ofdescription








alue ?‘ 2< Siving a function fxooe values for all values of x arethe propositions to be described; 3 .giving a .formal law that governs the
construction of the propositiosn, inwhich case the bracketed expression
has as its members all the terms of
a series of forms.
It is obvious that we can easily
express how propositions may be' con-
structed with this operation, and
how they may not be constructed
with it ... .
181 .
Thus
, "to construct", bildcn, implies two things at
least. it implies the presence of non-constructed
elements, and a "formal law" or "operation" 21 by which
to bring them together to make up, construct, the final
Product. Construction, to put it briefly, implies law-
ful order of elements. If this is so, of course, then
substance (assuming consistency in the use of the word
on Wittgenstein's part 22 ), as Wittgenstein sees it, is
not totally simple, but has structure.
Nevertheless, the argument goes, the objects which .
make up substance must still be simple, if not, sub-
stance could not be substance, i. e ,, that which guaran-
tees the meaningfulness of sentences apart from any con-
siderations, especially considerations of the truth of
other sentences. For let us suppose that the object o
is complex in possessing exactly two qualities (any sort
of qualities — logical, color, etc. — will do), q 1 and
2 23
q . Sentence S
x
has its (supposedly independent) sense
guaranteed by the substance, which is a relation of ob-
jects — for simplicity's sake, let us say three objects.
Thus, where G = 'guarantees the sense of, and C = 'is
constructed of, and T = the substance:
k ‘ T ^ C °1 °2 °3^ G s i-
Letting a superscript represent a quality, and assuming
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Where q^ q2 and ox could be related in one way, the
sense of
S;L is fully determinate, that is,
S;L has a
determinate sense. But suppose that ^ q 2 and ^ could
be related in two ways, i.e. j






In this case, k* is ambiguous, it can, so far as we know,
written either as 1, or as 1', would suggest, is
therefore not fully determinate, as it must still be de-
termined whether the relation suggested in 1, or that in
1’,'is intended. S
1
does not have a determinate sense.
But a proposition, according to Wittgenstein, must be
determinate (3.23, 3.251, and 6.124). Somehow, in other
words, we must know whether
q;L
and q 2 can be related
in one way only, or, if (as in 1 and 1' ) in more than
one way, then in which v/ay they are related.
Now let us assume, in k and k'
, that 0] is irreduce-
ably complex. This is to make the assumption that, in
terms of this limited example, substance itself is made
up of irreduceably complex objects. The paragraph im-
mediately preceding this one has shown that the relation
183 .
between q 1( q 2 and 0;L must be determinate if s, is to
have sense. What that determinate relation is could be
expressed in a sentence to the effect that,
m
' q l’ q2 and °X arfc related in a given ($) manner .
This could then be expanded as appropriate, either, on




lated ln one way
' or > on the other hand, m could pick
out precisely which of several possible relations held.
Every meaningful sentence, i.e., every sentence with a
determinate sense, presupposes the truth of m or an
analogous claim.
We have seen, however, that the role of substance
is to avoid precisely this situation. Substance, that
is, .is what guarantees the meaningfulness of sentences,
independent of the truth, in each case, of m or some
analogue of it. Thus the objects which make up substance
must be simple. If they were not, substance could not
play the role Wittgenstein assigned to it, the guarantor
of the meaning of sentences, independent of the truth of
any others.
8. Proposition 2.0211 is, in a sense, a definition
of "substance" (and v/as so used in section 2, p. 166
above). Yet it can be equally well treated as an argu-
ment in its own right. If so, two questions arise.
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Why (reversing the antecedent and consequent of the
stated version) does it follow from the fact that "whether
a proposition had sense" does not depend on "whether an-
other proposition was true" that there is substance? And,
secondly, why should one hold that "whether a proposition’
had sense" does not "depend on whether another proposi-
tion was true"? Wittgenstein simply ignores the first
of these questions, and concentrates on the second, to
which proposition 2.0212 is his answer. An answer to
the first can nevertheless be indicated briefly before
we tun, to 2,0212, although not discussed or fully devel-
oped here.
Let us reformulate and clarify the first question
as follows. Why do the following three propositions in-
volve, on Wittgenstein's view, a contradiction:
(i) The proposition p has sense;
(ii) Its having sense depends on the truth of
no other proposition p'
;
(iii) There is no substance.
If (iii) is true, then language stands over against
reality directly: if it refers, the only things to refer
to are objects as they are in the world, i.e., as they
make up facts. We have seen, in section 5 above, that
the correlation of each of a proposition's ultimate
elements with things is a necessary, though not sufficient,
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condition of its having sense. If p is to .o l ha/e meaning
3.11
, "then each cr i + o t° elements must ^ in connection
with reality, with the obiectq +ho+ ,oj s t at make up the facts.
Bu c then, in order for r r' IO P t0 have sense, a further pro-
Position must be true, namely one such as,
(iv) The elements of r> arc inHoni ..
specific objectslin specif^ ed to
Let me draw an analogy at this point. Suppose that
Fld ° 15 3 tMn d °g ’ but 1 to picture him as a fat
one. There are two ways I can do so. The first of thes- analogous to the way which seeks to deny the existenc,
of substance. I take Fido, and put him in front of' one
or more trick mirrors, in the last one the image is that
of a fat dog. If there is no substance, sentences are
ultimately this kind of picture, just as the false image
of a fat Fido depends on there actually being a Fido (on
the truth of something other than the picture). so the
sense of a sentence depends on the truth of other
sentences
.
Alternatively I can simply draw a picture of a fat
dog and represent that as Fido. From this we cannot
conclude that Fido exists - indeed we cannot conclude
that anything but the picture exists. (If we acknowledge
it as a picture, then we must of course acknowledge that





case, Where we are concerned with the relations
the picture and what it pictures.) Here the
sense of the picture does not depend on anything exter-
nal to the picture; on the parallel theory of sentences
their sense would not depend on the truth of any other
sentence.
ihis analogy undeniably has its weaknesses, as do
all analogies. One such is that I have not shown how
the second way of falsely picturing Fido involves sub-
stance. In spite of this, however, the analogy makes
clear the way in which that theory which denies substance
is forced also to deny (ii). (ii) is bas ic to Wittgen-
stein's thought; no theory which rejects it may be
attributed correctly to him.
Thus, presupposing the ultimate determination of
sense independently of truth-value, objects cannot serve
as the sense of sentences: substance is necessary, and
we have answered the first question. But, what about
the second question: why should one presuppose the ul-
timate independence of sense from truth-value? There are
two ways immediately at hand to answer this question:
Wittgenstein’s own in 2.0212, and another, not directly
given by Wittgenstein but easily culled from what we
have already seen of the Tractatus and the Notebooks.
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Let us turn to this one first.
If "whether a proposition had sense" did "depend on
whether another proposition was true", then there would
bo two possibilities. The first of these is that £n _
Visioneo by Black in the passage quoted above
( 2 , pase
166). As he claims there, sentences would be unable to
reier, or latch on, to the world at all. If this were
the ease, we would indeed be caught in a vicious intra-
linguistic infinite regress, as he points out. Realizing
this, one might attempt to maintain a theory such that.W
analysable?
0 na!”eS
' Sii names are
) '?heref°re
, any sentence presupposes for
iL.s meaningfulness the truth of someother sentence;
(^) The objects to which these names refer arelike the names, irreduceably complex.^
This second possibility is already cast under sus-
picion by the line of reasoning used in k, k» and 1,
owing to its avowal of irreduceably complex objects.
Even if it were not, we could still show that it does
not represent Wittgenstein’s intentions. Let us take
three sentences, S, S', and S", such that
(i) S presupposes S',
?;i
(ii) S' presupposes S'',
( i i i
)
S * is true (i.e.
,







Since (by assumption) the meaning of sentences depends
on the truth of (some) other sentence(s), and S" is
true, S', though false, can be meaningful. But what of
S? Since its presupposition is false, however meaning-
ful, S itself cannot have meaning (though it may appear
to). However much this conclusion might satisfy Straw-
son and those who think of presuppositions as he does, 26
it would not do for Wittgenstein, since it makes the
meaningfulness of a sentence (S) depend on the truth of
others
,
I he attempt to make sense dependent on truth-value
is seen here to fail for one of two reasons. Acceptance
of that dependence either a) forces propositions ultimate-
ly to be unable to refer to anything at all, or b) holds
that they can refer to ordinary, irreduceably complex
objects. Neither of these positions, however, allows
Wittgenstein to claim many other things he explicitly
wishes to claim. Thus the independence of sense from
truth is shov/n to be a fundamental, and irreplaceable,
part of Tractarian theory.
The third in this series of arguments, that con-
tained in 2,0212, stems of course from 2.0211; it
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defends the existence of substance by defending the
independence of sense from truth-value, through the
notion of picturing, if "whether a proposition had
sense” did indeed depend on “whether another proposi-
tion was true”, then ”we could not sketch out any pic-
ture of the world (true or false) » tiK +Vl" Lihe the preceding
argument, but unlike the first, this is a modus toilers’ ,
we can "sketch out” a picture of the world, so the sense
of a proposition must be independent of the truth of any
other proposition, since the notion central to this
particular argument is that of picturing, it might seem
appropriate at this point to examine that perennial '
favorite topic of d^ctatus explicates, the picture theory.
.In fact, such an examination is not necessary. It
is sufficient to realize that, for Wittgenstein, we can
picture reality (the world), and that we can do so truly
or falsely. Then we must ask. Why or how would the de-
pendence of sense on truth-value entail our inability to
picture the world?
As above, this problem divides into two. First,
along lines similar to those of Black's interpretation,
where the answer is fairly easy, since we become in-
volved in a vicious infinite regress, we can do nothing
at all, including picturing the world. So again we
190 .
might feel tempted to rest content with the view that
we refer to irreduceably complex objects which make
up the world.
But again, Black misinterprets Wittgenstein's argu-
ment. Wittgenstein himself mentions no problem with an
infinite regress here, in fact, the problem of an in-
finite regress is not mentioned directly even once in
the Tractatu s. When Wittgenstein hints at an infinite
regress (most directly in 4 . 2211 ), his attitude is that
it constitutes no problem for him. In importing the
notion of an infinite regress into this argument, Black
presents us with one which, whatever its merits, is
surely not Wittgenstein's. Wittgenstein's argument con-
cerns -- not an infinite regress — but our inability
to sketch out a picture of the world, either a true one
or a false one. It seems natural, then, to explicate
this final argument by seeking to answer two questions
»
Vihy, if there is no substance, is it impossible to make
false pictures? and, Why, under the same conditions,
would it be impossible to make true pictures?
The answer to the first question is presupposed by
the second. If there were no substance, then, as we
have seen, the meaningfulness of one sentence or propo-
sition would depend on the truth of another. Truth, as
a large number of propositions in the Tractatus show
(i.a., 2.223 - 2.225, 3.05, 4.022 - 4.024, 4 . 063 ) is a
matter of successful reference, falsity a matter If fall _mg to refer. If there were no substance, therefore, a
sentence could be meaningful i e .» 1 ‘ .» could be a picture,
only if some sentence referred. Either (Eer impossible
it, or some other sentence presupposed by it, would have
to refer tor it to be a picture. Either directly (througl
itself) or indirectly (through its presupposition) it
would have to have reference. Yet this contradicts Witt-
genstein's claim that false sentences do not have
reference
.
Let me clarify this by an example, and return to
Fido
;
"Fido is fat" must, on the theory of the Tracta-
tus, picture something. If there is no substance, it
must picture the actual world, either directly or in-
directly. But, since it is false, that is impossible.
If we nevertheless hold to the claim that there is no
substance, then "Fido is fat", since it fails to picture
what is the case, simply fails to be a picture at all.
Since the same line of reasoning can be applied to any
false sentences, we seem forced to conclude that for
Wittgenstein if there is no substance we could not sketch
out a false picture of the world.
^
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"Fido is fat" is a complex, non-elementary proposi-
tion. It might be thought possible to claim both thatn 10 false and that it pictures, and yet deny that sub-
exi-ts, claiming that its component proposi-
tions, the elementary propositions, do refer, but are
put together wrongly. "Fido is fn+M a_ . .& J rxu 1S lat is a picture, but
a distorted one.
Even if this could be made consistent with Wittgen-
stein's theory of truth (which I doubt), it does not ac-
count for the following claim:
4,23 ‘ .If an elementary proposition is true
the state of affairs exists: if anelementary proposition is false, thestate of affairs does not exist.
Elementary propositions, like all propositions, are pic-
tures: yet they can be false. They are also in direct
connection with objects (4.22 and 3. 203 ).
28
Either there
is substance, to enable them to picture what is not the
case, or, if there is none, they simply could not, in
contradiction to 4 . 25 , be propositions at all,
If we cannot make false pictures, we cannot make
pictures at all, on V/ittgenstein' s theory. "A proposi-
tion," he writes in 4.023, "must restrict reality to
two alternatives: yes or no." It does not "restrict
reality" to one of those alternatives . If reference were
193 .
a precondition of meaningfulness
, then the very fact
that a proposition was a genuine proposition would guar-
antee that it had reference - directly or indirectly,
however distorted. Merely ' knowing that 4 i s a propoli-
would, -ince false propositions are impossible,
guarantee its truth, and "restrict reality" to the "yes"
alternative.
9. It has not been the purpose of this chapter to
discuss the validity or convincingness of Wittgenstein'
s
arguments in 2.021 - 2.0212. Principally I have attempted
to state his arguments as clearly as I could, as clearly,
and as accurately. This necessarily led into a discus-
sion of what substance is for Wittgenstein, a discussion
which is as yet not fully complete, though at least the
groundwork has been well laid. We have seen that it,
(i) is reinterpreted to be language-dependent,
(ii) guarantees the sense of any sentence
independently of' the truth of any other,
( Hi ) is niade up of simple objects (which
must be simple precisely because they
make up substance),
(iv) and is itself not simple, but has some
structure.
It is most of all this last point that needs expli-
cation -- but not here, where the point has been the
simplicity of objects, not the nature of substance.
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It turns out, then, that, for all the trouble it
has taken to develop it, Wittgenstein’s argument is
really very simple. Objects must be simple, else sub-
stance could not fulfill the role it must play, could
not be what it in fact must bp T f vf 4.^ e. if substance could not
fulfill its role, we could not make pictures of the
facts. Here the argument stops, Wittgenstein seems
to feel that it is obviously ridiculous to think we
not do so. Here too, since the major point of
this chapter has been made and defended as Wittgenstein
made it and defended it in the Tractatus
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The last chapter stressed the role of substance in
the metaphysics of the Tractatus. Substance, as Wittgen-
stein interprets it, is not a substrate for or of objects
as, e.g.
, Locke would have interpreted it. It is rather
something uniquely related to language, though not it-
self literally a part of language. Objects make up the
substance of the world and must be simple, without any'
complexity.
Ry presentation of Wittgenstein's proof of the
simplicity of objects was built around the realization
that Wittgenstein uses the German word " bilden " (which
Pears and McGuinness translate in 2.021 as "make up")
more precisely than it or its English counterparts are
normally used. In particular, as its occurrences later
in the T ract atus indicate, a, b, and c are said to make
UP (Hidden) y when the following three conditions are
fulfilled
»
(i) y can be (exhaustively 2 ) analyzed into
a, b, and c;
(ii) a, b, and p cannot themselves be further
analyzed
;









That, therefore, which is said to be "made up-
stance, in this case - has both a structure,
and at least relatively unstructured elements,




2.025* It is form and content.
(where "it" refers to substance). Thus the nature of
substance constituted the first proof that Wittgenstein
feels there must be absolutely simple objects which do
not possess any form.
In this chapter I shall concentrate on the notion
of form in the Tractates, to show that it, too, commits
Wittgenstein to the existence of simple objects. I shall
first discuss what Wittgenstein meant by "form". This
discussion, which occupies the major part of this chapter,
consists of two major sections. In the first I distin-
guish three different types of forms (or three different
uses of "form"), and provide a provisional account of
form m general. The second part begins with some prob-
lems in the preceding account, and develops the notion
of form more explicitly and thoroughly. After develop-
ing the notion of form, I show that there are certain
important characteristics of all forms which preclude
their belonging to objects. Thus again the conclusion
of the argument will be that objects are or must be
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simple
, not possessing any form or quality, - or if
Possessing any, then certainly none which can be known
to us
.
Wittgenstein's avowal of absolutely bare objects
has historical precedence in Kant's avowal of a thing-in-
ltoclf. There is, however, no evidence to indicate that
Wittgenstein was influenced directly by Kant's work.
They both do assert that bare objects exist, but for
different reasons, To avoid the danger of assimilating
the arguments of one to those of the other, 1 shall in-
dicate two differences between their positions. (1) Witt-
genstein argues from the existence of substance to that
of simple objects, while Kant does not do so. For the
latter, substance is a category; objects cannot make it
up. For Wittgenstein, substance is something closely
associated with language, though not part of it. Thus
it is independent both of reality and of the human mind
(see, e.g., 2.024 for the former; reasons for the latter
are developed later in this chapter). (2) Wittgenstein
is committed to the position that to ascribe qualities
4to objects
,
to claim that objects are really character-
ized by what we think of as qualities, is senseless.
Kant, on the other hand, is by no means so clear. Inso-
far as, e.g., space and time are forms of intuition, they
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characterize the way in which men must think and perceive.
Yet it seems at least possible (i.e., at least to make
sense to claim) that objects could actually be in space
and time, even though we could never know they were.
Thus, consider the following passage from the Prolegomena .
Ill
faculty of intuiting a priori affects
seLaUorIn
eL°V he^- en0rnen °n^ is '
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snail be glad to know how he canfind it possible to know a priori how theirintuition will be characterized before we haveany acquaintance with them and before they a?e
with
9^ed t0 Ti • SU ? h ’ however » is the casespace and time. 5
Kant does not seem to argue here that it is nonsense to
say .that things are in space and time, but rather that
if one does so, he will not be able to account for our
ability to predict certain spatio-temporal characteris-
tics of objects even before we perceive them. Precisely
because we cannot know anything about objects independent
of our mind, we cannot know whether they are, or are not
characterized by the categories.
I
A
I have identified substance as content with simple
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o^ects. Following the ^vision, in 2,025 . we now asK,
Wh3t 13 SUbstance from the side of form, or more
-imply, what is form? Wittgenstein is not slow to give
US “ eXa'"ple of wh^ he is thinking of here,
2 ‘ 02i1
'
Sf^rms^o/objeol^ (being colored >
"-'his alone, however, raises more problems than it answers
In particular, there are three problems which I wish to
examine more closely here, all of which are raised by
passage
. They are, (l) How broadly should "forms"
here be interpreted - i.e., what sorts of things 6 are
to count as forms? (2) What is the meaning of "Form"?
(3) Hew is the paradox found in 2.023 to be resolved?
1. Copi could easily answer the first question. 7
He would claim that these three forms must be thought of
as synecdochical, that Wittgenstein means them to, as it
were, stand for or represent all qualities. And indeed,
Wittgenstein seems to intend precisely that in the in-
stance, as is quite clearly brought out in the first
passage in which he discusses space, time and colon
2.013: Each thing is, as it were, in a space
of possible states of affairs. This
space I can imagine empty, but I can-
not imagine the thing without the space.
2.0131: A spatial object must be situated in
infinite space. (A spatial point is
an argument-place.)
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A speck in the visual field, though
colou^ ^ r° d ’ mUSt haVe someour
i it is, so to speak sur-rounded by colour-space'. Kites must
Of +e—t;
1- pitch ' objects of the senseo touch some degree of hardness, ando U Oil,
Here he extends the list of terms by including pitch and
hardness. More importantly, he indicates the incomplete-
ness even of this list by tacking on "and so on" at its
end. The particular examples which appear in each of
these three passages
( 2 . 013 , 2 . 0131
, and 2 . 0251 ) are
meant as merely the first steps of a complete enumeration,
of all those qualities which we normally think of as char-
acterizing objects — of what we would normally call
material properties. However, since Wittgenstein's use
of "material properties" is technical
,
8
I will call them
ontic properties, to avoid confusion in later chapters.
Our preliminary conclusion, based on these three passages,
is that all ontic properties — colors, shapes, degrees
of cold or hot, etc. — are to count as forms for Wittgen-
stein.
2 . i he most important proposition defining "form" isi
2 . 03
3
i P orm is the possibility of structure,
The pivotal importance of this proposition in this con-
nection has long been realized,^ but the closeness of
its relation to other important notions in the Tractatus
206
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has not been made clear. Given what we already know
about substance from the last chapter, the definition
comes as no surprise. !t is merely making explicit in
another way what Wittgenstein has already said or implied
when he called substance form as well as content. That
is, a given form governs elements which neither have nor
are that form themselves, but which can be related in
certain ways to give us certain other definite forms or
structures. Ke does make more explicit his departure .
from a certain way of thinking about, e.g., colors. As
this way would have it, color is something basic, unan-
alysable, given us as brute fact through our experience.
Wittgenstein views colors, etc., as given us only in com-
binations of objects. It thus seems clear that the
Plural form, "objects", der Gegenstaende . appearing in
2.0251, is necessary. A weak argument for the simplicity
of objects might even be made out of this point (though
I will just mention it in passing)
i A single object can-
not be said to have a form, only several (i.e., at least
two) objects together. (In this light, see also 2.0122,
3.142, 3.144, 3.3, 4.024 - 4.026, etc,).
One might, however, question whether there is any
significant gain in clarity in defining "form" as the
possibility oj structure. As we have seen, the
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definition amounts to little more than what we already
kn °W
' if "'e are °learly aware how Wittgenstein defines
"substance". Whatever doubts arise with the notion of
substance simply seem to recur with that of form, and
those that plague form are seen to touch substance also.
Though this is the case, there are nevertheless several
gams. One is that we are able to free substance (inso-
far as it is form) from too close a reliance on objects.
Structure, as 2. 032 defines it, is the way in which ob-
jects are actually connected with each other in states
of affairs, while form (by 2 . 033 ) is the possibility of
such structures. If form is too closely assimilated to
structure, it might seem that the only possible proposi-
tions are those which are actual. 11 On the other hand,
if the relation of form to structure is not clearly seen,
one is liable to attribute to Wittgenstein a theory like
that sketched above, in which properties are seen as on-
tologically basic rather than, as these passages indicate,
themselves complex.
Besides helping us avoid such errors as these, a
clear awareness of 2.033 ensures that we interpret "form”
broadly enough to fit Wittgenstein's use of it in the
Tract at us . V/e have seen by now that "form" refers to
what v/e normally think of as qualities. His primary
208
.
use of ..structure", however, is for states of affairs
and facts. - We can broaden our concept of form to in-
clude the ways in which the efements of propositions,
states of affairs, and facts in general are related to
each other. That is, while ..form" does include what we
normally think of as aualitieo ;+ iq f s, it also includes struc-
tures which are by no means usually so viewed.
As 2.033 also shows, the notion of form is broader
than that of structure. Structure, as 2.03 2 tells us,
is tied down to given states of affairs*






1S the structure of thee f affairs.
Form, however, is not structure but the possibility of
structure. It is, in other words, not the "determinate
way in which objects are connected", but the possibility
of that determinate way - the possibility that objects
would be connected in certain ways. An actual green spot,
according to the theory of the Tractatus . is a structure,
the determinate way in which certain objects have in
fact combined; green taken structurally requires that
there actually be green present. It follows, of course,
that not all forms need be given (actual or realized),
though they must all be actualizable
. Or, to put it
more simply, not all possible combinations of objects
209 .
(forms) must be actual (structures), though such struc
tures must always be possible.
Both Ramsey and B. F. McGuinness have attacked the
problem of what ••form" means in the Tractatus . and both
have seen similar, and, to their way of looking at it,
indissoluble problems. McGuinness, I think, is particu-
larly clear in his statement of the difficulty!
Ihe structure of a fact or picture j c- thp wavin which its elements hang together
( 2 . 032
'"'
;
• •)» The form is the possibility ofthe structure (2.03 2 t 2.1 5 ). It is first ofall necessary to see that two facts or pic-tures are of different structure if




U h ^ same forrn - Thus a fact andhaVG the Same form (must have,indeed), buo cannot have the same structure.^
(In a footnote at this point, McGuinness acknowledges
that his interpretation occasions difficulties with
other passages in the Tractatus
. ) The reasons for this
interpretation seem clear, but he misconceives the re-
lation between form and structure. It follows from his
interpretation that no two structures, i.e,, no two re-
lations between differing objects, can be the same.
Structure (to use the language of Max Black's article"^
for a moment) is, for McGuinness, only token, never





However clear the reason behind such an interpreta-
tion may be, it does not seem to fit what Wittgenstein
es even in the very passages McGuinness quotes. Why
Should the occurrence of different sets of objects affect
the "determinate way in which objects are connected"
(2.032)? Mere change of objects would not seem to affect
the relationship between the objects necessarily (though
it might; we cannot say in advance whether it would or
not). Put concretely, if the structure is "loves
maternally", then it does not seem to follow that "Marsha
loves Peter maternally" necessarily has a different struc
ture from "Jane loves Marsha maternally". The "determin-
ate way in which" Marsha is connected to Peter, then Jane
to Marsha, need not be different (though it might be).
Wittgenstein, it seems, intends to use "determinate way"
(dj^e Art und Weise ) with token/type ambiguity, while
form is apparently limited to type-occurrence.
At this point we can define "form" and "structure"
more explicitly
,
though still in an initial and limited
manner (the full definition occurs below, Section II B)
.
I will concentrate for the moment on fixing clearly the
sense of same structure" and, to a lesser degree, "same
form".
16
One fundamental difficulty with these terms,
as Wittgenstein uses them in the Tractatus . arises from
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the picture theory. "The chair in my office is grey
fixtures the grey chair in my office, therefore, be-
tween the two (between the chair and its picture) there
is an identity of form (see 2.16 - 2 . 17 , and 2a8 . 2 18z)
The picture and the chair have a given iogical form "in
common", they share it. Yet they also have many points
of difference, I can sit in the chair, but not its
sentence-picture, etc. Indeed, such diverse objects as
words, tables, chairs and books, as well as people, all
may share the same form by signifying the same, things
(3.1431, 4.0311), despite the obviously great disparity
in their normal actual structure. Thus the definition’
of "same form" at which I shall aim is one which will
allow that, if objects a and b have the same form as
objects c and d, it may nevertheless be the case that,
for example, c and d also have some form which a and b
do not. It is precisely this fact about form and struc-
ture which would allow words to act as symbols, to pic-
ture things which are actually quite different from them.
Let a, b, c, and d be different objects, and R. , R r
-L 2 3
and be different relations. Then suppose that a and b





Assume, however, that they can only instantiate one of
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these relations at a time, and cannot be related by R
Since form is the possibility of structure, the form of





b)v O'CaR^b) . -O (aR^b)
,
v^here the v is read in the exclusive sense.
If the form of c and d is identical to that of a







where -v- is not read in the exclusive sense. Reading-
the 'v 1 in the inclusive sense allows all the structures
which obtain between a and b also to obtain between c and
d, though it allows other structures to obtain between
the latter which cannot obtain between the former, just
as certain possibilities are open to my chair that are’
not open to its picture.
Let us suppose that in a given situation S, a has




In the same situation, c bears the relation R to d; i.e.i
(v) Si aR-j^b . cR-j^d
.
Then, in the situation S, a and b have the same struc-






then a and b have a different structure than do c and d.
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Because (ii) and (iii) still hold, they would still be
said to have the same form, despite the difference in
actual structure. In S’:
(tj-i) S' I aFi^b • (cR-^d • cP>2d)
,
a and b have the same struoture as c and d, even though
c and d also exhibit a structure forbidden by definition
to a and b.
It may appear odd that two sets of objects may have
the same structure, without thereby having the same form.
Yet this also reflects the way in which Wittgenstein
thinks about form and structure. It underlies the strain
most clearly expressed in:
5.5j 63: in fact, all the propositions of oureveryday language, just as they standare m perfect logical order.
. .
The task for philosophy is to ferret out the logical order
from the chance similarities in structure; to find out
which structures of the world have the same form as those
structures of language to which they are identical.
Philosophical confusion (a brand of linguistic confusion)
stems from taking the occurence of two identical struc-
tures as the occurence of two identical forms.
3. At one point in the Tractatus . Wittgenstein ap-
pears to distinguish between forms and the sort of pro-
perties which I have called ontic. In 2.0231 he writes:
2.0231i The substance of the world can onlydetermine a form, and not aHFmater-lal properties. For it is only by
kroner??
Propositions that materialp p ties are represented — only by
are prSduf“°
n °f °bje0ts that th^
A full discussion of this passage would presuppose a
greater degree of clarity on the difference between for-
mal and material properties than one could achieve at
this point. I have, however, pointed out that Wittgen-
stein uses "material properties" in a technical sense
rather than an ordinary one, and that this is my reason
for calling these properties "ontic" rather than "mater-
ial". At present this brief and rather dogmatic asser-
tion must suffice to remove the apparent difficulty.
B
Ontic properties by no means exhaust the range of
possible properties or forms, however. Perhaps Wittgen-
stein's most famous use of "form" in the Tractatus is as
logical form. In this section I argue that there seem
to be two different types of logical form, which Witt-
genstein discusses: the logical form of objects and
the logical form of the world, I set out two criteria
for the former, and add one further criterion for the
latter.
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1 he logical form of objects iq fiv. c,+J 13 first encountered
at 2.0233.
2.0233* If two obiectq hnvo
is that they are different.
Here, logical form, like r-olnr ^' color, space and time above is
said to characterize objects. How does logical form (in
sense, the logical form of objects) differ from
properties? Only in this, according to Wittgen-
stein, that the logical form is more general, less depen-
dent on particular circumstances, than any other kind of
form of objects. That this is the difference can be
seen from 2.18 - 2.2, where Wittgenstein links the notion
Of the logical form of objects to th„+ ^ . . .uu c at of picturing; but
it is made even more clear by;
3-3151 h"eturn .
a
constituent of a propositioninto a variable, there is a class* of pro-positions all of which are values of theresuming variable proposition In gen!eral this class too will be dependent
t?™




if a11 the si ^ns init that have arbitrarily determined
turned int0 variables, weshall still get a class of this kindihis one, however, is not dependent onany convention, but solely on the
nature of the proposition. It corres-
ponds to a logical form -- a logical"
prototype. 6
±
The procedure Wittgenstein intends to carry out here
seems fairly simple. Beginning with a proposition which
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represents a fully determinate relationship between two
objects, one can first generalize the constant which
represents each objects
(a) aRb
becomes in two stepss
(b) xRy
.
Wittgenstein points out that (a) is fully dependent for
its meaning on the meaning that our arbitrary conventions
have given to its parts. Remove those conventions (or
what we understand by means of those conventions) and
the sentence ceases to express anything; it becomes a
series of meaningless marks. (b) still depends on those
conventions, but less so. *R< is still fully determinate,
a constant and not a variable, and as such requires the
system of conventions in order to be understood. If,
however, we change (b) toi
(c) x<|>y --
then we have an example of a fully general form, variables
having been substituted for all constants. This, Witt-
genstein says, is not at all dependent on our "arbitrary
conventions" : it depends on the logical nature of the
proposition icself. It does not of course rest on the
logic of (or the logical nature of) propositions in




we would have ended with the equally general, equally
non-arbitrary logical form*
(e) x<pyz.
Although both (c) and (e) may, as Wittgenstein holds,
correspond to logical forms, they both lack some distinc-
tive features of the logical as Wittgenstein sees it
elsewhere in the Tractates. In particular, both (c)
and (e) do refer to objects (though not to any given or
pal ticular objects), i,e., they have reference (Bedeutung )
.
though not any determinate reference. (e), for example,
holds for any objects found in any three-place relations
whatsoever — but not for those not found in a three-
place relation (if there are any). Closely tied with
the fact that we do not know without looking at empirical
evidence whether there are any three-place relations or
not is the fact that the logical forms of objects are
not tautologies. Wittgenstein even expresses doubt as
to whether thinking of them as a priori (as, e.g.
,
tauto-
logics) even makes sense:
5-5541: It is supposed to be possible to
answer a priori the question whether
I can get into a position in which
I need the sign for a 27 termed re-
lation in order to signify something.
5.5542: But is it really legitimate even to
ask such a question?
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,
ThB Eeneral 11,16 °r th« in this sequence of proposi-
' (5,554 ' 5 - seem! 1 1 this, it is not •
even l.o ask ;;uch a question as "Will l need an
n Placed relation to signify something?" That question
i.. an empirical one, and to discover its answer wc must
look to, on the one side, our actual notational needs
(5-555> ’ and °n th0 otl ' er





5.5561, first paragraph). If We could, per im-
Bpssibile . predict in advance that we will need a certain
n-p.lace relation to signify something, then that particu-
lar relation would have a special status over those n-
placed relations not so needed or not so predictable,
This would also violate Wittgenstein's earlier claim
that there "are no privileged numbers" (5.453, repeated
almost verbatim in 5.553).
Thus it seems that (c) and (e) represent logical
forms only in a somewhat degenerate sense. They are
(°0 general,
and
(?) not dependent on our arbitrary notational con-
ventions. They (or their quantified versions) do, how-
ever, both depend on material or empirical conditions
for their truth, i.e., they are not tautologies.
I he logical forms of the world, or, one might say,
219 .
iully logical forms, also fulfil! conditions «,) and («j
in addition, they are free from any dependence on partic

















6-11 The proP°sit:ions of logic are tautologies.














es any more thar> theybe e uted by it. Not only must a
^
' an™ ° f lo^ c be irrefutable byf-ny possible experience, but it must aJ soe unconfirmable by any possible experience.








ance a descriPtion of ailtrue logical propositions.
6. 1251: Hence there can never be surprises in
6.13:
6 . 22 :
Logic is not a body of doctrine, but amirror- image of the world.
Logic is transcendental.
The logic of the world, which is shown
in tautologies by the propositions of
logic, is shown in equations by mathe-
matics.
In contrasting the logical form of objects with the log:
cal form of the world, 6.1251 is especially important,
in its contrast with 5.5542. It could come as a sur-
prise that I need a given n-place relation! I cannot
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Predict that. But no feature of
be surprising, 17 for all of them
— Priori .
a tautology i s or can
are predictable and
Sinoe tautologies are, according to Wittgenstein,
empty", i.e., without reference to experience, the last
passage quoted above (6,22) raay seero pu22ling
_ How can
he refer to tautologies as the logic of the world? Does
this not give them some empirical content?
-
ThS answer t0 these questions lies much earlier in
the l^actatus, and points out a much more fundamental
connection between the two types of logical form. The
logical form of objects is the logical form of particular
objects or groups of objects; that of tautologies is the
form., of all possible combinations of objects whatsoever.
Thus the logical form of tautologies gains its indepen-
dence of objects precisely by a method sketched for
things by Wittgenstein much earlier in the Tractatus ;
2 . 01222
j
Things are independent insofar as
they can occur in all possible situ-
ations, but this form of independence
is a. form of connexion with states of
affairs, a form of dependence.
Tautologies gain their independence of particular states
of affairs (objects in combination) through being depen-
dent on all possible states of affairs. Although the
parallel with objects may seem startling, we have
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already seen one much like it in 4.462,
i.a., the first sentence of 6.124, "The
it recurs in,
propositions
Of logic describe the scaffolding of the world, or
rather they represent it." This too is a large part of
the basis for Wittgenstein's claim that logic is "tran-
scendental"
( 6 , 13 ). The logical forms of objects are
not of a totally different type from that of the logical
forms of the world (6.211 and 6 . 22 ). They are, rather,
the first steps on the way to it.
II
Section I has shown that there are three distin-
guishable, significantly different ways in which Witt-
genstein uses the word "form" in the Tractatus . I have
called them ontic form, the logical form of objects, and
the logical form of the world (represented by tautologies
and contradictions). The last of these, I have argued,
show three important characteristics!
(e^) they are general
(p) they do not depend on arbitrary conventions
^ free from any dependence on empirical
i clO "C 0 1'S i
The logical forms of objects fulfill conditions («) and
(?), though not condition (?) • That a given (partial)
logical form is the logical form of an object depends
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on the fact that there actually is an object (more
correctly, there are objects) which do display that form.
It has, therefore, proved no difficult task both to
distinguish and to point out the similarities between
these two types of form. Yet there still remains a gap
between ontic forms and the two varieties of logical
form. Are they related in the Tractatus by name alone,
or is there a closer, more integral relationship between
them? In this section I argue that the connection be-
tween them is not one of name alone. Ontic forms ful-
fill condition (<*), but do not fulfill conditions (?) or
. This, of course, is nothing more than the general
definition of "form” as "the possibility of structure"
( 2 . 033 ) would lead one to expect. These considerations
serve, in one sense, simply to reemphasize the importance
of the notion of structure, an importance which might be
overlooked if the connection between ontic and logical
forms is not clearly demonstrated. In demonstrating the
connection, I will also complete the formal definition
of form begun in the last section.
Before doing so, one point must be clarified. What
does it mean to claim that ontic forms do not fulfill
condition (^)? The most frequent example of ontic forms
^n
_i_rac tatus is colon does it make sense to say
that color does •'depend on arbitrary conventions..?
( By
3 ' 315 ' U in faCt depends on arbitrary linguistic con-
ventions.
) I am obviously committed to the claim that
it does, but I win make no full-fledged defense- of that
claim here. I can, in fact, not do so, because any such
defense would require an understanding of the way in
»hich "arbitrary" is used here, and that will first be _
come clear later in this section. Rather, I shall point
out roughly what is meant by the claim, relying at pre-
sent on ordinary, pre-philosophical concepts.
It seems easiest to approach the problem via an
example, continuing to emphasize color as the represen-
tative for ontic form. Let us, then, suppose that my
pen .is green. That it is green is, of course, a contin-
gent matten we assume (at least) that it could have
been another color. But the contingency of its having
that particular color does not imply anything, it would
seem, about the arbitrariness of any convention, especially
of any linguistic convention. The green color of the pen
is (or at least seems to be) independent of any conven-
tions, in the normal sense of the word, whatsoever.
There are, however, many people who are unable to
see the difference between certain shades of green and
bluei those particular shades of green simply look
blue. Let us assume that person A sees the non... b Pe as green,
lie person B cannot distin-ni <?)-, i +guish between that shade of
green and blue t
^




ed iS SOme 0f '^ia to determine
, indepen-
ently of either subject, when color-concepts are rightly
aPPXied. In the absence of such further criteria, it is
Purely arbitrary to call the pen one color or the other.
But suppose there are vsuch other criteria, as there
normally are. Why should one accent themp , use them to
adjudicate differences? One's decision to do so might -
based on yet further rational considerations, but
Ultimately the decision to accept these considerations
arbitrary, i.e., without rational grounds.
Our predicament, somewhat generalized, seems to be this,
attribution of a property to a thing seems to be arbitrary
insofar as there are no good reasons for that attribution.
If we can give no reasons, if there are no objective
criteria, our claim must be considered arbitrary. When
there are criteria, they themselves are either arbitrary
or justified. To close off the opening chain of justi-
fications, and thereby avoid an infinite regress, with-
out making the chain itself arbitrary, one of three things
would be necessary, either a statement which is self-
evident, or a statement which is self- justifying, or
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qUeStl °n ° f the 0b^^iv.Uy of criteria (such as the
G ° d t0ld me S °"’ When made by a believer to a
believer)
,
Wittgenstein very earJv foi-t- -*J ry felt that an attempt at a
solution the first way would be bankrupt. 18 Any attempt
to answer the problem the third way is exactly what the
preceding paragraph seems to throw into doubt, at least
for most men who want to rely on rational thought and
Procedures. ' The middle of these three ways has fas-
cinated philosophers as diverse as Hegel and Chomsky 20
all attempt to utilize it seem prey to one unanswered
and. it seems, probably unanswerable question. Why
should we all accept that particular standard of justi-
fication?^
A closely parallel criticism lies ready at hand in
the Tractatus. Induction seems to be a rational, and
therefore not an arbitrary, procedure. Yet according to
Wittgenstein
i
6.363! The procedure of induction consists inaccepting as true the simplest law thatcan be reconciled witlTour experiences.
6.3631s This procedure, however, has no logicaljustification but only a psychological one
.
tL 1? ^ear that there are no grounds
^
hat the simPlest eventu-ality will m fact be realized,
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.
* utu. l.«, „n,„ll2„ tMi
include all scientific lav/s
s
6 .372: Thus people today stop at thp iof nature treating
X e laws
inviolable lust af r T aS something
treated in’past ages.°
G &nd Fate were
as if ever^mw^y eSx^a^yt look
Much more needs to be said about all of these prob-
Isras if they are to be given a definite answer. But my
Purpose here has not been to answer them; I have shown
only that it does make sense to say that ontic forms do
not fulfill condition (>?) i 0 ^.o,, that they are arbitrary
and do depend on our conventions. Now I will turn to
the main portion of this section, the problem of the
relation between ontic form and logical forms.
Form, as we have seen, is the possibility of struc-
ture; ontic form is the possibility that objects be
structured in such ways as to give us what we normally
call material properties. Color, which as above I take
to represent all ontic properties, is, therefore, the
possibility of certain structures or types of structure
22 ?.
of objects. This is whv "Tnn^ , ,ny
’ Inc identally, objects are
colorless" (2 022?) , ^2
,
*
' y When they are in combination
oo colors actually arise ** 1S * 0ntlc f°rm, like any other
form oi structure, is complex; it is not nnt io o tologically
simple (though it may appear to he tJ C b simple, or be epis-
temologically simple).
So far, we have seen structure broken down into
form and content. Its division, however, is finer
, as
the Trap tatus presents it.
2 - 0131
' wtssvsfc* gan argument-place.) P ls
A speck in the visual field thou vh
colour" Tt
rCd
' mU5t ^e^mf: it is, so to speak crir*rounded by colour-space. Notes musthave some pitch, objects of the senseof toucn some degree of hardness, and
As Wittgenstein describes it in this passage, the com-
plexity of ontic properties is composed of comparatively
simple points related to infinitely many other compara-
tively simple points. Colors are located in color-space,
1 ' 6 '
’
each color-point is related to infinitely many
other color-points, notes in note- (or musical) space,
etc. Each fully determinate color serves as a point in
that space! when compared with the relevant space it is
simple, but not yet absolutely simple. That each color
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still has see (minimal) structure is brought out clearly^ the parenthetical sentence to the first paragraph.
There are, then, many different spaces, each of
which is independent of any other. An object locatedm a given space must of course have a particular place
or location in the space (hence the second paragraph of
2.0131). But no given object must have precisely that
place which it does have: in far>+ ew •* l - ct
- strictly speaking
since the form of objects is (or is determined by) re-
lations, no single object can have a place alone in any
space (see also 2.0122). objects can also occupy several
spaces simultaneously, i.e., spaces may overlap to some
degree, though their overlapping is limited. Things can
be both spatial and colored, i.e., simultaneously at a
Place in color-space and in regular space, but they can-
not be both in mathematical-space and in color-space (or
so we normally assume).
One space underlies, or ties together, all spaces.
Any space is also in logical space. A given place in
logical space is determined through its having a large
number of relations which are unique to it, possessed
by no other place in any space. It also has a large
number of relations or forms which are general, which
belong to it not in virtue of its being that particular
229 .
Point in that particular space,
simply because it exists. This
write
i
but simply because it is,













out by the logical shuSu^ofColour!
Individual colors - places in color-space - also
have logical properties which enable them to stand in
logical relations to each other, hence to make impossible
certain relations. At the same time they have other
(material) types of relations, which set them off first
as places in one particular kind of quality -space
, and
then as subsections of that space.
This initial development of the notion of space
allows us to complete the definition of "form" begun in
I A2 above. In completing it, I shall also be able to
explain more clearly the sense in which Wittgenstein holds
ontic forms to be dependent on our arbitrary (linguistic)
conventions. These two problems - that of the nature
of forms and that of the arbitrariness of ontic forms —
arise together and must be treated together. Not to do
so amounts either to falsifying the nature of ontic forms
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(»y not taking note of their arbitrariness), or falsify-
;ng the nature of forms in genera! (by simply not acknow.
edging ontic forms as forms).
To define ••form.., let us assume six objects, a, b,
.1 e, and f. Assume also nine relations, r R .
As before, if a is related to b by
R;l we write ,
?
(1) aR^.
— snd b have relations p p
'1 n * inclusive, we write:
( 2 ) aR , b
.
As we saw in the last sub-section (XIA), a space is a
system of relations which is complete in itself (though
rt may
’ “ the Sense ex-Plained above, be able to overlap
certain spaces, and unable to overlap others). Let us
further assume that certain relations define a space, in
that all and only objects which are so related are said
to be in that space. 23 In particular, of these 're-
lations defines one space, R
5
a second. Now consider the
chart following, on the basis of which I will define











































by no matter what ob-







• Qspace j Rg alone fits
_______
that description from
among these forms, 2^“ d0 °“ n0t depend on any given objects - or, as Witt-
genstein has it in 2.0122, it depends on all the
Four forms count as the logical forms of objects - R
*
5 ' V and R6 . -hey are general, i.e.. appear more tin
once on the chart (R
2
even appearing in two of the three
columns
. ) But their frenm 1 i -Hr ir.general ty is not purely formal, it
depends on empirical factors - the actual occurence of
the relations more than once. The remaining forms have
neither kind of generality, their occurence is unique’
(with the obvious exception of R
? ,
which does not even
occur once). They are, therefore, in the simplest sense,
ontic forms. Our question for this section becomes more
specific , Why (in what sense) are Ry R4 and R ? arbit-
rary? That is, how can we be said to determine these
three relations through our conventions?
There is one way in which all of these forms are
general, predictable and therefore not arbitrary. 2 -5
Following the procedure Wittgenstein outlines in 3.315







t° the general form for an +,1 ° 11 two-place relations,
(c ) x(j) y
With complete loss of arbitrariness. In this sensS( no
expressible relation is arbitrary. 26
'
ThS arbltrarine^ of these relations, then, does
not stem from their lack of generality, that is merely
the mark of their arbitrary nature, it stems rather from
'
6 ln "hlCh We determine the relations, the way in
Which (to take a particular case) the user of a language
uses the words of that language, That Wittgenstein holds
this to be the case is seen most clearly in the following
propositions:
. j . !?3» Logic must look after itself.
If a sign is possible, then „ „-i__




Sic is also Permitted,U he reason why ’Socrates is identical'means nothing is that there is noproperty . called 'identical'. The
have°fs?n?
nonsensical because weailed o0 niake an arbitrary deter-T ?,°\be ? ause the symbol
^
self, would be illegitimate.)
^o ?0 P Grtain , sease - WG cannot makemistakes in logic,
5.^733 s ^c^e says that any legitimately con-structed proposition must have a senseAnd I. say that any possible proposi-
’
legitimately constructed, and,II it has no sense, that can only be^ecause we have failed to give meaningto some of its constituents.
’ 2
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rivtn anv Lw that we have not
^denticilT^^i— meaninr; to the ^Fordxu nxicai














It sees clear, on this basis, that Wittgenstein would
certainly allow the possibility of defining (redefining)
"is identical" in such a way that we could give "an ad-
jectival meaning" to it. There is indeed no reason, as
far as the i^actatus is concernedi for nQt doing ^
long as we are explicitly aware of what we are doing.
The resulting language might well contain a number of
statements not easily accomodated by our present lan-
guage, birc it would not be incorrect in any sense. The
three relations
, R^, and R
?
, like "identity" in 5.473
ana 5 .+r 33 , have been determined by the speaker. ^ They
seem to apply to the object (and perhaps, so far as this
section is yet concerned, they do), but they do so only
as determined by the speaker.
We have been examining a cluster of four notions
i
the logical form of the world, the logical form of ob-
jects, ontic form, and the arbitrariness of the last of
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lorrns. The devices I have employed have
allowed us to make sense of all of them - but at an
apparent cost which now becomes quite clear. Xs witt .
genstein justified in moving from + h . .ll 11 oni 4he claim that f R, • j_ s
arbitrary because, as nart n-r
^
p of our symbolism, it has been
fuven a meaning by us, which we could just as easily
(and correctly) change, to the claim that the relation
R
(f
is itself arbitrary? if this is a fair representation
of his claim, it seems that he is (to use the Quinean form
01 the objection) guilty of confusing use and mention .
9Ulte ^ naUVSly aS
’ Aristotle. If this were the
case, it would be a most discouraging, if not an impos-
sible task to salvage or defend his ontology. To show
that, it is not the case, that Wittgenstein is not guilty
of a use-mention confusion, is the task of the next
section of this chapter.
III
Wittgenstein would indeed be guilty of the suspected
confusion between use and mention, if the above way of
posing the problem were correct for him. It is not,
ihe problem as stated above presupposes that language
(descriptions of real relations) and reality (the re-
lations themselves, in the world) are fully distinct,
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separated in a way in which as far as the Tractates i=
concerned, they are not. m this . + •
. , .




^ thSreby C °rre0t thS mdsunderstanding
Sr the ab0V° °riticisra of Wittgenstein. I thenargue that two claims about objects folioJ i l w from the
notions of substance and form as t a10 I have developed them.
ibS flrst ia that objects cannot be forms fof~ - (O any sort);
e second is that objects cannot have forms (of any
sort, at least, that are known or knowable by us). From •" ^ th6n f °ll0WS that and must be simple.
.
W e have already seen several ways in which language
is ana must be independent of reality. 28 Language, as
well logic, must .. care for itself, i. e ., it must be
able to impart meaning without reliance on the way things
really are. Nevertheless, it is not somehow "above"
things in the world (to use a metaphor which Russell's
theory of types naturally suggests). The words of a
language, its signs, are just as much things as are
tables, chairs (see, e.g., 3 .143 and 3 .1431). Language
IS a series of facts which picture other facts: it is,
at least in part, a sub-set of the facts of the world,
and not something completely different from them.
Language, with its forms, and things, with their
236 .
f0™ S
' t0g6ther mke UP s'^tance. Thus language and
reality meet on the neutral grounds of substance. The
metaphysical problems this line of' thought introduces
are not inconsiderable - particularly the question of
What, exactly, the ontological status of substance is.
This, however, is a problem which cannot be solved until
look at Wittgenstein's attitude toward Platonism, in
the last chapter of this dissertation, m the meantime,
«e can see how this concept of substance allows him to
escape the criticism that he confuses use and mention.
Substance, as we have seen, is composed of two. parts,
form and content (2.025). All three kinds of form, as I
’
have shown in this chapter, can be reduced to the ways
which objects can be related! again, as 2. 033 tells
us, "form" is defined by means of the more basic term,
"structure". States of affairs and facts have structure:
objects, which make up states of affairs, do not have
structure, they are simple (2.02). The distinction
between fact and thing is fundamental to Wittgenstein
in the Tractatus. To think of a form, whether logical
or ontic, as an object would amount to collapsing that
distinction. Thus one cannot identify objects with
any sort of form .
29
I he order of things, their structures, cannot be
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known without experience w;-nr x l . As Wittgenstein puts it,
things do not have an "a priori order",
5.6331, For the form of the visual fiais •surely not like this!
“ 13
Eye—CD
5 . 63 ',! This is connected with the fact thnno part of our experience if at thlsame time a priori .
e
Whatever we see could be other than
brother Mt^sT1*0 3t a11
There is no a priori order of things.
Although, as 5.634 claims, there cannot be an a priori
order of things, there can be and is an a priori order
of rooms. That is, while we cannot know what structures
actually obtain among things (and hence cannot know with-
out experience what the world is like), we can know what
world could be like, its possible structures, before
experiencing such structures actually. Of the logical
forms of the world (tautologies and contradictions) this
is clearly the case, they are for Wittgenstein preeminent
examples of what is a priori . In fact, as we have seen,
in a sense all forms are logical forms (as seems to be
reflected if we combine 6.3 with 2.0121). That is, the
logical form of objects and ontic forms would, if the
defects in their generality stemming from our arbitrary





If this account of forms is c
to an object literally, since
itself also a priori (insofar
be said to be a priori )
.
have some a priori element,
orrect, no forms can belong
that would make the object
as the form itself could
ThlS ar^Ument
' even if correct, inevitably strikes
one as too simple, too incomplete. ^ ^ ^^ ^
more concrete, definite proof, especially for ontic forms
that Wittgenstein held that they are a Eriori (have an
a priori structure). Such a proof is not hard to find,
<5. 3751,. ^example * h simultaneous presence
tL visual f^fif
-
tha Same place in











physlc ?' “ore or less asi -- a parxicle cannot havetwo veiocities at the same time,bat is to say, it cannot be in twoplaces at _ the same time; that is to
Plaies^t
1^68 that are in differentp ces a the same time cannot beidentical.




two elementary propositionscan neither be a tautology nor a
contradiction. The statement that
a point is the visual field has
wo different colours at the same
time is a contradiction.
)
Colors, here as usual synecdochical for all ontic proper-
ties, have logical structure, and are thus, in some degree
at least, predictable. That is, it is possible to predict,
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*now in advance
, some properties of a certain color,
even though we have never seen it.
Examples of the logical (a nrin • \lC m°ri) characteristics
of the logical forms of objects are nnt v, „J c o hard to find in
the Trastatus either. The laws of physics are such
forms
, and Wittgenstein clearly declares them to he,












they knew exactly hoTltVeT' ff
‘3re
as always, what is certain a priori'proves to be something purelyT^ii^al
.
)
6.33> • We do not have an a priori belief ina law of conservation^"” but Frthlf «
%£
10r
j- knowledge of the possibilityof a logical form.
e oin
6.34. All such proposition, includine the
laws^Vf sufficient reas^nf thl




Ch the Pr°P°sitions01 c can be cast.
Thus all three types of form are seen to be a priori (in
way), and so logical. Objects, however, are clearly
not a £riorij they therefore cannot have form (in any
straightforward sense of the word "have"). They must be
absolutely simple.
The two above arguments approach the simplicity of
objects through the notion of the a priori . In the Trac
tatus this notion is entangled with another, that of
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foreseeing; the two are tipa + ntied together for Wittgenstein^ the notion of constructing. "There cannot be/, g
Wittgenstein (5.556), "a hierarchy of the forms of ele-
mentary propositions We’ 6 Can foresee only what we our-
selves construct."
FOrms32 ° an be hierarchically
, rising from
the forms of elementary propositions to ever more general









itS own arS™ent,n operation can take one ofits own results as its base.













These hierarchies of forms are what Wittgenstein tells
us in 5.556 that we "construct", and that we can "fore
see . He continues this line of thought in 5.5561 by
claiming;
5. 3361 : Empirical reality is limited by thetotality of objects. The limit also
makes itself manifest in the totality
of elementary propositions.
Hierarchies are and must be independent
of reality.
It is the last sentence of thi s passage which guarantees
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us the independence of fern, from reality, from objects,
and thus the simplicity of objects.
Yet there is a problem involved with 5.5561 which
was not involved with our prior arguments. According
to it, we clearly construct hierarchies by means of an
operation. But what of the first ..term., (or ..member,..
£iied) of the series? As 5.556 warns us. we cannot con-
struct or foresee "the forms of elementary propositions."
If our ability to do these things with other forms indi-
cates that they are a Eriori, and independent of objects,
then does not our inability to do this for elementary
propositions equally clearly indicate that at least their
forms are dependent on reality, on objects, and therefore
characteristic of objects in a straightforward sense, and
not a E^ori? (Needless to say, if this were the case,
Wittgenstein would simply contradict himself at this
point.
)
To argue this way, however, would be fundamentally
to misinterpret the nature of elementary propositions.
Elementary propositions are not tied to reality as the
argument supposes; Wittgenstein held that they are as
independent of reality as any other propositions!
4.25i If an elementary proposition is true,
the state of affairs exists: if an
elementary proposition is false, the
state of affairs does not exist.
242
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"An elementary proposition," Wittgenstein claims in an
earlier passage (4.22), "consists of names." Names,
however, are elements of language /and language is a
human construction. 33 Thus it would seem ^ ^
bers of the hierarchies are independent of reality, from
the first to the last (if there is such).
IV
This completes the arguments I shall marshall to
show that Wittgenstein, in the Tractatus
. was committed
to the existence of simple objects, objects much like
the "Dins Hi Sich" of Kant's Critique of Pure Reason 34
It by no means even attempts a minimal treatment of all
the problems touched on in the course of the arguments.
In particular, two problems in this chapter simply arose
and were promptly ignored. While I do not wish to dis-
cuss them fully at this point, it seems valuable to
indicate the lines along which they can be solved.
The first problem is put clearly into focus by a
comparison of what I have said with B. F. McGuinness'
article, "Pictures and Form in Wittgenstein's 'Tractatus
Let me quote from that article at lengthi
The Tractatur . hnwpVO *. ,




of n places are of the mIT ^Predicateswhereas we have assumed logical form,
this. The implies??™ T contradictory of
about the form of an objectVoilM
thValk(cf. 2.0121 and 2 0131) J ir f’° 4l . aad 2.023j
different logical * forms * thn^h
ob ^ ects have
of affairs in which the'nn« are states
other cannot, in the way ^halta ™?
Ure and the
bright and a weight cannot
c °lour can be
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ate ?- °r between pro-, facts, and things.
Are all the relations Wittgenstein uses in the
fnaotatus distinguished from each other only by the
number of places (objects) they range over, so that
all n-place relations would ultimately be the same, o
does he hold that there can be two different kinds of
relations, both having the same multiplicity (both,
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being n-place)? This miPQ+i^question arises most acutelym connection with Section II b nWr, uB above, where I assume,
as does McGuinness, that ail v,. l n-place relations are the
Same - BUt h °W C“ — «- conflict with apparently
contrary lines of thought (none of which I have yet
examined closely)?
Its removal is a very simple task, 1 think, once
Wittgenstein's theory of objects as absolutely bare
simples has been made clear. Objectively - i. e ., from
the side of the simple objects - all n-place relations
are eo i£so'one and the same. Any simple object can fit
into any two-place relation, for example, and all two-
Place relations are (logically) the same for simple ob-
jects simply because they are two-place relations. No
given objects can be excluded from any relations, be-
cause objects, being simple, have no qualities or forms
which would prevent them from entering some relations
while enabling them to enter others. No ramified theory
of types as mentioned by McGuinness will be necessary
at this level.
From the side of complex objects -- objects seen
as having qualities or forms ~ objects which we can
experience (which are part of the world) the answer
reverses itself. Each complex object has certain forms
245 .
(or a certain form) which permits it to ,.permi enter certain
re ations and forbids if to enter certain others, the
logical multiplicity of totally different types of re-
lations may well hp +
'
y be the same. From within the world,
a ramified theory of types clearly seems necessary fir
the theory of the Tr^tatus. That necessity, however,
only appears to conflict with our immediately preceding
findings, the two are consistent if „e keep Wittgen-
stein’s theory of objects clearly in mind and distinguish
between simple and complex objects.
B
ihe .foregoing exposition has concentrated on what
might broadly be called the a priori. The role I have
ascribed to it is much greater than is normally the case,
at least for those concerned with the Tractatus . Any
form is in some sense a priori. But this raises its own
problem. What is the role of a posteriori elements in
experience? How indeed can Wittgenstein maintain that
there are a posterior i elements if the a priori elements
are as broad as I have interpreted them to be? Redness
(being red) is normally thought of as something known
a posteriori
; my interpretation (buttressed with such
passages as 6.3751) implies that it is a priori .
246
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Wittgenstein himself seems m n+h
th»t n Passages to declareall experience is a E°steriori (as in 5.634).
The full solution of this, too, must await a con-
aeration of complex ejects. The answer may
ess be sketched here as follows. From' the standpoint
of simple objects (which are outside the world and out-
51(36 eXPeri6nCe)
' 311 f°-s «e a Eriori. But which Qf
the many possible combinations of forms do we actually
f-d, do we actually experience? That is to say. which
of the forms are really found together in experience^
That is not a question which we can answer a Eriori, the
answer to it - to the question of what complex objects
there are (exist) in the world - necessarily involves
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What are objects - what is their real nature? The
Tractatus has been enlisted as support for nearly every
ma Jor answer' aiven thic; n„ oc,+ i13 qUeStlon m the twentieth century








Allaire attribute one or another version of realism to
Wittgenstein, by -object-, they claim. Wittgenstein means
loth particulars and properties, both, e.g., thing and
red. Ellis Evans is even more extreme, for he holds
that relations
. as well as properties and particulars,
serve as objects for Wittgenstein. Irving Copi 5 and
G. E. M, Anscombe
,
6
on the other hand, deny that objects
can be properties or relations for Wittgenstein, they
can only be, as Copi styles them, "bare particulars".
Wilfrid Sellars/ while agreeing with Copi that objects
can only be particulars, argues that Copi and Anscombe
are wrong in limiting them to bare particulars, only
qualified particulars are to count as objects, on Sellar's
interpretation of the Tractatus
. Ky own position (ex-
pressed in Copi's terms) is that objects are, for Witt-




they have no properties at all, not even the logical
253 .
p”p'rti'* °°w **«.«, «.
’** ,h» » <-~W w,
In developing my own views J ha.. +-L l'“ - ve treated this pan-°Ply of conflicting and mutually contradict^ tory opinions
.
" 3 ^ aPPear t0 be a high-handed manner, I have
Sent, and I will do so in this chapter T h • •rapier. i begin with
Copi-s article, not only because my own position is
closest to it, but also because it is fundamental to all
but. one (Ellis’) of the above. I then examine Sellar’s
position, which lies closest to my own of any of the
above except Copi’s and Anscombe’s. Finally, ! will
examine some of the grounds presented for the realist
interpretation of the ^^actatus, grounds given in Edwin
Allaire’s paper. His defense of this interpretation of
the Tractatus is able to take advantage not only of the
work done by Copi and Anscombe, but of that done by
ellars as well (to which neither Bergmann nor Stenius
had access). It thus represents, if not in every res-
pect the best, at least the most broadly based defense
of the realist interpretation. I do not concern myself
with what one might call the extreme realist position,
as represented by Evan’s paper, because Copi’s article
pointed out its defects more than adequately.
254 .
in commenting on these three papers, I shall not
be concerned with a detailed examination of and reply
to all their arguments. To do so with each and every
one of these disparate papers would be a task sufficient
ly intricate and boring to drive even the legendary
Scholastic to tears . 9 1 leave many arguments out, and
am concerned with only two things. In Copi's case I
wishes show that at least two of his own arguments,
carried to their logical conclusion, would lead one to
admit that Wittgenstein espoused absolutely bare parti-
culars. In the case of Sellars and Allaire, I will. show
that their arguments, formidable as they seem do not
show that Wittgenstein rejected absolutely bare
particulars.
Of course, the best defense of my position is con-
stituted by the arguments in the two foregoing chapters,
none of which has been examined by any of the people
under consideration here. If those prior arguments are
not convincing, my criticism of alternative positions,
even if it is strong, is of little value to met hut if
those arguments are convincing, these criticisms need




Copi s Paper, "Objects, Properties and Relations in
the .Tractatus.", opens with several powerful argents
designed to show that Tractarian nhi +xan objects are neither re-
lations nor qualities. Interesting•icso as these arguments
are, I shall not examine them I shall1 °n simply assume
that his defense of the claim + *,„ + vthat objects are neither




are neither relations nor pro-
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r 'fstinction between formal
!• Pf1 ^ d material (contingent) proper-ties permits three different kinds of oarti
?hi?




3 “aterial Property impliesw e v tf » , ? f r °Perty ' but not con -
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ib mUSt alS ° possess the formal
, .
y 1 being capable of possessing that
abso^u?elfb^
rty V V No" cleSL af •r ather ~~r' ^^biifalai] as one possessingneix formal nor material properties a
particular as one possessing formal butno material properties, and a qualitied par-ticular as one possessing both formal andmaterial properties.
With the possible exception of Parmenides Iknow of no historical philosopher who dis-cussed absolutely bare particulars.
Certainly Wittgenstein's objects are not ab-solutely bare; they have "internal" proper-
ties ( 2 . 01232 ) or "forms" (2.0141), where
form is a possibility (2.0141) and therefore
logical. Kis objects are therefore either
qualities or bare particulars. 10
i
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He immediately adds to this that several passages
2.01,-J, 2.0233, 4.023) support the view that objects
Have both internal and external properties, but ..there
seems to me to be overwhelming evidence that he (Wittgen-





apparently by the argument in th Qb the second paragraph of
the first quotation, Copi feels that he has disposed of
the possibility that objects are "absolutely bare par-
ticulars". Then, despite some admitted counter-evidence
he presents four arguments to show that objects are bare’
particulars. I shall first examine two of these argu-
merits, and then turn to the araumpnt nr +uie £ e of the second para-
graph above.
,
The first (Copi's second 12 ) could be rephrased as
follows
:
(Al) Complexes (facts, states of affairs) canbe described, not named.
'







a ProPer>ty, the asser-at it did so would constitute adescription of it.
(A4) But this would violate (A2), and istherefore, impossible.
Copi, of course, limits this argument to material pro-
perties, but on what grounds? It seems to work equally
well against the ascription of any sort of properties,
257 .
even logical, to objects (if it ao -> ,1 11 ctually establishes
anything at all^). For there seems to V
,
b crn 0 be no reasonUnc Copi gives none) to limit ( \D pu ^wU) , the fundamental
Premise, to any given sort' of property.
The second argument I win examine' (Copi-s thirst
could be rephrased as follows
i
(Bl) Propositional signs are analysable.























’ S ° " a11 P^ticu-
Again granting, pace Sellars, the validity of the argu-
ment, what Copi has actually shown is that objects are
absolutely bare. For if we leave the object with a
gical property, exactly the same argument can be gen-
erated to show that that property must also be removed.
Now let us turn to the specific reason Copi gives
for eliminating the possibility that objects are absolute-
ly bare, i.e.,
, or limiting these two arguments to the
case of material properties instead of all properties,
that rea-on, again, is found in the second paragraph of
the first quotation from Copi's article. Here he argues
258 .
" SlnCe 2 ' 01231 «**»*•• —rnal" Properties tooycts, they cannot he ahsoXutely bare
. 2>01231 als0
attributes externa! properties to objects, but this,
copi tells us, is to be discounted in the face of the
subsequent arguments, two of which we have examined
But with this, copi leads himself into a dilemma, if
he accepts the full force of 2 ,oi23 l, he must accept the
claim that objects have both internal and external pro-
pertreo. This is more than he wants objects to have, so
he presents the subsequent arguments to show that 2 .012 3 l
should be limited to the claim \ •6 that objects have only
internal properties.
The two arguments we have just examined, 16 when
fully and clearly worked out, 16 have shown us that ob-
jects have no properties at all. Copi wishes to use
these two arguments to show that:
(1) Objects do not have "external” properties.
But these arguments commit him, as we have seen, also
to the claim that:
(2)
or external"?
^ ^ proPerties . "internal"
Copi has, it seems, shown more than he wishes; he needs
an argument which limits these two arguments in such a







in sight. Thus, at loast two Qf h
.
s
Copi to a claim about the Tractat.ua „hich
rejects elsewhere in his paper, that
for Wittgenstein, absolutely bare particu-
II
.
SSllarS b6SinS "Naming and Saying"
, with
an important agreement with Copi-s position. He writes
that "all objects in atomic facts are ...dtl,
• . . without ex-
ception particulars
.
» 1? w f •,* * ‘ he teels, however, that
C opi position is tQo __ wittgenste . n d
.
d
not hold objects to be bare particulars, but rather held
that they may also have material properties. The heart
of Sellars' position is expressed in the following
passage
:
Now if a philosopher combines the two thesesU) there are not atomic facts involving onlv






Now in my opinion Copi is correct in attribut-
ion th
the second of the abovetwo eses (all objects are particulars) iftherefore
,






- his claim' that
is committed to a doctrine ofare particulars would be sound. Conversely,
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.
if Wittgenstein did hold o •
thesis^hat
' there^ ~ T̂t °^is surprising, ^herefore'^to& “arguing that his contention +h^ w-?2 pi .rejects monadic atomic fact *
'
^tgenstein
what he ( somewhat relSctan^vf+ SuPP°rted
affirmation of the doctrine of barfparticulars. 18
Sellars then contends at length that Copi erred in not
realizing that Wittgenstein does indeed countenance
monadic atomic facts.
There are only two points about his complicated
argument which I would like to examine here. The first
the contention that Wittgenstein countenanced monadic
atomic facts, I do not think that Sellars' evidence is
convincing. I then v/ish to examine the moral Sellars
draws from his arguments: that i s> if there are monadic
atomic facts, is Wittgenstein eo i^so committed to the
claim that particulars are not bare (let alone, as in
my position, absolutely bare 19 )?
A
Does Wittgenstein countenance monadic atomic facts?
Sellars says he does. He begins his proof of that claim
with an appeal to Bertrand Russell's tactics: "Philo-
sophers of a 'reconstructionist' bent have often found
it clarifying to treat one thing as a "limited case" of
another; and if Russell, for one, was willing to speak
°f " qUaUty 35 " -Nation, there is no freat
initial improbability to the idea that Wittgenstein
S be willing to speak of a monadic configuration." 20
SU°h “ SainS itS effaotiveness largely from the
assumption that Wittgenstein's thought was actually
fairly close to Russell's at this time, close enough
that Wittgenstein might well have been tempted to make
the same moves Russell made (or, at least, that it is
reasonable to think he would be). As p have argued> 21
however, this assumption is dubious at best, Wittgenstein
letters to Russell from this period and his comments to
his friend Paul Englemann both show that well before the
Tractates was published, Wittgenstein already felt (or
realized) that Russell did not understand his (Wittgen-
stein's) work. The two simply did not think similarly
enough to justify arguing that, because Russell did
something, there is no great initial improbability" to
the claim that Wittgenstein might also be willing to
try it.
One of Sellars* principal arguments ends with the
followingi
The only point I have wanted to make is thatcastrations, pertaining to quantification
r to distinguishing between names and state-ments support the idea that the atomic state-ments ol a perspicuous language must contain
262 .
3-"t least two name^ +hco^ •
do so not by supportinp'the^ide^th^ 0118 ^ ouldatomic statement would con-^tn +fc
that a miniraal
^rticular^, but by supporting ]v ^
ames of two
would contain the name' of a universal®
3 that U
descriptive statements ° • ,
at the at omic
would contain naZTll
Sellars has attempted in the passages preceding this to
demonstrate that, as far as quantification theory goes
Wittgenstein could allow monadic atomic facts, since
much of Wittgenstein's argument in the Tractatus is
bound up with the problems concerning theories of quan-
'
tification, if Sellars can show this, then presumably
be has given one more reason for rejecting the nominalist
interpretation of the Tractatus .
' T ° demonstbate it he has set up an artificial lan-
guage, which he calls Jumblese, by means of which he
feels he can arrive at what Wittgenstein would agree to
be a logically adequate notation. He provides us with
the following "schema for the translation from PMese
into Jumblese" (here reproduced for convenience)! 23
PMese
I. Names of particulars
a, b, c, . . .
Jumblese
.
Tha same letters written
in a variety of neutral styles,
the variety being a matter of
height, the neutrality a mat-
ter of the use of the ordinary
font i
a
* c * • . . ; (rest not re-
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(ra8t n0t repro '
fx! ^',,2^1 variable ,




’ y* z > * • « » (as above)
V • Quantification
(Ex) greerT x






(E() (Ex)x (as above)
According to Sellars' translation schema, where in English
we have
:
(Cl) This is green,
in PMese we would haves
(C2) Green a,
and finally in Sellars' Jumblese we get,
(C3) a
This last then is, according to Sellars, a monadic atomic
proposition which Wittgenstein would countenance, since
the names in atomic propositions are connected with ob-




There ls no doubt that the tran^Uf
which
nslation table with
cellars provides us will a T,«
p
-rpqt
c 1 us t0 ‘translate ag ea many statements from FMese to TlJmhl
, ,
6 10 Ju™t>lese (thus Eng-
h t0 tumble se ) . The problem is that •l ^, m accomplish-ing this feat of tran.i^- • P01 slation, we do not ^* « o show anything of
f-’T'translation n-r > j(Cl)
, does indeed appear mnotuch simpler thanits rnglish counterpart* but tv,^ +1 ' U that aPParent simplicity
vanishes on close consideration. There is a perhaps'
6Ven m °re fUndamental ^iticism <* Sellars. argument
WhiCh Can ^ br °Ught * observing the way in which
he himself refers to (c 3 ) (and other Jumhlese translations
of tins sort). He writes, "I have attempted to explain
how a propositional sign can consist of one loglcaliv
arti culated name." 2 ^ R + w . ++ .“ Ut ttlttgenstem argues very clearly
bab i s essential to names that thmr t ithey lack all forms of
articulation:
3. 3^11! So one could say that the real name of
signified itVJf*
aU symbols that
t had m common. Thus one
v/ni nri
6
’ a11 kinds of composition
name
d Pr °Ve to be unessential to a
A name must avoid any kind of articulation at all, even
logical articulation", that is of the essence of a
name. If a propositional sign is even logically articu-
lated, it cannot be a name at all.
265 .
Ihe fact that, in the face of ?c 01 3.3411 and other
statements to this effprt c- nn- ciiec , Sellars calls (C3) a "logi-
cally articulated name" suggests that he may misinter-
Pret Wittgenstein even more severely at this point. It
suggests that, although Sellars explicitly says that the
proposition "consists of" a namp bo ;• e, he is actually think-
ing of the proposition as a name. If this is so, it is
a^serious ignoratio elenchi for a Tractatus scholar,
since Wittgenstein explicitly castigates Frege for that
very errors
3 . 143 :
fact this P
rop ° sltlonal sign is a .
forr,’nf
obscured by the usualm. of expression in writing or print.
ln a Prihted proposition, for ex-
Parent P°
essential difference is ap-
and a word!
66" * propositional sign




° Cal "1' 3 proposition a composite
Did Sellars merely slip when he called (C3) a "logi
cally articulated name", or does this represent some-
thing integrally connected with his claim that Wittgen-
stein countenanced monadic atomic facts? I believe the
error is deeply involved in his position. "A name means
an object. The object is its meaning," (3.0203). "Ob-
jects can only be named ..." (3.221). Thus if there
are monadic atomic facts, facts consisting of one and
only one object, they can only be named. But if thatwere so, some sort of structure would be essential to
(at least some) names. l n call -1 nr- ,i g propositions such as
3) names Sellars provides a reductio of hi£i^jic_u _o O s own argu-
ment. s
Even if Sellars can escape these criticisms, his
alarm that (C 3 ) is acceptable as a monadic atomic fact
to Wittgenstein would still contradict other proposi-
tions in the Tractate If (c 3 ) is what Sellars claims
it to be, then the single object a has a form,, a form










P th6 mtUre of the
A new possibility cannot be dis-covered later.
. How are we able to know a monadic atomic fact which
consists of one object, a? We can, it seems, know it
only in one of two ways, through experience, or by some
other moans. If it can be known in any way other than
through experience we can have a priori knowledge of it,
but this violates 5 .
6
34 (as we saw in the previous chap-
ter), If we know the object through experience, however,
there is no reason why we could not know it without
267 .
wm
s, all its possibilities. Mankind long knew iron-- example, without knowing that it could be mixed wHh
certain alloys to make steel, I can with1
» a as iron
now it and yet discover a new possibility ofo Dlil y occurence
ater, thus contradicting 2.0123
.
SSllarS might °f— to escape this conclu-
sion by maintaining that the form of the object is
strictly speaking unknowable (though I doubt he would
, .
d ° S °^' If S0
’ thls again seems in flat contra-
diction to what Wittgenstein writes. The unknowable is
the mystical, and:
6.44t It is not how things are in -h
that is mystical
, fut^ it
Thus Wittgenstein considers the form of a - how a is -
knowable
.
To sum uP! Wittgenstein claims that the form -of a
is knowable and must be known, so to speak, all at once.
Sellars' interpretation seems bound to deny one or the
other of these, and therefore must be false, at least
for the Tractatus .
There is yet another argument, admittedly weaker,
to show that Sellars is wrong here. Sellars seems to
admit that Wittgenstein holds (Cl) and (C2) to be com-
2 6plex. if SOf and if it ((Cl)) serves as the English
268
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} - Frances to the con-
'
.
' 0f cc™Plexity may not be a
Snt condltl °" of synonymy for Wittgenstein, it i s-east a necessary condition
,
27
'"i’he most telling argument in Copi'c „ar
+v, • ,
11 s P per against-°ea that the Tract^ countenanced monadic atomic
facts, " writes Sellars, is based on the premise that if
facts are monadic, "surelv tt™ •
.
y hey include such facts-
as that a certain point in a visual field is red", 28 If
30
' then n ° 0ther at0mic fact could contradict them
21, 2 ' 0262
’ 4 ' 211
- 5.1241), But obviously, Wittgen-
em holds that it could be contradicted (6.3751), so
that no such proposition could serve as an example 'pf
a monadic atomic fact. Sellars makes two comments on












the answer, and £0 which, as a^ogicLjTLwas not required to have the answer. 29 ’
As evidence cellars cites a procedure of Moore's and an
argument from Anscombe, though he might also have argued
from 5.55541 and the surrounding passages. 5° And were
it a question here of the existence or non-existence
269.
(or necessity or non-necessity) of triadic or thirty.
Place relations, then one would be forced to conclude
that
’ aS Sellars in«-ates, the question is purely an
empirical one which Wittgenstein as a philosopher felt
that he^ could not answer. But monadic relations are
unique in part precisely because it can be shown, not
only that they do not, but that they can not, exist.
Sellars then adds the comment that "Wittgenstein
may well have thought that there are monadic atomic
I’acts, indeed that their existence is obvious, but that
no statement in ordinary language represented such a
fact, so that no example could be given in the sense of
written down."31 ln a way this is true Qf wittgenste
s
attitude towards many n-adic atomic facts (e.g,, dyadic),
yet in a way it characterizes his attitude unfairly.
However obvious he may have felt the existence of any
given n-adic atomic fact to be, philosophically he re-
mained neutral as to whether it really exists. This,
again, is what he intends in 5.5541 and the surrounding
passages i it is not philosophically obvious what the
world would look like, i.e., what n-adic facts we would
need, if it were characterized as it really is. Even
if we prescind from the arguments I have enlisted before
m this section, the argument in the passage quoted
270.
above will not allow Sellars to defend his claim that
Wittgenstein accepts monadic atomic facts. Wittgenstein
would have demanded more solid grounds for their exis-
tence than their merely seeming obvious (see his Kote-
~ •*-?—’ P- 2e-3e); that "obviousness" alone
might well have made him suspicious.
B
Is Sellars correct in claiming that, if Wittgenstein
admits monadic atomic facts, then he denies the existence
of bare particulars? If indeed Wittgenstein would. admit
that there exist a number of really different monadic
atomic facts, then these facts could only be different
by having different properties: Sellars would be correct.
But Wittgenstein was not hesitant to admit that there
could be many, infinitely many, identical objects:
2.02331* Either a thing has properties that
nothing else has, in which case we
can immediately use a description to
distinguish it from the others and
refer to it; or, on the other hand,
there are several things that have
the whole set of their properties in
common, in which case it is quite
impossible to indicate one of them.
4.2211: Even if the world is infinitely com-
plex, so that every fact consists of
infinitely many states of affairs and
every state of affairs is composed of
infinitely many objects, there would
271 .
suill have to be obiect^
of affairs. J
CXs and states
5.5302t Russell’s definition of •=• i<. lnadequate, because according- to S'we cannot say that two objlots tave
?FveS?f
r+^°Perties in(t-v n i xhis proposition is nevercorrect, it still has sense.)
In view of these passages, it seems that Wittgenstein
could conceivably have countenanced monadic atomic facts,
all of which could be identical, without denying that ob-
jects are bare. Corresponding to them would be monadic
propositions, which could only affirm that they are dif-
ferent (2.0233), but nothing more. That is, it would
not follow from the fact that the monadic proposition
'
affirms something about the object (i.e., affirms simply
that it is different from another object) that that ob-
ject has any properties at all.
There is another way. too, on which one might coun-
tenance monadic facts, without denying that the Bedeutung
of the names involved has no qualities. One could simply
claim that all such propositions refer to one single
entity, and that that entity has no qualities. This, I
think, is by no means a position Wittgenstein would
gladly accept (it resembles a linguistic rephrasal of
Plotinus' more than any other32 ), but the point here is
not that Wittgenstein actually held this position, but
272 .
that he could have held it, without denying bare (or
absolutely bare) particulars.
Cellars' argument, then, collapses on two counts
First, he does not give us' sufficient grounds for be-’
lieving that Wittgenstein would accept a (merely) logi-
cally articulated language, such as Jumblese, as adequa
Even if he could convince us of this, his argument woul
fail, since it seems that Wittgenstein could countenanc
monadic atomic facts, of a kind, without denying his
(absolutely) bare particulars.
Ill
Diametrically opposed to my interpretation of the
Tractatus is ihai of Allaire and Bergmann. it is with
Allaire arguments in his "The 'Tractates' . Nominalis-
tic or Realistic?", that I shall be concerned here. I
divide them into three basic groups. First come those
arguments drawn from outside the Tractatus itself, par-
ticularly from Wittgenstein's Notebooks, 1914 - iQib
r
and his article published in 1929. 33 Then come a group
arguments replying to several arguments presented by
Copi and Anscombe. Finally, (in the order in which I
shall treat them3+ ) comes a long argument based on
2.0231, which Allaire refers to as "a stern test for
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any realistic interpretation" 35 of the Tractatus
A
It is not certain when thpne final version of the
2!^±atus was preparedf 6 but it surely seems to have
been ready by 1919. As G. H. von Wright speculates it
seems more than likely that all the Tractatus was tlken
from earlier notebooks, and the parallels between Witt-
genstein's loJebo^i9U__
L9M and the TraetatuR add
support to that conclusion. So Allaire's first argu-
ment, based on evidence from the Notebooks , would seem
fairly strong:






SageS enf?rce realism. Thi
,
uV/o n foll w are typical.
Could one manage without names? Surely notNames are necessary for an assertion tha?this thing possesses that property.
Relations and properties ... are objects. 37
But I have already dealt at length with the kinds of
passages Allaire uses here, in the first section of
this dissertation. 38 As I pointed out there, such pas-
sages do not indicate "a bold realism" 39 on the part of
the young Wittgenstein. They indicate rather one of
two things: they show, on the one hand, some amount




count as an obj ,ct (a confusion which the Tractates
only partially clears up), and on the other ^ ^indicate a genuine, deliberate comment to using
JeCt amblcuously. a usage widespread in the Tractatus
a oe .f. such passages as Allaire uses,' at any r^7~
-t support the conclusion that Wittgenstein was a real-
ist m his pre-Tractatus period.
Of the material written later by Wittgenstein and
used by Allaire for support of his interpretation of the
A^Siatus (the 1929 article and the Blue Books '! i shall
say little. By 1929 Wittgenstein had ceased even to
pretend to know what he had meant by many passages in
'
the Tractatus. 0 Whether or not he actually did not
know, or was just not interested in expending the energy
to rethink and clarify the old passages, the fact remains
that he did not even try to be a reliable guide to the
iractatus. Allaire is thus at best on very shaky grounds
here, especially in regard to the 1929 article, about
which Wittgenstein often commented negatively. 41 Further-
more, if we accept Copi's interpretation of Wittgenstein's
comment in the Philosophical Investigations, p. 2le, then
Allaire is simply wrong when he continues 1 "He (Wittgen-
stein) never speaks of it (the Tractatus ). at least with
respect to the nominalism-realism issue, as Copi and
275 .
Anscombe do,
Thus the evidence that Allaire marshalls from out-
side the Tractatus. if* it. i c
- 10 is not simply wrong (misinter-
pieted), is at best weak and scarcely convincing. Let





Allaire attacks only one of Copi’s arguments
directly, the very one which Sellars maintained to be
the strongest against the affirmation of monadic atomic








’ specific coloursught to be counted among the simplest. Ifjec s are properties and elementary proposi-tions consist of names of objects
. ! thenthe propositions (’this is red’ and 'this isblue j must be elementary propositions. Butcan they . both be true? Wittgenstein's answeris unequivocal! "For two colours, e.g. to beat one place in the visual field, is impossible,logically impossible, for it is excluded bythe logical structure of colour
, . , iffollows that colour predications are not ele-
mentary propositions, and the implication ,
seems clear that objects are not properties,
^
As Allaire points out, Copi maintains two distinct theses
here j
(Dl) il follows from 6,3751 that color predi-















" ^ c ^ s ( S1roples) are
Allaire then arrues th-vf i ^ ,
,
g at
' ln the ^SStatus, Wittgenstein
did not hold (D2) to be true that «wi+t’ n Wittgenstein does not
believe, at least st +>,« +•a the time of the 1'ractatus . that if
a specific color is not a property, nothing is." 44
Rather, Allaire claims, Wittgenstein held that specific
colors are to be analyzed into their specific, atomic
shades - and that these shades are objects for Wittgen-
stein.
Allaire develops his explanation of 6.3751 on the
basis of two fundamental assumptions, the first of which
is that the program and procedures outlined in Wittgen-
stein's 1929 paper (which Allaire calls "confused and,
even to its author, disappointing") accurately reflects
Wittgenstein's intentions at the time he wrote the Trac-
tates, ten years or more earlier. Such an assumption,
as I have just pointed out, is at best a liability, at
worst an outright disaster.
Even if Jit tgenstein* s later comments on the Trac-
tatus were accurate, one might well wonder whether
Allaire is correct in reading the passages he refers to
as containing a reference to the TractatusJ 5 In the
paragraph which Allaire quotes Wittgenstein writes
i
277 .
"Now if statements of degree were analysable - as I
used to think •» Tn +v... In the preceding paragraph
he writes, 'One might think - I thought so myself not
long ago -
. . .... Both the „ as 1 ^ think „ ^
long ago" are taken by Allaire to refer to the
period of the Tractatus.'^ But the Tractates was indeed
long ago" in Wittgenstein's mind at the time, these
Passages seem to me better taken to refer, not to the
Tj^ctatus, but to some line of thought he had been pur-
suing m Austria. 47 Thus even if one wishes to trust
Wittgenstein's own interpretation of his earlier work
(as Allaire argues we should), it is by no means clear
that these comments refer to that work.
1 Th ® second Point of fundamental importance to
Allaire's argument is a critical one. He remarks that
6.3751 poses a problem more than it gives an answer,
the problem of how to analyze colors to show their struc
ture i




^ vL TT, b^ue ' cannot be
SToffl’l “°?f* the
" loSical structure
ities, that isAo soAtio^LT* pos?ibil-vague phrase >8 1 n> 1 fc ls merely a
He then points out that the nominalist interpretation
’’does not
. . . provide a solution- to the problem;
not even approach solving the problem". This he
regards as a serious weakness in that position.
It is a weakness which I shall make a brief attempt
to overcome. Like Allaire, I base my solution along
lines indicated by the parenthetical comment in 6.3751, .
though I read that remark quite differently;
8 . 3751 s ....
is °I ear that the logical rroduct
oJ: tvvo elementary propositions' canneither be a tautology nor a contra-
‘ diction.
.
The statement that a pointm the visual field has two different
colours at the same time is a contra-
diction. )
The "logical structure of color" refers, as I pointed
49ou
, to the logical and color spaces surrounding the
object . The contradiction Wittgenstein sees lies, not
in the object (as Allaire's interpretation would have
it), but in the structure, the conflicting structures,
of the spaces surrounding objects. A given (shade of)
red, e.g.
,
occupies a particular point in that logical








he SamS time) entirely
is one which lnvolves the structure of the piaoe occupiea
by objects when red and when blue - not, however, the
objects themselves.
That this is closer to Wittgenstein's actual inter-
tions than the "soluti nn" rs-p-p ^ •o i tio offered in the 1929 paper is
read ily apparent in a moment's reflection nnl necx o an argument
have usee before. 50 As 5.5541 and environs show, we
cannot predict what actually is the case, what exists,,
what must be independent of any actual experience in
order for us to be able to predict it. But (El) i s a
contradiction, l.e., it can be shown false logically!
there is no need of experience for us to know that it
is false. Thus it cannot depend on any (existing) ob-
jects such as shades of colors for its falsehood.
Perhaps Allaire would feel that we cannot, strictly
speaking, predict this contradiction on the basis of
Wittgenstein's theory. Kis interpretation takes Witt-
genstein's philosophy to be closely related to Hume's
on the essential point here, as is most clearly expressed
earlier in his article, in connection with his comments
on 2 . 0231 !
280
.
As the context (roughly 2 oil o „,c ,clear, the main point of j n ,,7 ?'
025 ) makes




facts in which it actual „
e ti y and the
therefore a variant of S occurs. 2.0231 is
atomism. It declares +J£?
™eS1S of loPic al






logical connection Set^en two
is no
too there is no logical rnnn" ^acts, so
and the facts in which ifaclSuy
Here Allaire clearly attributes to Wittgenstein a version
of atomism very much akin to Hume's. Yet to interpret
the iractatus this way is to foist upon Wittgenstein
problems which, though they plagued Hume, never arose,
never needed to arise for Wittgenstein .^2 He blocked
them, m part, precisely by maintaining that the pseudo-
propositions of logic (tautologies and contradictions)
are predictable.
C
Either proposition 2,0231, or the immediately
following proposition 2.0232, plays an important role
in all three of these papers;
2 . 0231 : The substance of the world can only
determine a. form, and not any mater-
ial properties. For it is only by
means of propositions that material
properties are represented — only
by the configuration of objects that
they are produced.





1 have of course provided my own interpretation of thema cing 2 even more radicauy
does
'
-station of these passages is critical fQr
interpret,ation of t,hp Thnot 4e TraetatHB, they deserve and win
receive a separate, special treatment.
'
On this one point, Allaire 55 and Sellars 54 find
themselves on one side, opposed to Copi and Anscomhe
on the other: neither of the former feels that 2.0231
e used 00 buttress the nominalistic interpretation
Of the Tractatus. and their reasons for arguing that it
cannot are verv similar'ar. Consider 2.0231 first* Anscombe
argues, on the basis of it, that propositions are neces-
sary to represent material properties, names alone can-
not do the job. But properties are configurations of
names, each of which stands in direct connection with
an object: since configurations are necessary to repre-
sent material properties, the latter must, as Wittgen-
stein puts it, be formed only by "a configuration of
objects". Objects, therefore, have no material proper-
ties. 55 Anscombe thus interprets Wittgenstein's propo-
sitions in a straightforward manner. She conceives the
last sentence of 2.02 3 1 genuinely to be divided into
two parts, connected through an analogy between them,
the first of which concerns language, the second of
282
.
which concerns the Daraiinilei non-linguistic (ontological)
phenomenon, (Wittcen^to ig s e n ueas this kina of analogical
i easoning elsewhere, of course, see e61 b
* • g. , 2.0122.)











Passage in question r „ ?^Pre ?ation of thereading of the context What Ji+t*1 careTulsays is "Roughly Spea>5 nJ (*' •VLttf?nstein
sprochen): objects a^p ? j
Bei -laue:flg ge-











do not determinp + 010 18 that objects
green, the fact t^f S S GV?n if a iF
mined by a
° a is green is not deter-
Why Sellars wants to interpret the passage this way-
SeemS ClGar en °U£h
- ^eonbe. Copi and those who follow
them have to argue that fact and object-world are parallel;
they, have to argue that the two halves of the second sen-
tence in 2.0231 constitute an analogy. Sellars singly
reinterprets that relation, he argues that what this
proposition in fact helps to show is a difference between
facts and objects (namely that the latter cannot determine
the former). Sellars' reinterpretation, if correct,
would thus block Anscombe's argument.
But is cellars reinterpretation correct? It seems
perfectly clear from both the English (in the Pears and
McGumness translation) and the German versions of this
proposition that in, "only by the configurations of
283 ,
Ejects are they produced", the "they" refer„ t „131 Properties- in the precedin- s t
' '
ri se g en ence T-r i+ j
then what Wittgenstein is telling us h
' Q °eS
’
that, eg if a •
' ei ® 1S cloarly
f0
/ ’ er0en ' thSn a is ^ complex object
Admittedly, the fact that 2 023l as
°
bje ° tS '
• ‘•31, read by Sellars is
I™ 1- oddity (to say the least) is not the mist• mg argument. But the proposition, when read nor.
does support Anscombe's interpretation. Why shouldxnoute Sellars' aberrant reading to it? Sellars •
himself gives us no reason to do so, it seems that the
/
^ ^ rSad ^ StUl remains that of Anscombe andCopi,
n thl ° baSls
' to °- Copi's interpretation of 2 o23225 Clail"ing (aS s^cdochical) that objects lack all
material properties is, if not justified, at least stren-
e-d. Wittgenstein is indeed remarking ("incidentally"^ PaSSln§ " °r " cas^lly", not "roughly") that obiects
are colorless. So they must be since (as follows from
2.023 1) color first arises from combination (configuration)
of objects. Any other interpretation seems to press
Wittgenstein's words far out of the shape they have in
these tv/o passages,
That polemical twisting of Wittgenstein's words






In so doinp- he fir^t ll
material properties.
(in the sense o^ unangl’v'^h^^
the substance
world determines a fSrm 0f the
titles have formal * T
bl ° means that en-





h do not de-
determine the confi nn* «m 16® at*?ns but which
occur. He also s^yffw Vn - W !? ioh the'V can




rty an™n? ty “s^l ttheby its formal pronortv a+1 de eripned
nate this differpn^o ’’ A
Attempting to illumi-
material prwertiet









facTthat° ^week^s?^’coloured and the fact that a s^ck ™ red
-esyr s/sesa *%*
gss ? redb$7
In particular, note the sentence which I have italicized.
What Allaire claims is undoubtedly true, as far as it
goes, material properties are accidental and do appear
only in configurations. Wittgenstein simply goes fur-
ther than Allaire, he says that they actually "are
produced (ge bilde t)" only through the configurations.
Allaire, too, pays too little heed to what Wittgenstein
actually is saying in this sentence. Furthermore, his
interpretation commits Wittgenstein, as we have seen,
285 .
to a Humean version of atomism. That in turn involves
ittgenstem m problems, centering around the a prior i
predictable characteristics of colors, in which he was
_
actually not involved.
There is undoubtedly much that is valuable and
defensible both in Sellars- and Allaire -s comments on
these passages. That objects do not determine facts,
e.S., or that 2.02 3 1 is also concerned with "enforcing"
and clarifying the difference between formal and mater-
ial properties are comments which do help clarify the
complex of problems with which Wittgenstein tried to
deal in these passages. But there is no good reason
to question the fundamental correctness of the inter-
pretation of the propositions originally given them by
Copi and Anscombe. Indeed, as Sellars and Allaire show,'
attempts to interpret the passage in a way which does
not support nominalistic interpretation of the Tractatus
result in a highly abnormal reading of its words, a
reading neither the German nor the English structure of
the sentences supports.
IV
The three persons I have chosen to criticize
represent, I think, the high-points of the three major
286
.
erpre uations of the ontology of the Tractatus. Many
° 6rS haVS Written Wel1 °n that subject
i to deal with
all the arguments, all the- papers, I would have to un-
leash a raging torrent of words, a torrent which might
be more difficult to end thsn + na to continue indefinitely.
I have no desire to continue it, it115 is, at any rate,
not germaine to my task.
Set out to show that all arguments oppos-
ve the nominalist interpretation of the Tractatus were
clearly wrong, nor even that those I have chosen to
consider are so. What I hoped to show, and hope I have
ahown
, is that some of the principal arguments which
have been adduced to block that interpretation are, when
not clearly wrong, then at least by no means clearly
coirect. If i have done this, it is enough, I must
then rely on my prior and forthcoming arguments to con-
vince the reader that my (extreme) nominalist interpre-
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, in Copi, I.a u a , ., op. cit,, pp. 249-271.
As I pointed out earlier (Section II, p. 153 ancj
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intended to be Th^v
open to some reasonable doubts? at letst?
0SiU °n iS






Ss obje^t^'the^r? iS that Wittgenstein





this is—most aSbiguous aeCT™L? 11 ftrs p ?lnts out,certain what Plato interdpd &^ ?inoe lt is un-It can, ttSFefore be + °Se elements to be.
tion, except perhaps the realist^n^+f2^ interpreta-Copi's first argument (op ei? 'o i«M ^Status,treated later in this chapter?"
P- 184) -^ITr b®
Suppose that one could successful iv kof his arguments + n ? lully llmit all four
< not concern me* it is ni
1
-
1! Properties. This need





enough. The only trnuhi^^ 1X ° s not g0 far
Whicf, would euSnS. “seibSSSf 0?°
U
i
d KTbare objects? his only attpm^+ +«Jty of abs °lutely
.
to be, at best, a weak o,???
P t0 d ° S ° 1 have shown
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p. 35f,
Allaire does not explicitly state this. It is how-ever, the only reason I can find for ascribing thereasoning of the 1929 article to Wittgenstein's
earlier period (otherthan that Allaire wants to doso, 1 or obvious polemical purposes.)
This seems all the more likely in view of the obviousovertones of logical positivism found both in this
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I have often warned, throughout the preceding
chap ..ers
, "thaL * * ic? ~ 1v, v •0 ls amblSUous in the Tractatus .
y interest so far has been to show that Wittgen-
stein does affirm the existence of absolutely simple
objects in the sense of absolutely bare particulars.
Emphasizing this line of argument, this meaning of • ob-
ject', to the exclusion of the other has led us into a
strange situation, simple objects lie outside the world;
though they may be said to be in logical space, etc.,
neither spatial nor color qualities can be said to char-
acterize them, or belong to them, in any straightforward
manner, simple objects can shed all their properties as
people can shed all their clothes, and no property is
any closer to, more essential to or really a part of,
an object than any article of clothing is of people.
But what has happened to our familiar world, the
world of complex objects replete with qualities? Ob-
viously we have lost it, just as Wittgenstein warned us
at the very beginning of the Tractatus we would,
is the gist of 1 - l.ll, objects lie outside the






or this and the following chapter is to return the world
to us in the way Wittgenstein returns it. I„ this chap-
ter I have three principal aims. The first is to show
how we can introduce and use complex objects in the Trac-
tatU “' * hen 1 Sha11 ^ iscuss the nature of complex ob-
jects. in particular how they have qualities. In this
I Pay especially close attention to Wittgenstein's use
of 'internal', 'external', and 'formal'. Finally, I
shall provide a brief summary comparison between simple
and complex objects.
What is the world? In one sense this is a very easy
question for Wittgenstein to answer; in another. sense it
is a question which, though answerable, is very compli-
cated; m yet another sense it is unanswerable.
We can derive the first of these, the simple answer,
from the following propositions!
1* The world is all that is the case.
1.1: The world is the totality of facts, not
of things.
1.12: P or the totality of facts determines
v/hat is the case, and also whatever is
not the case.
1.13: The facts in logical space are the world.
r
•12 and 1.13 are of special interest, since they uoint
out an ambiguity in Wittgenstein's position which will
bo of some concern later. The latter implies that the
world consists of two parts, neither of which alone can
be the world, but which together make up the world, ob-
jects and forms (or "spaces").
A conflict arises between 1.12 and I .13 ( or 1 ). In
1 and 1,13 WittSenstein defines the world as "all that
is the case", i.e., the "totality of facts"
( 1 . 1 ). i >12
°a^ S that the 'totality of facts determines
( bestimmt )
what is the- case" (italics mine). The question thus
arises: -Did Wittgenstein distinguish clearly between
being (what is the case) and determining (what is the case)?"
If he did (and the natural assumption is that he would
probably do so), which claim is closer to his actual
overall intentions: that the world is the totality of
facts, or that that totality merely determines the world?
That this question arises here points out an ambiguity
in the word 'fact' as Wittgenstein uses it, which I
cannot develop until the end of this chapter and the
next chapter. However, in light of this problem, our
simplest answer to the question of what the world is
must take the form of a disjunction: either it is all
the facts in logical space, or it is determined by all
296 .
the facts in logical space.
According to the above, the world is split into
two Clements, neither of which alone is the world. The
second, more complex answer, in contrast, attempts to
answer the question from within the world, without split-
tlng “ “ C °nside- ^cts as part of an experi-
enced world known a Posteriori. Thus, empirical scien-
tists give the best answer to the question of what the
world is. Important philosophical questions neverthe-
less arise, and perhaps chief among them (for Wittgen-
stein m the Tractatus, at any rate) is "How is this
world-picture related to the one we have just examined-
Or, more precisely, the first answer took properties
away from objects, but this one seems to give them back.
How can one reconcile the conflict between the two
answers?
xhis, of course, is the central question of this
chapter. Its answer may be previewed briefly in the
following propositions!
6.13t
6 . 341 !
Logic is not a body of doctrine
a mirror-image of the world.
Logic is transcendental.
but
Newtonian mechanics, for example, im-
poses a unified form on the descrip-
tion of the world. Let us imagine awhite surface with irregular black
spots on it. 7/e then say that
297 .
6. 3^2 j
whatever kind of picture these make
asTw?rtT fPProximate as closely’° 1 Ylsh to the aescription of it' bvcovering the surface with a sufficient]
v




arS^hether it is blacker. In . this way I shall have im-tpa -fled f °rm °n the description






nesh would have made thedescription simpler: that is to say,
cm-r?n^




0Sh -°r oonversely ) , and so on.- different nets correspond to .dif-ferent systems for describing the
world. Mechanics determines one formor description of the world by sayingthar all.propositions used in the
description of the world must be obtainedm a given way from a given set of pro-Positions -- the axioms of mechanics,
it thus supplies the bricks for building
the edifice of science, and it says,
Any building that you want to erect
whatever it may be, must somehow be
constructed with these bricks, and with
these alone.
'
(Just as with the number-system we must
be able to write down any number we wish,
so with the system of mechanics we must
be able to write down any proposition of
physics that we wish.
)
And now we can see the relative position
of logic and mechanics, (The net might
also consist of more than one kind of
mesh: e.g., we could use both triangles
and hexagons.) The possibility of
describing a picture like the one men-
tioned above with a net of a given form
tells us noth ing about the picture.











laracteri2 e the picture
the^world aesori»lng






hlch it is possible
1 y hese means. We are
the fact thT'T^ about thc world by
Logical space and the quality space of Newtonian mechanics
are here declared similar in this respect: they do not
arise from within the world, from the qualities of facts,
but lie, so to speak, at its boundaries. What lies in
the world (what the world is) is combinations of objects
(facts) as they are shaped by the spaces lying around,
but extrinsic to, them.
It is also, in a sense, impossible to answer the
question of what the world is.
•
6 ‘ /|A<’ ! H i s . not things are in the worldthat is mystical, but that it exists.
The how of the world can be known, but that it exists
cannot, and this is the mystical. If we follow this
approach, the world again divides into two. On the one
hand we have the knowable, the how things are, the way
m which they are or the way in which objects combine
i
ultimately, the forms of the world.1 On the other hand,
299 .
we have what is, according to this w
+ , al1
b U,lfa Proposition, essen-P rally mysterious, that the world is m au . In very realsense, the question itself is declared no
. nsense underuhls approach.
obi rr
in an °f tMs is there a pia° e f°r c °mpiex
Oects. Nowhere In each of these three views Witt-
genstem has, one might say, been trying to view the
W °rld fr °m itS edge




- (™ S iS least - the second view,
In tMS We can aPPly again a passage from
one of his letters concerning the Tractatu s, »der Sinn^ Buches ist ein ethischer. Ich wollte einmal in das
Vorwort emen Satz geben .... Ich wollte naemUch
schreiben, mein Werk bestehe aus zwei Teilen, aus dem,
der hier vorliegt, und aus alledem, was ich nicht ge-
schrieben habe. Und gerade dieser zweiten Tail ist das
Kichtige. Es wird naemlich das Ethische durch mein Buch
gleichsam von Innen her begrennzt
. . .
,» 2
complex objects occur within the world. They are
introduced through an analysis of facts (unlike genuinely
simple objects). Facts are said to be comprised of
states of affairs which are said to be objects in com-
binationt
2* What is the case — a fact — is theexistence of states of affairs.
300 .
2. Oli A state of affaire l
is a combination of objects (thingsff*
hen^ approached from within the world, things have pro-
perties, even essential properties.
2 ' 012!
thinf
elC nothinS is accidental: if ag can occur in a state of affair-the possibility of the statP •'must be written into the thing it^elff
8
Objects in the world also have forms, in a normal, straig,
forward manner
i
2,0141: The possibilitv o-p -i+o ^
• stafpq Af tii
y
r .its occuring in
object,
affairs ts the form of an
2.033: Form is the possibility of structure.
Wittgenstein uses -object', in the sense of 'complex
object', very broadly in both the Notebooks and in the
21^£l^tus, m the former it is clearly the case that
the word can be applied to anything one wishes:
What seems to be given us a priori is the
IT
" Id^ ical^irtheS concept
’ toof^
0^ ^ properties
* etc., are objects,
The Tractatus is not quite so clear on this point, but
I believe one can still see that Wittgenstein held there
that, wit_hin the world, any proposition or relation or
property could be (or could be thought of as) an object.
object' is, so to speak, a word constantly shifting in
meaning and type of reference, to meet the needs of the
301 .
moment. Thi^ t
’ ’ 13 the waning of 4.123 , which
interpret to concern more than i u -t thati s one proposi-
tion s
^•123 1 a property is interm l : r * •
unthinkable that it, 1 * l* 13
not possess it
S °bject should


















Perhaps a more appealing interpretation, at first
e, nee, would be to claim that Wittgenstein is pointing
out here that 'object' can be used at any level in a
series of types. if the series - object, property of
the object, property of the property, - represents a
series constructed in accordance with Russell's theory
of types, then one may plausably wish to read Wittgen-
stein here as claiming that 'object- can be shifted from
one level to the other, from the first level, e.g., to
the second. Then the property (of the object) becomes
an object (the sense of the word 'object "shifts", Witt-
genstein says) and the property of the property becomes
merely a property ('property undergoes a corresponding
"shift"). This interpretation will not do, however,
302 .
th>w of twi
3 . 331 and 3 . 332 )
.
Further evidence that Wittgenstein uses -object-
thio broadly occurs later in the Fractatus ,
5.4?3: Logic must look after itself.
If a sign is possible thpn i + ,• ,capable of sigHfylK?’ -5+ xt ls . also






u_ _ U t-L c s also pernnif + pHuhe reason why -Socrates ! “f .7 ,
means nothing is the? Jh
is identical*
Perty called* MenUca^ mb"
n ° Pr°~
sition is nonsensica? i
' he proP°-
foppj .I. , fisical because we haveiai.ied Lo make an arbi tnru .
v tion anH no+ v oixrary determina-
nt^/ / because the symbol inltseli
, would be illegitimate.)
'
mistakes^inkogic
? ' "" Cann0t “ake
(See also 5.4?33.) If there is no good reason to prevent
one from interpreting identity as a relation (if one is
willing to "make an arbitrary determination" to do so),
there is likewise no reason to prevent one from seeing
it as an object. Anything can be an object, too, pro-
vided only we "make" the proper "arbitrary determination".
The range of objects in the world can thus be exceedingly
great
, indefinitely if not infinitely so.
We can exhibit something which is common to all
these things we know as objects
,
4
namely in the claim
that all objects in the world are complex. All such
objects, in other words, are subject to analysis, to
breaking apart into yet simpler components until we
303 .
roach the position outlined in the first two chapters.“ which we have on the one hand forms and on the other
absolutely simple objects. All the objects of the world
are complexes formed of simple objects in relation. From
this an apparently very startling thesis follows (start-
ling, that is, for the Tractates as normally interpreted):
complex objects, objects in the world, are a type of fact.
The thesis appears as startling because for the
iractatus fact and object are normally taken as belong-




Agairst the background of earlier metaphysicshe outstanding innovation of Wittgenstein* o
’
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me ’taP^y s icians search Tortho oi e highest generality about the
^ey usually' conceive of themselves
+
® investigating some nameable entity, orin the language of the Tractatu s . a thingA supremely important one, to be sure" '^umma rerum, containing everything that is
as a Par_t » hut a ‘thing nonetheless.
Wittgenstein breaks sharply with this tradi-tion. He rejects at the outset the tradition-al conception of the universe as something
tnat can be referred to by a name.
5
I, of course, have used the same point, the fundamental
difference between fact and thing, to criticize Sellars. 6
304 .
Yet however surprising thic-ls claim might seem at first










n faCtS can also ^ objects, furthermore,
Wittgenstein equates world with foot- (+ + .Wl ac s (totality of facts),
" °bjCCts ^utMde the world. Yet he does not
deny that there are objects in the world (as 4,123, i.a.







. By the definition
of fact given u 2 - 2,01 above, we have no choice but
•
t° say that complex objects of all types - molecules or
colors, pens or sounds - are all actually facts.
But does this not vitiate the sharp distinction
Wittgenstein has always been held to make between fact
and thing, as well as that between their linguistic
counterparts, sentence and name? It does not; in fact
it forces one to make the distinction even more clear-
cut and accessible. To show this, I will examine the
historical roots of Wittgenstein's distinction between
propositions and names (which is reflected precisely in
that between fact and object),
Wittgenstein was undoubtedly under Russell's
influence when he made the distinction between proposi-
tion and name, particularly under the influence of
305 .
Russell's work in "On Denoting" 7 T n +Vl +6 • l that article
Russell presents a theory of sentence-analysis whi^h
enables one to escape from the kind of extreme Platonism
e had held earlier. The theory is based on a vital
distinction between genuine proper names and merely
apparent proper names; confusion of the two, Russell
claims, has seduced many philosophers into accepting
had arguments for the existence of numerous abstract
objects; after clarifying the confusion, we can return
to a more sensible ontology. Apparent proper names look
(or sound, etc.) like names, but they can be shown to
have a logical structure, and therefore to be disguised
descriptions which need not refer. Genuine names lack
the .structure necessary to a description, disguised or
overt
.
How does one know whether what appears to be a name
disguised definite description or a genuine name?
Russell's early answer, accepted initially by Wittgen-
stein, was that of logical analysis. We analyze propo-
sitions until we come to what are obviously fully anal-
yzed propositions; such names as appear in them must be
genuine names. As I have shown, Wittgenstein early re-
jected Russell's method, substituting one of his own.
He retained, however, the distinction between propositions
306 .
von a ter he gave up the program of logical analysis aslf Wr °nS ' Slmply -achievable, he maintained that
tMS Central disti-«on was both true and useful (see
f °r °nG expressi- this in the 'i'ractatus l Ap.
Plying this to the world, to ontological problems, he
made the obvious distinction between what has structure
and what has none rPhe> ,ion , t e former he called "facts" (or
"states of affairs"), the latter "objects".
ThlS 18 obviously a very unusual, extended use of •
the word .fact' ( 'Tatsache.
) , but its oddity is no guar-
antee of its uselessness. Wittgenstein is trying to ac-
count for two things which had bothered him in the Note,
books, on the one hand our strong feeling that there
must be simple objects, on the other the certainty that,
if an object appears in our perceptual field, it is eo
i£so complex. He accounted for both by excluding simple
objects from the world (from our fields of perception)
and making the world the sum total of structures or com-
plexes, facts and states of affairs which make up facts , 9
By this maneuver he both satisfies the analytical require-
ments of logical analysis (by providing for the existence
of genuine names and things to which they can refer), and
at the same time does justice to his belief that we can
307 .
never rid ourselves of complexity in the world, x.e.,
that we can never find an example of a fully analyzed
proposition, 10
Thus my claim that things are a species of facts
(though there may be facts which are not things) is not
so improbable as it may have seemed at first. Both the
genesis of the distinction, and passages in the Notebooks
and the Tractatus, tend to support that identification.
Furthermore, it casts new and interesting light on a
number of propositions in the Tractatus . The thesis of
1.1, for example, would read, the world is the totality
of complexes, not of simples. In line with this inter-
pretation, 4,2211 and related passages become more than
an idle speculation for Wittgenstein, for it would seem
that, often at least, he was tempted to view the world
as precisely such an infinitely complex group of com-
plexes. to end the series of complexities is to leave
the world.
Does this use of ‘fact’ have anything to recommend
it outside the context of logical analysis? Despite its
oddity
, I think it does. We can best show this by a
comparison. Many philosophers, such as Aristotle, view
concrete things (which they of course admit to be com-
plex) as in some sense ontologically basic, able to
308 .
exist independently, or that upon^ ^^
Pend, without itself depending on other thi,
Aristotle holds in the Cot
^
^
that the primary sub-
:
are thinSS like indi— cows, ete. Ihl .S re" eCted ^ la«' 11 histone claims, by a fun .'




S Whlt6 ' ^ ' in ™ place'
, on the other.
flrS " th6Se iS ^ ultimate sublet, that which
cannot be a predicate; the other two, though similar in
structure, can ultimately be predicated, if f read the
Categories Correctly, and that of things like the first
Wittgenstein wants to blur this type of distinction
man
' tMS WMte “0 this-in-the-market -place are
all facts, they are all similar in that they are com-
plexes. There is no genuine one-way dependence (as Aris-
totle of course argues there is), + u- +Jt this white may not be
able to exist without this man - but this man is equally
unable to exist without this white. For one or another
purpose, Wittgenstein might agree, we may wish to lay
stress on one or another of complex, Aristotle on
men, or Bergmann on colors, etc,, but Wittgenstein re-
mains indifferent to all these possibilities, since none
of them brings out anything of genuine ontological sig-
nificance. The only genuinely significant ontological
309 .
distinction, for Wittgenstein i s that h ^’ in between facts
and things, between all complexes on + n1
» the one hand, and
absolute non-complexes on thn uP o e other. Wittgenstein is
thuo, unlike Strawson and Strawsnn*^ • no^r o s version of Kant, 12
a genuine revisionary metanhvc-iniJ rae ^physician in the Tractates . at
least, and his revisi nni o+ + >o st tendencies are clearly visiblem the way he redefines the word -fact'.
II
Complexes of all sorts are distinguished -from each
other by the relations they have to one another. If two
things have all the same relations, they are indistin-
guishable but not therefore the same thing (as, e.g.,
Leibniz would have claimed):







u from their external pro-perties, is that they are different.
0233 1 sEither a thing has properties thatnothing else has, in which case wecan immediately use a descrintion to
ref^Hfo
1^ lt fr °m the others > and
tuf®
t0 11 ; or
’ on the other hand,there are several things that have thewoie set of their properties in com-mon, in which case it is quite im-possible to indicate one of them.




ause Recording to it we cannotsay that two objects have all their
properties in common. (Even if this
310 .
ao8^°^eTer correct ’ -u
Properties are reduced in all cases to rolations
, tQ
say of two things a and b that they have "the whole set
of their properties in common" is to say that they are
related to all and only the same things in the same way.
That properties are reduced to relations is nothing more
than one would expect from the arguments and rebuttals
of the first three chapters, but a very brief review of
the reasoning behind it may be helpful at this point,
since it serves as the basis for this section.
Following my own second chapter (and most commen-
tators on the Tractates.) I divide properties into two
kinds (the former of which again divides into two but
that division is not now relevant), logical and material.
That the latter are relations is shown (as Copi has al-
ready pointed out 1?) by 2.0231 - 2.0232, where Wittgen-
stein claims that they are "produced by" "the configura-
tion of objects". That the former are also reducible
to relations can only be indicated briefly at this point.
In 6.12 Wittgenstein equates formal and logical properties.
6.12. The. fact that the propositions of
logic are tautologies shows the
formal -- logical -- properties of
language and the world.
The fact that a tautology is yielded
by this par t icular way of connecting
311 .
Wio°Sri^
C"tS characterizes the1 k
‘ constituents. if pro
when^thev
aI' e t0 yield a tautologyv/ne y are connected in o ~ZZ.tr •
way, they must have certain' st™^
1”





that **><* PossesrtKsHal properties.
As Max Black points out, 'formal' and 'internal' mean
the same for Wittgenstein,^ and Wittgenstein himself














' or ’ in tha case
.? l s » about structural proper-
formai
Che Same sense about
relations^
atl °nS “d Structural




Thus both material and logical properties reduce to
structures, i.e., relations between objects which do not
have those properties.
If the above view is correct, and if, ultimately,
objects are absolutely bare, Wittgenstein's reduction of
properties to relations of objects seems to make no sense
If objects are absolutely bare, they have no properties
at all: even great clusters of them would seem incapable
of producing (or being^) properties. Following this
line of development
, I have emphasized in Part II,
"haPtSr the l>roPer 'ty“ spaces within whlch’object
find
.
themselves do not helong to the objects themselves
' ^ d ° n0t belonS °^ects, what sense is
there in saying that they are (or are formed by) rela
tions of objects? They would seem to be entirely ind e-
pendent of the obiect r i c oJ -. as is our perceptual apparatus
(our "faculties") on, e.g., Kant's view. Either way
here seems to be no good reason for reducing all pro-
perties to relations.
The problem can also be put another way. Wittgen-
stein would maintain that there is a very strong rela-
tion between configurations of objects and material
properties. Material properties cannot arise except
through configurations of objects; such configurations
are necessary to their existence. 1* (The same, of course
holds true on my interpretation for logical properties).
But it would seem that there is an insurmountable diffi-
culty in accounting for a necessary relation between
material (or logical) properties and configurations of
absolutely bare objects, if their configurations can be
correctly said to produce material properties, then bare
objects must have at least the property that, in certain







wo.wm,,,.^ Gm that "°P1 ' S COmment about ''Plato' s recep
H




^ haS thS CaPaMli^ <* receiving form
( 50 -
The problem that faces me, briefly stated, is how
1,0 eet from a world of obiects t„+ = 11J totally Without denying
the necessary relation between the configuration of ob-
,
J6CtS and the qualities
configurations produce.
The source -of the
y 13 that absolutely simple
objects do not seem ahio produce anything (and for
this reason the di ff i +, r *ll faculty does not arise for either
Copi or Anscombe).
Let me attack the problem in two ways, the first
via the net metaphor. 6.341, 6. 34 2 , 6. 34 3 and 6. 35
clearly express a metaphor which is at the heart of the
£fflctatus theory of properties and descriptions, since
the first two were quoted above (page 4), I ehall only
quote the last two at this point:
6.3^3: Mechanics is an attempt to constructaccording to a single plan all lietrue propositions that we need forc description of the world.
6 -35
i





ous -ly say nothing
Msition ! 61r actual form andposit . A he network, however i «?







iple of sufficient, tc. are about the net andnou about what the net describes.
The metaphor is clear, and so are its limitations. "The
form is optional (belirtig)-, the properties „e end up
ascribing to the world and its objects, the relations
oee there, can be changed as we change the "form of
description". "The Doqqihin+u *P°ssl Dility of describing a picture
like that mentioned above with a net of a given form
tells us nothing about the picture. (For this is true
of' all such pictures.)" To rephrase this in a way
similar to that in which I stated it in Chapter II, our
- P— 0 ~ conceptual schemas attribute qualities to ob-
jects (put the objects in various places in different
spaces), but those qualities do not characterize the
objects themselves, What does tell us something about
the world is "the precise way in which it is possible
to describe it by these means" and "the fact that it
can be described more simply with one system of mechan-
ics than with another."
This last part is of special concern for the prob-
lem at hand. The "precise way in which" we can describe
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the world means preoiselv tu +c y the true sentences which do" fa0t
’ °n a £iVen describe the world. ThatU
a contingent matter, depending on what objects there areln terms of the metaohor i + ^p , it depends on the location of
the dots on the rage — even +k e •though it can not describe
their, - and can quite easily (if perhaps somewhat un _
naturally) be said to be produced by them. The relation
between the properties and the description (the net) is
necessary in this sense, if there were no dots
there are, there would not be that particular natural
property; if there were no dots at di -a,uu QO0S all there would be
no properties (material or logical) at all.
The metaphor is exciting, but its many limitations
are both obvious and at times exasperating. Expressed
less metaphorically, Wittgenstein's position can be seen
as the conveyance and reconciliation of two lines of
thought. The first of these is already very familiar,
the world is the totality of facts and facts are (essen-
tially) complex. I have dwelt less on the second, so it
is less familiar. We can construct a priori numerous
combinations of material properties - for example, this
white page (that this page is white, to express it as a
fact), this red page (that this page is red), etc. Yet
we pick out only one as actual, only one description as
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true (though the false descriptions are none the le . 8
meaningful)
. Why? We do so because that is the way theW °r" d rSally 1Si bSCaUSe
- of those descriptions which
our "net" makes available to us, those fit the world best
though once again, the necessity of the existence of
simple objects shows that the descriptions do not fit
exactly). The complexity of propositions is reflected
in the fact that many simple objects exist; the proposi-
tions that we pick out as true are reflected in the way
in which the simple objects fit where and as we say
they should, even though their actual structure lies
forever beyond our grasp. Throughout this, of course,
it is always necessary to remember that simple objects
do not even have the capability of receiving form that
Copi attributes to Plato's objects, Wittgensteinian
objects are totally indifferent to any form.
Ill
The reduction of all properties to relations seems
justified. It allows us to speak of the relation be-
tween objects and properties (configurations of objects)
as Wittgenstein in fact speaks of them. Instead of talk
lng about relations and properties, we can from this
point on limit ourselves to a concern with relations
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alone. Wittgenstein divides relations into four prin-
cipal kinds, internal, external, formal and material. 18
Of these, " material" is used only twice in the Tractatesm 2.0231 with "properties" and in 5.44, "Truth-functions
are not material functions". There is no objection to
interpreting it as it seems to be interpreted normally
to mean contingent properties characterizing contingent
objects. My main concern here win therefore be with
internal, external and formal relations and properties
n ca “ e 01 formal', with the meaning of 'for- '
raal series' and, to a lesser degree, 'formal concept',
too. Unlike standard approaches, 19 my approach begins
with an explication of the first two. This reflects
Wittgenstein's own procedure, he introduces •internal-
in 2.01231, but 'formal' does not even occur until 4.122
(where it is used of formal properties). Formal con-
cepts, which occupy Anscombe and Black almost exclusively,
are introduced only in 4.126, after a thorough discussion
of internal relations (4.122 - 4.1252), and are intro-
duced with the words: "We can now talk about formal con-
cepts .... This implies that an understanding of for-
mal concepts requires, as background, a competent under-
standing of internal relations (and formal properties),
ihe procedure in Black and Anscombe is incomplete,
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though not therefore wrong.
I shall restrict myself initially therefore to
internal relations. What is an internal relation? A
careful examination of the Tractatus (made with the re-
ducibility of properties to relations in mind) seems to
produce two answers to that question:
4.014, A gramophone record, the musical idea
e written notes, and the sound-wavesall suand to one another in the sameinternal relation of depicting thathola between language and the world.
Ihey are all constructed according toa common logical pattern.
(Like the . two youths in the fairy-
tale, their two horses, and their




4.123: A property is internal if it is un-
.•
thinkable that its object should not
possess it,
(ihis shade of blue and that one stand
APso . in the internal relations of
lighter uo darker.. It is unthinkable
that these two objects should not standm this relation.
)
(Here the shifting use of the word 'ob-
ject' corresponds to the shifting use
of the words 'property' and 'relation'.)
Recast in terms of relations, the first sentence of 4.123
would read:
4.123': A relation. is internal to an object if
it is unthinkable that the elements of
that object not stand in that relation,
It seems clear that Wittgenstein intends these two
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definitions to be synonymous (though this i s admittedly
I"
aSSUmPti °n °n ** ^ *>» -h,« says he docs)Are they? s; ’
At first glance it would seem that they are not, for
there are good, commonly known and most' unexciting rea-
sons (which I have arran<r^ k tKed below m order of their im-
portance) for disputing their synonymy,
1) 4.014 concerns itself with facts, while 4, 123
concerns itself with objects.
2) 4.014 calls for internal relations to-be "con-
structed according to a common logical pattern", since
they are all so constructed they, like a picture and the
depicted (see 2.161 ), must in some sense be one, "there
must be something identical in" the one and the other.
On the other hand, 4.123 uses the apparently psychologi-
cal^ term "unthinkable", nothing is mentioned about a
logical Pattern - nor anything logical at all, and in
the examples which follow parenthetically, no sort of
lden uixy
, of being "in some sense one" is even mentioned
in passing,
3)
1he principal point of nonsynonymy seems to be
one which since the criticisms of Descartes’ Meditations
(at least) has been common philosophical coinage, there
seem clearly to be many things which are "unthinkable"
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but which are nevertheless not therefore logically
-Possible. 'Unthinkable' is a mcholegical term
_ ^
Wittgenstein needs (and gives us in 4.014) a logical
term. Thus either our inability to think of the object
without that relation, or the construction of relations
according to a common logical pattern, could serve as our
criterion for internal relations - but not both.
The nonsynonymy is merely apparent. To prove it
so I shall show three things. 1) the psychological
overtones of 'unthinkable' do not exist for Wittgenstein,
that /+ -°14 COncerns ^cts, and 4. 123 things, makes no
difference; 3) the two can then be eliminated in favor'
of a third way of stating the requirement for internal-
ity, a way which combines both Wittgenstein's intentions
in 4.014 and his intentions in 4.123.
We can, claims Wittgenstein, think only that which
is subject to laws
6.361s One might say, using Hertz's termin-
°l°Sy
> that only connexions that aresub j e c t to law are thinkable.
But this simply means that we can only think that which
is (in some sense) logical
s
6 * 3 * i he exploration of logic means the
exploration of everything that is
subje ct t
o
law . And outside lo^'ic
everything is accidental . 20
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Thus "thinkable" for Wittgenstein loses any psychologies!
overtones and gains logical connotations. One might say
"unthinkable" in Wittgenstein- s use of it here means not
'I cannot think; of if >-m+ iu , ,
’ tut i t cannot be thought of at
all, and that for logical reasons (i.e.\ because it is
illogical). Thus (to continue for a moment to use the
object-terminology of 4.123), 4.123 says that an inter-
nal property of an object is part of the logical form
of that object)
_
so that one cannot think of that objec
without also thinking of its logical form, i.e., its
internal relations. 21 Thus the third, and most serious
criticism above is obviated,
4.014 and 4,123 seem, as the first criticism above
pointed out, to concern different types (categories) of
things, 4.014 concerning facts, 4.123 objects. We have
already seen reason to doubt that this is a very far-
reaching difference, when I argued above that complex
objects should be thought of as facts. Objects and
facts, both being complexes, must both have structure,
and this structure must have logical characteristics in
order to be recognized by us as structure at all. Thus
4.014 says that certain structures have the same "logi-
cal pattern" in them, governing their construction, and
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Relations) are those relitiono <(among the elements that
it up ) which are determined a pr j ori hhence without
1Ch the C °mPleX iS Unthi^^e (as that complex), and
WhlCh theref°re co^«tute the "logical pattern" in ae-
cordance with which the obiects exist wJ CXo . We can now form
the following amalgam of the two propositions,
,












internal relation i4 +v ?? Possess it. This
of the complex \ih r^+










is external relations, which are never explicitly defined
in the fractatus
. However, there is little difficulty
m defining them by contrast to internal relations. If
lormer are logical, and their denial unthinkable (for
that complex)
, then the latter are non-logical and contin-
gent, and their denial is quite thinkable, without chang-
ing the complex under consideration. External relations
occur in addition to internal relations; they, as it
were, often obscure the basic identity between two in-
ternally related complexes (a score and a record do not
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ook Identical) and can be changed without affecting
the (common) logical pattern. Thus, according to Witt-
genstein's theory in the Tractates, there is a logical
identity, i.e., an internal relation, between exempli-
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J
1




n °W alb its ihter-
Here one feels inclined to say that external properties
are a subset of internal properties, that internal pro-
perties are all those logically possible for the object,
while external properties are those which happen to be
exemplified. If so, then external properties are also
internal (though not all internal properties would be
exemplified, i.e., external). This, however, encounters
grave difficulties with such passages as the last para-
graph in 4.023:
4.023 (last paragraph):
Just as a description of an object
describes it by giving external
properties, so a proposition
describes reality by' its internal
properties.
This suggests that in giving the external properties we
324 ,
d ° ~ alS ° give the in^rnal properties. it also
conflicts with*
4 , 1 2 2
1
1 An internal propertv n-p Q -p +.
also be called «
f fact can
fact rin




sanse in which we
Irnple)^
faClal featur^- ex-
A given face has and must have its features in order to
be that face. Likewise a given fact has and must have
ltS °Wn intel'nal rela«°ns (features), if that fact is
to be exemplified (assuming, just for the moment, ^Black
' th
f
' unexetiplified fact- makes sense for Witt-
genstein) 3 then all its internal features must be exem-
plified along with it, not just some of them.
Thus 'internal property ('relation') is best read
as 'relation which characterizes the logical form (in
sen^e) of the object’, i.e., the way the elements— be related, if the object is to be that particular
object. And 'external property (relation)' is likewise
best read as 'relation which characterizes the ontic
form of the object', i.e., a relation which the elements
of facts may have, contingently, but which they may also
fail to have without thereby destroying the preconditions
for a given object to be the particular object it is.
V/e cannot, of course, actually express the internal
properties of an object or the internal relations among
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ject^ or facos. Any proposition which would attempt
to express such would, in order to express it, have to
be constructed according to the same logical pattern as
the fact to be expressed, thus, it would end up showing,
not expressing the internal property or relations. As
Wittgenstein says, the internal relation of the fact (or
between the objects) "expresses itself in the proposition
representing the situation, by means of an internal
property of that proposition" (4.124). The proposition
and the "situation" it represents are therefore one "in
a certain sense", as Wittgenstein says in 4.014, the
same thing, in so far as the proposition manages to rep-
resent it correctly. That is, in so far as the proposi-
tion and the "situation” it represents both have the same
internal relation, they are the same.
Although internal relations ana properties cannot
be expressed, but only shown, we can construct a means
of reproducing them. That is, we can present a formula
which enables us to order other elements by the same
logical rule, thus to make otherwise different structures
identical. This formula, or rule, Wittgenstein calls an
operation!
5.2: The . structures of propositions stand








result of an operat ion^hat ^ ^hext out Of other proposition pf°^cesare the base^ ~ s (whichc s of the operation.)
5.231*
Since operations concern internal relations, they too
cannot literally be expressed and anythine attesting to
express one 'correctly would have to share with it an
identity of structure, since one operation, no matter
how often applied, does nothing hut repeat the same struc-
ture, the same internal property or relation, operations
can "vanish" (5.254), leaving only the numerous identical
structures. An operation is ultimately an unessential
device, one which may perhaps have pragmatic value, but
which could disappear in a fully perspicuous language.
Operations, unlike functions as Wittgenstein con-
ceives of them (see 4.271, 5.2341, 5.5301), can take
propositions and propositions only as their bases
i
5.23. The operation is what has to be doneto the one proposition in order tomake the other out of it.
5.233: Operations cannot make their appearance
proposi«nn
P?int at which °ne
S ;'^4 h9tions begins. proposi-
They have nothing to do with the truth or Parity 0f
the various propositions which result from their appli-
oatiom as in a proof in logic> thg operaUon ^
eeed correctly and even necessarily, hut only the resul:
will be true or false
5 . 25 : The occurence _ of an operation doescharacterize the sense of aproposition.










* °" ^ baSes °f
(Operations and functions must notbe confused with each other.
)
operations are exclusively concerned with gener-
ating or producing propositions from propositions, and
not with the sense of any given proposition or proposi-
tions. and because they alone (rather than functions)
can use the results of their own application as bases
for further application, they alone are able to account
for or generate hierarchies:
5 ' 2







Vhi^headlid ^not' adrait the"p^ibif
At least part of what Wittgenstein intone uc.exibtei e ds here is thisi
hierarchies (which, as we have seen, are and must be
independent of reality and hence of sense) are related
solely on the basis of internal propositional relations
tP other members of the same hierarchy, since logical
operators, on Wittgenstein's theory, can only show an
internal relation among properties (through generating,
tautologies and contradictions, e.g., which are not genu-
ine propositions since they lack sense), logical opera-
tors are also, or are the results of, operations,
truth-functions of elementary proposi-tions are results of operations withelementary propositions as bases
(. .these operations I call truth-
operations.
)
5.23'H, The sense of a truth-function of ois a function of the sense of p,
*~
Negation, logical addition, logical
multiplication, etc. are operations.
(Negation reverses the sense of a
proposition.
)
Max Black writes thats
|
W. wishes to make a distinction between anoperation and a function (5.251), yet the
J 29.
jssaa ««
Point of view (and conscquen«v 4 a ,
:
• • • W. himself cons^.t^tW4=4 lnology)truth-function of n- ,, Lly calls athat-£ results from o bv th^ al ^nativelynegation (5. 2341b) V/p -Y lh 4°Perafion of
character of the rule fn^T at fention on theAnd so in yenerllT^o ° deriv^£ ~£ from p.
that x 2 is a certain indifferently
natively, that yZ^c, f
^Coion of x -- or alter-
operation of 'sparing'
fr °m * 4 the
tiJn- to ?h
at ^^l^Senstein ' restricts




° ^ases ' the"
related, 2 u
*
J operation are internally
In this passage Black shows himself insensitive to the
real differences Wittgenstein makes between operation
and functions. If x 2 concerns numbers (i. e .. extra-
linguistic or extra-propositional entities), we could
on Wittgenstein's account of operations, call the
derivation of x from x an operation. Mathematicians
might be quite willing to do so, but Wittgenstein did
not feel himself bound by their usage any more than he
felt himself constrained to use 'fact' in anything like
a normal sense.
We can represent visually the difference between
operation and function, where both are taken to apply
to propositions. Since all propositions are made up of
elementary propositions and elementary propositions of
configurations of names only, 26 we can represent the
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base proposition s as»
1) bgc
f
''hero each letter represents a name. The operation -o--
applied to the proposition s (0-s, to use Wittgenstein's






then 'O'O's 1 s
3) b
d° bd c bd c
00" is the wedge, 'V in its normal logical sense).
The basic structure s remains and must remain unchanged .
through all applications of 'O'*, a function 'P' on s
might work as follows*
b > b«0 0
b
a.
The function obviously does not preserve the fundamental
•internal relation- (the "one-ness") which the operation
must preserve.
^
Although the distinction between the two is sharper
than Black would lead us to believe, it is not always
preserved as clearly as one might wish in the Tractatus .
Wittgenstein clearly distinguishes two kinds of functions
(though he is not always clear as to which one concerns
him in a given proposition), truth-functions and
material functions
i
5.^ lU Truth-functions are not material functions.
331 .
Although the actual term 'material function' is USed
only in this proposition it tP , is nevertheless fair to
assume thac all functions which are not truth-functions
(and these appear in many passages, e.g., 5 . 25 ) are
material, functions. They are clearly distinguished from
operations in the manner indicated above. Truth-functio,
however, are not so clearly distinguished. In 5.234
Wittgenstein called truth-functions the "results" of
operations, but in such propositions as 5.2341 (second
and third paragraphs) and 5.3 he seems to come close to
identifying the two. But these passages - especially
5.3 — actually highlight yet another important differ-
ence between function and operation!
5.3» All propositions are results of truth-operations on elementary propositions.
a trntb“?
Per^ i0n - iS the Way in whichu h-function is produced out ofelementary propositions. It is of theessence of truth-operations that, justas elementary propositions yield a
truth-function of themselves, so toom the same way truth-functions yielda further truth-function. When a
truth-operation is applied to truth-
1 unctions of elementary propositions
it alvvays generates another truth-
funcoion of elementary propositions
another proposition. When a truth-’
operation is applied to the results
of truth-operations on elementary uro-
positions, there is always a single
operation on elementary propositions
that has the same result.
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Every proposition is the result o-r
p£oposU™°nS °n element^y
P ration is here conceived of as essentially incom-
plete, i.e., not including its results, while a function
includes its results (compare here also 5 .25 , second
Paragraph). Truth-functions are thus what we have in
completed, non-elementary propositions, truth-operations
consist of a procedure which generates a final proposi-
tion from one or more elementary propositions (see 4 . 12 7 )
but not that last proposition itself. One might say that
"tho struc ture of a. function nnn-i can be represented ast
5) f(x) = n
while the structure of an operation as,
. 6) O'x
(see the examples of operations which Wittgenstein writes
cut, e.g.
, 5.2521, 5 . 2522 , 6.02, 6.021).
/
The distinction between internal and external rela-
tions, with its attendant theory of operations and func-
tions, seems adequate for the Tractatus , it allows Witt-
genstein to develop as fully as he might wish all the
themes which center around relations and properties.
Is there anything added, except excess terminological
baggage, by the terms 'formal concepts' and 'formal





aware that he could continue by using
This, I take it, is the brunt of the
of 4,122s
4.122s in certain sense we can talk aboutformal properties of objects andstates of affairs, or, in the case
and in thp
a«°Ut structural Properties
t e same Sense about formalrelations and structural relations.





and again of the talk of structural properties ins
ihe^fact that the propositions of
ogic are tautologies shows the formal --
thfworld"
Properties of language and
(that -internal’ can replace -formal- can further be
verified oy examining all the occurences of 'formal' In
the Trac tat us and showing that 'internal' could be sub-
stituted for them — a task too tedius to carry out here.)
Why then does Wittgenstein introduce the term 'for-
mal . ihis one can only guess, but he seems to have
introduced it because of an ambiguity in the word 'inter-
nal'. Two propositions are internally related if they
(a) are in a hierarchical series such as, "This is a cat"
and 'this is an animal". But (b) two propositions can
also be internally related, it would seem, even if they
334 .
T “ * »« «na
*" '"1 " "* lnt*r"*n» b„ no,
V/ittgenstein does not eynii^i+ieXPllCltly out this ambiguity
u believe he was aware of it. and introduced Iformal .
to apply only to those cases of internal relations of
(or in) a series. For thic-his interpretation I will give
but one argument. Consider 4.1252 and 4.126,
4.1252, 1 call a series that is ordered bv— 1 oration a series of forms.
• • • a
4.126, We can now talk about formal concepts
formal p^perties .
^
W6 Speak ° f
Why does Wittgenstein say, we ’'can now talk about formal
concepts" as if we could not before? The answer is that
the notion of a series of propositions had not yet (as
of 4.1252) been introduced, when this is made available
he immediately devotes himcoi -f + j •j ut u n oelf to a discussion of formal
concepts and properties.
IV
In the next chapter I will turn my attention to a
question which I may seem to have answered already, is
Wittgenstein a Platonist in the Tractatus . i.e.
( does he
hold that there are abstract objects? Since I have
335 .
-braced a radically finalist interpretation of Trac-
tanan objects, as opposed to that of Allaire and Berg-
-ann („h0 are avowed Platonists), it may se em that there
any point in continuing discussion of the
question. But the answer is not as straightforward as
it may now appear.
Since that is the theme of my next (and final)
chapter, I will not directly discuss the nature of ob-
jects any further, A point-by-point comparison of simple
and complex objects, as we have seen these differences
develop throughout the preceding pages, will be helpful
in fixing the distinctions between them in preparation
of the final chapter.
' 1) Simple objects are not in the world, but at the
edge of the world. Complex objects are in the world, a
part of it; in fact, they make it up.
2) Simple objects are absolutely simple, without
any properties at all, even "logical" properties. Complex
objects, however, are characterized by properties in a
straightforward sense; that is, they have properties
(especially logical properties) without which they can-
not be, without which the object is "unthinkable". Thus
we can speak of the essence of a complex object, though
not of that of a simple one.
336 .
3)
Simple objects cannot, strictly speaking be
known. We can only know that they exist, and this we
kn°W thr ° Uffh C °raPleX
' ^—dental arguments. Complex
objects are experienced, hence a posteriori, and ofte„
known without the nece^itirssity of any formal argument to
show that they exist.
4) N01:hlne Which we peweive could be a genuine
simple object. Anything we can perceive is able to be,
or be seen as, a complex object.
5) Simple objects correspond to genuine names in
fully analyzed propositions. Complex objects corres-
pond to the merely apparent names met with in the un-
‘
analyzed propositions of ordinary language.
' 6) SimplG objeots
' lacking structure, can only be
named, never described. Complex objects can in fact be
described, never really named; Russell's theory of
descriptions shows (in Wittgenstein's reading of it)
that all "names" of complexes are deceptive.
?) Properties reduce to relations. Complex objects
have two kinds of properties, internal (formal, logical)
and external (proper, material). Seen from the side of
simple objects, these relations constitute various
spaces" (e.g,
,
logical space, color space, etc.).
8) The simple object is independent of any space,
337 .
ana the space from it. The complex object is not inde-
pendent of certain spaces, though the spaces still are
independent of it.
'
9) Seen from the standpoint of simple objects there
is a sharp division to be made between object and con-
ceptual scheme. From this point of view rii nrno *•> -E11 -1 - p operties
seen to be a. ppi ori ( to o „- -r-=°£i (6.35). Seen from the viewpoint of
complex objects, however, it is not the case that all
properties are a priori or predictable. In particular,
we cannot predict what elementary propositions there are
(will be) (see 5.634 and 5.5571),
V
,
I began this chapter with a question, What is the
world? To that we saw that Wittgenstein gives three
answers, the second of which has received an expansion
m this chapter. Perhaps the most important point to
realize, if our ultimate goal is to arrive at an under-
standing of Wittgenstein's theory of the world, with its
wealth of complexities, is that he uses 'fact' in a
most unusual way
, to cover objects as well as what one
normally would take to be a fact. The terminology, con-
fusing as it undoubtedly is, does at least help emphasize
the importance Wittgenstein attaches to complexes in the
Tractatus.
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In a sense this chapter is a commentary on I.13.
Seeing the chapter as such immediately raises two cues-
tions I have avoided. The fir^t ie + us, are there any facts
that are not in logical space, or is "in logical space"
aljtic to fact'? The second arises from my particular
treatment of "facts in logical space". 1 have so far
considered only what one might call existing facts, facts
which (to put it another way) also are found in time-
space or spatial space, etc,, facts which are observable.
What about unactualized facts, about what Wittgenstein
seems to call "possible facts" (see 2.0122, 2 . 0124
, and
2.02)? is the 'possible- in "possible facts" really, as
Black calls it in his comments on 2 . 202
, a "pleonasm",
or does Wittgenstein hold that there are merely possible,
unactualized facts (or states of affairs, etc.)? it
will be my purpose in the next chapter to answer that
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Sellars remarks +ho+ »•_„






able t° give any examt>les"‘ (see Sellar-^wh 5®-
?
e





1966; p. 26TT ’ _uaiian 60 .-o give any examples*
to produce a fully








1C at0InN facts means
of tM= a
?r °POS1N on . then, as j.
believe S®''






























, Max . op oit ti too t j*
afth^^rT'^^lGkhi^ohaptel^d'ahgui^at the end, for Black’s position*. g ’
There is an ambiguity throughout this and the npyfparagraph, which reflects an ambiguity in the ^racta^us. Are ob jects-in-relation ufoperties o?they merely produce properties? As I commented indiscussing the conflict betv/een 1,12 and 1 13 itdoes not seem that Wittgenstein was aware if thi-confusion. So my exposition, being merely an ex-
note^i?)
1
' unavoidably embodies it. (See also foot-
Configurations are necessary to the existence ofmaterial properties if we read 2.0231 literally to
that th
configurations produce the properties butTL t? rS6 6t are different from the configura-tiono. Ix the configuration and the properties are
Si ffT;T
en Ter ° iS n ° relation between themlt
between)













gssays on Wittgenste in'4 « J V. • ) *






to^internal ^ '*>“shown us. i, as 6.12 already has
the
Co.
See Max Black, op, cit.
internal* and * formal
'
and Anscombe, G. E. M.
s
stein * s 'Tractatus*
P. 85 and Chapter 9
pp. 122-124.
^passim (see index under
j- or all individual passages),
An_Introduction t o Wittgen-
narper and Row, New York"
(PP. 122-132), especially*
1965;
On the last sentence here, compare 2.012 - 2.0122.
°M in Part x > that certain rassa-es intheJotebooks present the problem that', if the in-ternal relations are different the object is dif
*
speakiA-of -he
WS inSM6 ourselves that weArer“A. A e object when we ascribe some-what. different properties to it? The basic ornhlem is where do internal relations end and exter-na relations material properties, begin?
, Wittgenstein has no answer,
To this
namelv f+ •
be Sald to be the same face —
wMoh \ 1ST?nf ln a ternPoral procession of -facesvhich can be linked together in a unique way. But
facts
1S °bviously not relevant in discussing






hls 1 follow Wittgenstein, not Carnan
Wittgenstein never distinguished (in the Tractatus)between. logical truth and non-logical truth The
-
propositions" of logic can neither be true nor
'alse, strictly speaking, since they have no sense.
25. Max Black, op. cit.
,
p, 259f,
26. See Copi, I.
, 0p. cit.
27. It is possible that +*i> Q i .
hand for talk about aseri^nf
3 funotion is sh ort-
Wittgenstein is serionsw °f operations, if
that all relations are St?rato?,
tS
f
t0 thc ™esi sthen (since truth-*unoV?™ 1 ly trath-funct 5 oral
tiono can ultimately be ^uce'd t
°Perations
> ^
theory at least — and nnf^ °-T)erat ions, in
eliminable Tt
c operations, we saw are
committee} to this' th^TuV-hi
Wit;V:enstein as
a thesis of externality" Rosenbers calls




This, however is a ffl ?
dl^te this in 5.3.
pursue -- both in a+tpnT.+ ?
Ul °
.
line of thought to
stein's views 'on' th° V+l 1^ 10 see v;hat V/ittgen-
ins to judge thSse viS™ 1«/
0U1
1
be and in attempt-










Wittgenstein espoused a peculiar version of Platonism“ thS 2ract_atus. But what is Platonism? This question
difficult one, I Will simplify it here by taking
Platonism to be the beli^-P + u 0 +. 4-'0 D lei that there are abstract en-
tities of some sort,
The claim that Wittgenstein was a Platonist in the
flatus seems to conflict with my earlier chapters
(particularly Part I, Chapters II - iv). since Platon-
ism and realism have so often been closely associated in
P ilooophy, it may also seem that 1 am here maintaining
a position like that of Edwin B. Allaire, 1 who presents
what he calls a "realistic interpretation" of the Trac-
tates (though not, again in his words, a "neatly realis-
tic" one).
I am neither changing my former position nor reject-
ing my claim that Allaire's interpretation is wrong.
Instead, I claim that Wittgenstein was a Platonist, though
not, m Allaire's sense, a realist. Allaire defines
realism" as the simultaneous acceptance of two theses
i
" (1) properties as well as particulars are constitutents
of atomic facts; (2) properties are different in kind
J>'l M-
froin Particulars"
. Alla -i -to n •
like ,
eXPlains th« - Proposition
(1) This is red
consists of two objects di-pfv^ + •a iferent in kind +v,ion+ , , u a, this and rod
^•^^'^cufeh I internret vji++ocx P-*- cx V/ ltt.o'en^t p. i n j_ _ -i _benste to be a Platonist Ido not feel thr,+ + u
+ ,.
1S g°°d evidence that he is, inthis sense, a realist,
Wittgenstein, then, believed in the Tractatus that
ro absti act entities of some sort, Two questions
immediately arise, What sort of abstract entities does
he think there are? Why does he think that there are
such entities? The latter question is, of course, ac-
tually two questions
: Why does he think there are ab-
stract entities at all, and Why does he think they are
of the type he declares them to be? I shall concentrate
on the first question and, to some degree, on the second
Part of the second. I shall not concern myself directly
analysis of his reasons for embracing the exis-
tence of some form of abstract objects in general, i.e.,
with a presentation of his arguments for Platonism.
Critical literature on the problem of the existence
of abstract objects has been immense in the twentieth
century. Particularly, Willard van Orman Quine 2 and
Nelson Goodman- 5 have led the attack on Platonism, but
J r J.
Noam Chomsky4 and J. j Kat . 5 am
..
4
’ araonE many others, haveattempted to withstand and even defeat the assault yconcern with th is entire literature will be minimal. lyPurpose here, as in the first two „ ,
.
- l Sl- ° chapters of this hadf
.
G Q1SSertati0n
’ iS t0 devel °p Wittgenstein's posi-
1011 “ ^ ClSar and coh^ent a manner as possible
Where it is unavoidable, I do refer to participants in
this debate: Quine in Section tr rn ,l IB
’ Chomsky and Katz in
Sec tions IC and TTR p 11+. t i
• \ although much more can be said
especially in defense of Wittgenstein's version of Platon
rsm against both Quine's and Katz' attacks, this again
not the Place to say it. These others, formidable as
they are in themselves, are used here entirely as foils
to Wittgenstein's theory.
A
Platonism is the belief that there are abstract ob-
jects, But what are abstract objects? This question is
nearly as difficult to answer as the question of what
Platonism itself is. Rather than confront it directly,
I will present three conditions which, together, are
both necessary and sufficient for an entity's being con-
sidered abstract.
111 -»«*. *« °p»°.,d „
ones m that the former em
.
are n °n-material, the latter
material -p~- So, for example
, the sheet of paper beforeyour eyes is materini +- r „
, .
' ’ leref ore concrete! the whiteness
('- ich the paper exemplifies) is no+ it it... J lo ° 1_tself material, so
abstract, fhis condition alone, however, j s not
sufficient to guarantee abstractness, after-ima,es
visions
, and ghosts would all be non-material yet * nomeans abstract entities.
.
(2) N ° abStract ob^ts are perceptible by the
Physical senses, though we mav nt „6 y> of coarse, perceive many
exemplifications of them. All concrete objects, on the'
other hand, can be perceived by the physical senses. If
we can be said to perceive or know abstract entities in
any way it must be different from that by which we ret
to know concrete objects. This condition is one which
links Platonism, a metaphysical theory, with epistemologi.
cal theories, the Platonist will not be a strict em-
piricist, and the empiricist will not be a Platonist.
Even where the universal is said to be in many places
simultaneously, what we actually perceive is a particular
(or many particulars) which exemplifies this universal.
(3) Abstract entities are not in space or time (they




• ins ofar as change
V^o863 SPaC6 ^ Ume ’ aWaCt cannot
change
, concrete ones can.
Wittgenstein's simple objects fulfill criteria (2)and (3), but not (l) sinpp +h
U
“ l ce they !ie outside the worldand have no forms, they cannot be perceived by our
Physical senses, and our knowledge of them comes from a
P rical source. Since space and time are the forms
°f °bjeCtS (2 '°251)
- objects are not in space and
0l '” e
' either - ThSy are
' ho™, concrete in .the sense
that they are the ultimately material element of the
world, substance is form and content, and, as we have
seen, objects ultimately are (or form) the content. Thus
if we restrict ourselves to simple objects alone, v,itt-
Genstein's position on Platonism is somewhat ambiguous.
If, however, each of the above conditions is seen as at
least necessary to a Platonist position, then as far as
his simple objects are concerned, at least, Wittgenstein
is not a Platonist.
B
The late nineteenth and early twentieth century saw
a rise of renewed and vigorous interest in Platonic on-
tolo.ico. Although there may be others, four varieties
«»»... h.« „«^
' “*—* »• «*,
t ,
nW"' “ S tW ° f°™ S 1 cal1 straightforward objoc-
'Ua
' and UneUlStic "i**™*. Platonism. The flrst of
6 SlmPlY h °ldS that the abstract entities which
Cxist are ob Jects which, except fw i •' C or being abstract, arevery like concrete objects At itJ S * lts Purest, it embraces
a thesis to the effect that i -r1
> if we can talk sensibly
about something then tto-t- •S
’-
Xn fchafc fcbmg must exist — if not
concretely, then abstractly. Russell6 and Meinong both .
the former for a short period only, held this version
'
of Platonism. It was Russell's "On Denoting" which
sparked the attack on it hv- 0 + -f- , •y attacking a theory of refer-
ence closely associated with it.
Although Russell, many of his colleagues, and those
who followed their lead no longer spoke with gay abandon
about abstract objects like Pegasus or the round square,
they continued to assert the existence of such objects
in other areas and for other purposes, m particular,
Russell, irege, Moore, and numerous others held that
there exists a peculiar kind of language-oriented abstract
entity known as a proposition. Although many different
definitions of 'proposition' were proposed, the main
thrust of the claim that propositions exist may be
349 .
captured in the following claims about them,
synonymousSentences in^n^o^ the v*riouslanguages; n “ r many different
Kuarantees^that which






d ° lng S °' even "hen using different
(c) the proposition is an abstract entitv
,
*he philosophical position that there are such ab-
stract entities we may call objectual linguistic Platon-
ism. It originates in a concern with problems of lan-
guage (particularly with the problem of the meaningful-
ness of sentences, in distinction to their truth or
falsity)
, and sees propositions as very similar' to
everyday, complex concrete objects in their structure.
(This is a position one would expect from Russell, whose
views were colored by his earlier acceptance of the
first kind of Platonism. In the case of Moore and Frege,
more needs to be said, but again, they are not my con-
cern here.) in particular, propositions have the follow-
ing object-like traits:
( ) fhey exist independently of any necessary
relation to most other propositions (as




^ have no necessary relating hlanguage-speakers; y on to any
(iii) They have no neces^arv r*r>i +•
sentence of any given lan^age?
t0 ^
(iv) They themselves and +h 0 ;
interrelations 'must h- d^
quallties and
we discover objects ?^°Vered (aser and their properties).
The other two varieties of Platonism are not,
perhaps, quite so commonly represented in philosophical
literature as the above. At least one of them, however,
g "mg rapidly m importance. One might call the
two Of them structural, as opposed to ObjectPal, Platonism.
The first variety of structural Platonism has been
developed largely by Noam Chomsky and his followers,
such as J. J. Katz. Their fundamental concern is with
problems in the philosophy of language, not with many
traditional metaphysical questions - though, as Katz
makes clear (in the work cited in footnote five above),
they feel that answers to these problems will be found
through their researches. Neither Chomsky, nor Katz
therefore shows much interest in such questions as, "Is
there Greenness (as well as green things)?" or, "Does
Pegasus exist?" The abstract entity which concerns them
is not any sort of object, but rather rules, laws or
351 .
Procedures in accordance with which certain speciai
objects (syntactic and semantic structures) are con-
tracted
. These rules cannot be observed either direct]
-
aSWe—— with the aid of some device
as a microscope. They are innate to the human mind, how-
GVGr
' ^ Can bS dlSCOTered (as Katz points out) through
a Process analogous to the way in which atoms were first
discovered. They thus hold the status of theoretical
Postulates, but the differences between them and such
theoretical postulates as atoms or electrons mahe clear
that these linguistic rules are abstract. Thus, for
example, while atoms are in space and time, the rules
are not (though, of course, the sentences which they
ultimately generate are). One might add, in a Leibniz-
lan vein, that if our senses were fine enough we could
Perceive atoms, we could never perceive these rules, no
ho.v fine or gross our senses became, all that is
perceptible are the sentences (=sentence-tokens
) of our
languages.
We may sum up the major theses of this form of
Platonism, i.e., structural rule Platonism, as follows,
(i) Structural rule Platonism is not, at leastnot directly, concerned with many traditionalquestions answered by the Platonist such asDoes Pegasus exist. ’
352 .
U11
SratM 1 ! *>» existence
8S8S.“* f"~““ S SRffiS,
(iii) These abstract on^i+ie
known directly S«t their*” -
0t be




Structural rule Platonism is a development of linguistic
o Jectual Platonism. In place of the latter's cumber-
some reliance on propositions, with all the deficiencies
.
h thSm ',hlch Philosophical development in the first
half of the twentieth century brought out, it substitutes
a much more -elegant system of rules which create sets of
sti uctures which are then the meanings of sentences in
languages, and the knowable identity of which guarantees
our ability to understand each other and other languages
too. It thus accomplishes many of the goals of linguis-
tic objectual Platonism -- esneciallv x.p y that of guarantee-
mg our ability to understand each other - in a more
elegant way, one which also avoids many of the problems
which beset the earlier form of Platonism.
The last form of Platonism I shall consider here is
the form Wittgenstein embraced in the Tractatus . That
which exists abstractly is an irreduceable structure, a
structure which, being irreduceably complex, cannot be
treated as an object. It is, rather (to use Wittgenstein-
,
353 .
distinction) p -PTo-t-/ a. lact, an abstract fnr>+ *4,x lacL
’ neither rule nor
3
' 1 WU1 eXPliCatC this version of Platonism in
" C " 0n 111 ° f thiS ChaPtSr
’ but I shall show why
' ln W °Uld haV° re





’ WU1 C °Unt™ our natural tendency to
read Wittgenstein as if he actually adhered to one of
It Will also provide a convenient introduction
by W3y of contrast, to his own theory.
: II
Wittgenstein’s criticisms of the first three forms
f Platonism form an interesting study in themselves, 'but,
llke the °utllne of the four forms of Platonism itself,
they are of interest here only as they will aid in under-
standing Wittgenstein’s own theory.
lhe fundamental aim of these forms of Platonism is
right, there is a need for a realm of abstract entities
of some sort which can, but need not, be actualized.
Althougn their goal is justified, each form suffers from
both its own special weaknesses and one basic defect
which, in Wittgenstein’s eyes, would underlie them all,
that of being too simplistic. Each one attempts to set
up the realm of Platonic entities in a way which will
escape the complexities of the concrete world (and each




cri 1G i sm ) . They thus
6 proble^s for themselves nrrhi
cnnnn+
° P blems wh ich they*— «... ......
: : ::
-1 » “**- **• -— .....
The clearest example nr
.. .
Pi of thls cc™es, Of course, fromthe simplest tvop o-f pi i-’ - t Platonism str?i i rrH+
Pla+ „ .
’ “ ra Shtforward objectual
niSm
' ItS iS *— one, from the Status
standpoint
, though none the less fatal. Those who
*
pause this form simply confuse abstract fact with ab-
stract object (or, linguistically, name with proposition)
following shows. Objects in the world, as we have
'
seen, are a species of facts* thn-t ,• . ua is, they like facts
are endlessly complex. Ky pen or Smokey the Bear are
both capable of endless analysis, breaking into ever
simpler combinations of obiects fthm^h{ houg never wholly
into objects, as 1.2 tells us). When complexity ends,
we have a genuine object which can be given a genuine
name: but it is no longer describable, i.e., no longer
in tho world at all. The straightforward objectualist
tries to defend a theory of abstract entities which lack
the endless complexity of genuine (world) objects.
Pegasus is the winged horse of Greek mythology — and
355 .
that is, basically, all he i s Tho ^
essential
' endless complexity
So to facts fann u(and he»« to world-objects)
i stotally lacking Ths •
ab _ + .
•
dioates we can apply to thatstract obiect sr>o ° VGrC y llmited when compared with
6 which apply to world object* or tou Jo us propositions
gaSUS ° an be fUUy * Pen or Kelso cannot be
p
"
riat °niSt °f tMS ^ been misled roughly'“ r6Se WaS (3 ’ 143) - Fr0H the structural similarity of
e names 'Pegasus- and -Kelso-, both of which are dis-
guised definite descriptions on Wittgenstein- s theory 8
the Plat on i st concludes that both function in the saml
way, as names, i.e., that both pick out objects which
’
are named. Yet the actual structural dissimilarities
between -Pegasus- and -Kelso- clearly show that the
latter is a concrete object in the world, but the former
lacks sufficient complexity to count as one, yet it has
some degree of complexity and cannot therefore count as
a simple object. Thus -Pegasus- is supposed to act as
a name, yet lacks the structural preconditions demanded
by the analysis of names. It is neither a genuine name,
nor a disguised definite description (the name of an
object of the type we find in the world) i it is a
defect, a misconception.
The same criticism easily applies to linguistic
356 .
^ectual Platonism, and Wittgenstein himself applies H
111 3 ’ 143 ' Pr °POSitions
- this view conceives them
cannot be endlessly analysed. They thus lack the pre -
requisites which would in , .d
’ l Wittgenstein's eyes, enable
them to make sense, i.e., sufficient complexity. The
two also share another defect which is perhaps more
clearly visible in linguistic ob jectualism. They con-
ceive of abstract entities as existing independently of
language. Linguistic forms can try, more or less success-
fully, to embody or express a proposition, but that pro-
position itself remains eternally what it is, apart from
all languages or conceptual schemes. 9
Wittgenstein is quite clearly opposed to such inde-
pendent., though knowable
, existence as 6.341, 6.342 and
6 -35, i • a*
,
show, if there are propositions of the sort
defended by linguistic ob jectualism, we have no access
to them. We must look elsewhere for a usable guarantee
of sameness of meaning either within a language or
between languages.
Rule-Platonism does not pretend to set up, or di
cover, the existence of any sort of abstract object
directly; hence it cannot be faulted with using the
concept of an object while at the same time denying
the essential prerequisites of its use. It therefore




Ji rules *5+ ^ ^ _ •
or rro
" ‘ ' 1V6S °f are strictly non-linguistic
P 1 ^-conceptual





' 3 more germaine criticism of the
Position from the ^t^ point of view. AU laws of
anguage, in so far as they are genuine laws, have at
east two characteristics in Wittgenstein's view,
not^things °"but\ one eptual schemed
(








' The °f l0gi °’ When tb»y are seen in connection
with language and not world-objects, are ultimately
reducible to operations (as we saw in Part II, chapter IV)
But operations cannot even begin to work until there are
propositions already there to work with, i. e ., the bases
of the operations
( 5 . 22 , 5.233). Thus from Wittgen-
stein's standpoint at the time of the Tractatus . the
laws of generative grammar may exist but, if they do,
they presuppose already extant linguistic structures.
They cannot, he might have said, generate syntactic or
semantic structures ex nihilo, the bases, the elementary
358 .
propositions, nrnst already be given. Furthermore u
Clear that Witt—-^ -e argued that
' °f generatiV° e~ -e ultimately dispen-
' Pre ° iSely because operations are dispersible U
17
" thSre are SUCh ^ « «** -ber (1;6ical.
y) USGleSS (th0Ueh ^ T have a pragmatic value) 0/they cannot explain linguistic structures because they
Presuppose precisely what they would have to explain,
,
A11 °f the first three forms of Platonism must
therefore be abandoned, not (again) as wrong in their
concept of what must be done, but rather as botched
attempts to do a necessary and defensible piece of work.
III
V/ittgenstein* s
of Platonism which e
cisms above — ono,
set up (or claim to
task is therefore to find a version
scapes from the three basic criti-
that is, that does not arbitrarily
discover) a realm of abstract en-
titles knowable but independent of any conceptual scheme
(language)
i one that does not arbitrarily limit the
number of predicates an object may have; and one that
does not presuppose what it at the same time denies
itself. All these defects must be remedied without
being as arbitrary in correcting them as those whose
359 .
theories involve the, were to begin with. As an example ,
one cannot simply remedy the first defect hy arbitrarily
adding this, that, and another predicate to, say, Pega-
sus, and then, to top it all off, add perhaps an "and
so on . Complexity must be present necessarily (or, as
Wittgenstein was wont to say in the Tractates
, essen-
tailly), Whether one is aware of it or not (just as in
the concrete world).
.
We have Steady, in the first section of this dis-
sertation, 12 previewed the direction Wittgenstein's solu-
tion takes. There we saw that, in certain passages in
his Notebooks, Wittgenstein views sentences as, so to
speak, forming a world of their own. This line of'
thought survives in the Tractatus, though not so clearly





A.picture represents a possible
situation in logical space.
A picture presents a situation in
logical space, the existence and
non-existence of states of affairs.
In a proposition a situation is, as
it were, constructed by v/ay of
experiment
.
Instead of, ’This proposition has
such and such a sense', we can simply
say, 'This proposition represents
such and such a situation'.
(See also 4.01, 4.93, 5.473 - 5.4733, and 5.526). One
360 .
may therefore characterize Traetn-ri
, .
- rac tara an Platonism as amguistic (or, at least i 1
’ a language-based) Platonism
ihe abstract entities i + •laims exist are related to
anguage in a close way which will be explicated below.
;
i0re 1 d ° S0
’ a Caution
« we may fairly characterize
ittgenstein's Platonism as linguistic, but in doing so
read
.
the *» a that is Slightly foreign
L0 intentions at tbp uhe time he wrote the book, As the
Passages from 6.3 to 6.372 show especially clearly,
Wittgenstein relied heavily on the intuitive, metaphor!--
sal notion of conceptual schemes or, worse yet, of a
"net" or "mesh" which we "throw over" or use to "cover"
objects when we describe them. The metaphorical and
the ..precise battled in the Tractatus, and neither won
there decisively. The -Fi >*<?+• i nd ? « +• T ,j. ~no iirst, inaication I have been
able to find that the precise, i.e., that which is con-
cerned with language, won (as the Philosophical
liStions clearly shows it did) is in'^7s "Notes^on
Wittgenstein's Lectures, 1930-33". In ignoring the
metaphorical lines here
,
13 we do not interpret the
Tractatus wrongly or unjustly. We simply give to it a
more precise interpretation, in our eyes at least, than
Wittgenstein himself could have at that point.
36l.
A = '+.031 shows very clearly it i,
which ( , ,
y ' L the Pr°PositionC (somehow) '•constructs- (literallv 1
together" ,
Moral y translated, " puts
wont", Despitc'TnTT
-tuatron" as an "experi-
lt d0
"
211 th£ dimCUlties -th this passage
,
68 ” US abSt-Ct entities are not conceived
a* eating independently of language. The propositions
P them together
; without propositions (and, ultimately
V" " °°nCePtUal SChSme) ' thGre W °Uld bS - abstract’65 UUSt 33 there w°ald be no concrete world with-
out a conceptual scheme, as 1 - 1 . 21 and . 6 _ 3?2
show). Yet both this and other propositions (e.g., 2 . u)
seem to attribute some degree of independent existence'
t0 thG " crtuation " Presented by the proposition. How
independent is the "situation"? How, in what way, is it
independent? And how does it come by this independence?
I will turn to these questions after answering a more
basic, though easier, question.
i’his concerns the propositions themselves. We know
that a proposition is also a fact (3.14), and that it
'nvolves or, perhaps, must involve elements which are
actual, i.e., concrete. But then it would seem that
the linguistic structures, i.e., the propositions, are
themselves concrete, not abstract, and that they there-






' "possible fact" or „ pos .
'Z\'T
Um' makSS S6nSe f°r ,Uttgenstein
- ao inter-
above, "possible proposition" may not
_ ^ a
consequence Wittgenstein would have to limit a Riven
to the set oi propositions actually already
constructed in that language Yet tv-U - xhis seems to contra-
act certain passages in the Tractatus
. e .g.,
4,02?!
ill® 1 ? 1??8 t0 the essence of aProposition that it should be ableto communicate a new sense to us
How could a new sense be communicated if no new propo-
sitions can be constructed?
'there can be no doubt that, for Wittgenstein, some-
thing must exist concretely before there can be any
Platonic realm, in this respect Plato's Platonism and
Wittgenstein's are far apart, since, as we saw above,
there would be no abstract entities without propositions,
Wittgenstein would hold that propositions (which all
must have a concrete sign, as 3.12 indicates) must exist
in order for abstract entities to do so. The existence
of concrete structures is even said to guarantee the
existence of abstract or logical structures,
3.h, A proposition determines a place in
logical space. The existence of this
logical
.
place is guaranteed by the
rnero existence of the constituents --
by the existence of the proposition
v/ith a sense.
363 .
But Wittgenstein is well aware (4.002) that the permu-
tations of language are endless, though this remains a
minor theme in the 'Traotatus. Not all of the permuta-
tions tha. are possible within a given language, dialect,
or idiolect will or need be made, many sentences will
never be spoken, though they could be. There is nothing
puzzling, abstruse, or contrary to Wittgenstein's thought
in calling these "possible but not actual" sentences,
where "possible" is understood as "can be constructed,
out of elementary propositions". For we can give a
priori the .ora of all possible non-elementary sentences
(5.5) J by giving the rules by which these sentences must
be constructed, whether they actually are constructed or
not, their possibility is guaranteed. Furthermore, they
share with actually constructed sentences the full de-
gree of complexity that Wittgenstein demands, without
even a hint of arbitrary adding of predicates. They
have that full degree of complexity because their place
in logical space is guaranteed through one's ability to
construct a sentence of this particular form out of ele-
mentary propositions. Thus Wittgenstein is indeed com-
mitted to the existence of possible propositions (or
sentences) among his Platonic entities.' But how we
construct these entities, what their nature is, how we
364 ,
have access to them, and how they are related to the
concrete structures they presuppose, are no longer
puzzling,
NOW we can attach the problem of the relation be-
tween the proposition and the •'situation” it puts to-
gether. it is here that Wittgenstein approaches the
traditional forms of Platonism most closely. A propose -
txon xs constructed out of elementary propositions as a
fact is out of atomic facts. The person constructing
the proposition takes the elementary propositions as
elements and orders them in certain ways: the result is
elemental y proposition which "makes sense". Now
& proposition is a Dicturp / 1 o -1 \ >h r ie U, 3.1), and a picture "is
laid against reality like a measure" (2.1512); "That is
how a picture is attached to reality; it reaches"^
out to it" ( 2 . 1511 ); though only "the end-points of the
graduating lines actually touch the object that is to
be measured" (2.1521), it is still true that the end-
points do touch. There is nothing between the picture
and the depicted; the sense of the proposition, the
"situation" put together by it, is none other than the
proposition itself when seen, not as merely a structure,
but as a "thought", i.e., a "logical picture of facts"
(3). j. he same ,.hing is implied above in 3.3, which
365 .
seems to identi "Tv *i+u_-Luonuiiy the mere existence n-r + v,
,
° of the constitu-
’ °" a proposition with "+h„
. .
l the existence of the oro-position with a sense" rpu.
' Eense 13 not an independente^ect or entity, it is the proposition.
lhlS
’ ° f course
’ represents the culmination of
another tendency we have observed in the Notebook
( see
Chapter V)
, ana a full acceptance of the impli-
cations of this theory that language - sentences -
constitutes its own world. There is a way in which the
sense^ of the proposition must be separated from the pro-
position, the sense is the proposition seen logically.
It is the logical figure the proposition cuts, or the
area of logical space the proposition carves out. Put
more sooerly, the sense of a proposition is the. complete
and infinite logical structure of that proposition,
while the proposition is the finite concrete (or abstract)
structure which has that logical structure as a form.
Independent senses are entia otiosa
. as well as incom-
prehensible.
Let me illustrate this briefly by constructing an
answer, on Wittgenstein* s position, to the question of
whether Pegasus, the winged horse, exists. The simplest
answer, a straightforward "yes", Wittgenstein, of course
would reject (Section II). But we can construct
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sentences about Pegasus - indeed it
an inf •„ „
’ P can be "hown that
' lni
5' 01 thG“ Can be obstructed, some true and
E °me falS6
' speaking, seen in this l ight
there ^s little difference between Pegasus and Kelso,
except that, more than likely, we know more about the
latter. From the standpoint of the constructions we
make “ lanSUage
> led ^ conceptual scheme (to
return to this basic notion) both Felso and Pn i Pegasus have
equal claim to exist.
lhlS approach clearly seems to fall prey to many
Unos of criticism which originated either with the
Logical Positivists or with the attitudes they engen-
dered. Particularly, despite all the philosophical
trouble one has pinning down a satisfactory explanation
of the notion of verifiability, we still feel intuitively
that there is an important difference between the two in
that many more statements about Kelso are verifiable
(m theory, at least) than are about Pegasus. We can -
or could, if we had a time machine - observe Kelso and
verify or disverify many statements about him; the same
is not true of Pegasus.
Although Wittgenstein was later attracted, to some
degree, to logical positivism, 16 there is absolutely no
visible evidence (pace Carnap) that he had any sympathy
36?,
a Une °f arSUment like th0 above when he wrote the
~ ' ~ °r eVen that lt had ocoured to him at all.
•ad one presented it to Wittgenstein at that time, he
’
mSht "eU haVe dlSmissed “ as irrelevant. Concern
Wlth Verifi °ati0n °f Position or theories plays no
part m the Tractatusi wi : _17
-— ^genstem sees himself
there as a logician, not an empirical researcher. This
is shown clearly by his attitude toward the natural
sciences and the comparisons he made between them and
Philosophy (4,11 - 4.113). But, if he did not choose
to simply ignore the above criticism, he could have
deepened his own position through a response to it.
Wittgenstein could justifiably attack the Positivist
on the grounds that he demands something which is irrele-
vant. If Wittgenstein were a straightforward objectual
Platonist, then one would expect him to be prepared to
offer some substantive reply to that sort of criticism.
Since such a Platonist denies any necessary connection
between abstract entities and us or our language, and
maintains instead that such entities are discoverable
(as are objects), he is responsible for providing an
account of how they are discovered (see Section lie),
But, as we have seen, Wittgenstein does not even think
of complex objects as they normally seem to be thought
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,
°f ' he ass iroilates them to fact- « a ,
does it ,al + k
‘
’ And what differencelu m ke that the fan+fact-complex which is Pegasus
I
"-11 «
- <« •»*«) ..W, l„roe« ,» loticase, .., 0 have facts or fact-complexes, and that is allwe need in order v,o to have an object.
ThUS Wittgenstein's conceptual revisionism4cU- o carries
.
1 ' ° 0nSeC!uences even beyond the way in which it
instructs us to see, to interpret, the real world. Oncewe acknowledge his two basic categories, simple object
and complex fact, in the way in which Wittgenstein pre-
' sents them in the Tractate +>,^i^iiabus, then we are committed to
one version or another of linguistic Platonism. At the
very least, no scruples can arise from difficulties in
verifiability to counteract the tendency towards it, for
the whole problem of verifiabilitv iol y is rendered philosophic
ally totally irrelevant.
Hy omphasis on "he linguistic character of Wittgen-
stein^ Platonism may well give rise to a needless puzzle.
Suppose one acknowledges that the fact-complex, Pegasus,
. ists in the way I have claimed Wittgenstein would hold,
namely on the basis that 'Pegasus' or 'winged horse' func-
tions in quite definite ways in our language. That is,
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use a Phrase too often used, they bave a definite
structure. Does Wittgenstein not run the risk
ere of reducing Pegasus, and ail other abstract entities,
to mere .linguistic structuresx , into mere collections of
propositions?
He does not. That linguistic forms are necessary
to the existence of abstract entities is, again, undeni-
able, but that does not make the abstract entities them-
selves into mere linguistic forms. The abstract entity
egaous is as different from the propositions about
Pegasus as is the sense of those propositions from those
propositions themselves. It is related to the "name"
'
(i.e., trie disguised definite description) 'Pegasus' as
the. sense of a proposition is to that proposition,
•Pegasus' has a logical form, which is not the same as
the logical form of anjr proposition about Pegasus (or any
set Of propositions about him)
, but which figures in such
propositions. But just as there is no fundamental dif-
ference between facts and complexes, concrete objects,
so there is no fundamental difference between proposi-
tions (with their logical structures) and 'Pegasus’
(with its logical structure).
Wittgenstein’s structural Platonism — which could
be called a Platonism of facts, not things — can be
370 .
summarized by the following To,
(
l S f ur propositions,
ere are abstract entities,-
(2) I'hGSG
analyzable 00%^^^^ endiessly
( 3 ) These entities are a






“ iS therefore quite Clear that the "possibl •ation" of 2,202 et a2 a
P e situ-
- Black claims. Possible , + ’
& PlS“"
cona-d a -
situations are propositionssi ered m relation to their sense, their full com
1
6X StrUCtUre
’ ratheP «“» exclusively in relate to
Pr °P0Sltl0nS (aS in a language)
. The same, of
can Be said of possible, but not actual, facts
actual
' 2 ' 0122)
' "" aU ^ ^ -
' Yet PrSSUPP0Se actu^ structures, given by
' COnCSPtUaP SChSme (i - e- l-guage), on the basis of
demon
^ ^ P ° SSlble ° an be defined clearly, and
st.rated to be a possibility.
are dt the same t ime possible facts (pD<rp ) .the two categories are not exclusive, but real, existing
’
facts are a subset of possible fan + c. ui b oi i cts, how does a possible
fact become an existing fac+o wn,g t? 'Wittgenstein never explains
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this explicitly in the Tractate + v ,L£latus, though I think onecan see what must happen, (j shal ,11 dlscuss Wittgen-
stein s answer f ir<?+ o +
facts ...
aetaphorical level.) Possible
have seen, are parts of the structure of
0Ur COnCGPtUal EChe— 0 hach to' 6.34, they are
PartS °f the
parts Of the net, however,
actually seem to "catch" something, these represent or
Picture real facts. A real fact, therefore, is one
which is both described (or describable) in our language
nd which seems also to exist outside language.
This sounds suspiciously i ike a confused rendition
of a truth few have ultimately doubted, real facts
'
exist independently of us. In fact, however, there is
-ch more to it than just that, for Wittgenstein is try-
ing to maintain as much of this truism as he can without
denying that objects are ultimately simple. He cannot,
therefore, maintain the straightforward correspondence
theory of truth that this truism would suggest. True
propositions do not simply correspond to reality, they
define the reality to which they correspond. Thus a
possible fact, which is presented via a linguistic
structure, is also an actual fact when we see it in the
world outside of language, where language shapes the
world. For if there were no language, if there were no
372 .
possible facts, there would be no actual facts, either.
IV
indicated in the last chapter that there seems to
e some confusion in the Tractates about what the mysti-
031 1S
\
6 ' 44 SSemS t0 the way things are, their





n0t -°-% thine s are in the worldthat is mystical, but that it exists?
5 2 ’ °n tfie ° ther hand
- d °es not seem to say the same
thing:






indef ’ things that cannotD to words. They make them-selves manifest. Thev arp '"h'rt T”mystical. ls
Taken with 4 116 . k m .f b 4,121 ^ esPec ially 4.121), this implies
that the mystical is precisely the form of things, and
especially, the logical form of the world. This, of
course, raises a very important question about Wittgen-
stein' s Platonism: are the forms given to us in possible
facts knowable or not?
That the bulk of the Tractatus
. at least, supports
the claim in 6.44, that the world and its forms are know-
able, cannot be doubted. Just one example of this:
^•53* l he correct method in philosophy
would really be the following: to
say nothing except what can be said
,
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(italics mine). But that the worUi^o. it is is a
reflection of the structures or forms of the language
We SPSak
' °f °Ur conoePtual schemes. Actual facts,
found in the world nnnI , ca be expressed, i. e>
, pictured,
y the P °SSible faCtS1 the f°™er are not therefore
mystical. But there is nothing by which we can pict(Jre
to ourselves the forms of the possible facts until we
create an actual thought-picture of them. This is be-










m,. ?Vhey - 0annot rePresent
realitv Tn




b ® able to reo-




t0 bS able t0 rePr®sent
abfi S ?rh We should have to beie to station ourselves with De-positions somewhere outside the'logo; that is to say, outside the
Thus the apparent conflict between 6.44 and 6.522
vanishes in the light of Wittgenstein's theory of
Platonism. The former concerns the world as it actually
is, its forms as they actually are, the world as
described by the natural sciences, the world as a ref-
lection of language. But language and its forms, the
unreflected forms, cannot themselves be described!
Propositions which try to do c n ty o0 (preeminently
, the
Propositions of philosophy) are nonopn1 ' d ^ ° se se t they are th«mystical as 6. 522 defines it.
I have mentioned tho+ vm++
Plfl+ .
^ Wlttgenstein reverses Plato-sa tom sm at one rnaior ooint -p ,J P ° l
' for he believes that thea street presupposes the concrete - that unless there-re actual linguistic structures, there could be no
poosible facts, states of affairs, situations, or any-
thing else, Cither, Here we corae across another decisive
poim, on which wi •lttgenstem reverses Plato. For the
0 F n V'NV* •tor...s are preeminently the knowable; we. can
have at the very best true belief or ooininn1 p o concerning
the reflections of the Forms in the concrete world For
Wittgenstein it is the concrete world which is hnowable,
the abstract world, the world of possibilities, while it
13 rea1
' is unhn 0wable
. It is the mystical.
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* ? ea Allaire, Edwin B « tmistic or Realistic?"' in G oSi ^
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Wi:^-tein. s view or theB .- -LV, 01 this dissertation.
It would be more natural +
all languages. But Wittgen-tSin hVay ' apart fromized the fundamental role of had not yet real-the l^actatus; that came iater puage "'hen he wrote
and thefaws of°thefariouf® ,f
C °Urse about science
Physics (except for 6 1 whieh^
fences, especially
laws whatsoever). However sinefff? apply to a11general, and the sub-emiont V ' c - f? is quite




consider such iideni^r nf
3
+u ^ co??ents on it, i y
justified.
w ac ng ci their applicatioITq^Ite
See again Section II, Chapter IV.
This dissertation, Part I.
We dealt with it in the last chapter.




]°°re ' s "Notes on Wittgenstein’s Lecture-
t
J ’ and v'/lttgenstein* s own PhilosouhisohaBernerkungen show clearly. They also shr^TipPr
-
^was never a whole ° i ow that he
its more ardent disc^fffff£
stein^s
C
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thlS dissertation opened with
16 qU6Stl °n ' "What does Wittgenstein mean by -thing-
( objec,-) m his early philosophy?" 0ur answer to that
15 n °W qUite ClGar! Wittgenstein uses the word ambigu-
ously throughout his early works (his Notebooks ion.
1916 and the Tractatus)
. It means:
qualities?
iS absolute^ simple, with no





merely logica( Sidles the'Sl
,
(fr°"
plement of material properties)?
C °m"
The first three chapters of Part II established that
Wittgenstein held (A) in the Tractatus
. and gave some
of his reasons for doing SOi the concluding two' chapters
did the same for (B)
,
Part I, devoted to the Notebooks
, developed this
ambiguity within that work. It also answered another
question asked in the introduction: "What led Wittgen-
stein to interpret -object- in this way?" The answer
given there, principally in Chapter V, is this, Through
his picture theory, Wittgenstein attempts to do away
with the necessity of having any theory of reference at
all. Later, in developing his ontology, he is thus
subject to two pressures. There i~ th P ^ •G lo L e desire to inter




’ 0r ^traconceptual, 1 elenents.
' £n do so, we can then only mean it in sense (a),WS haV° n ° refererrtial apparatus which would allow us^ Project (to use a word Wittgenstein uses in the Trac-tus) characteristics from language onto reality (ob-
jects). On the other hand, Wittgenstein also felt the
Pressure exerted by the fact that, both in German and




) are used in an immensely wide variety ofTO„. „„ *. „ be comtUy Ti.,
^




thing' is used in sense (B).
I have not, of course, continued the discussion of
the picture theory in Part II. For this there were two
reasons, Wittgenstein developed his ontology with mini-
reliance on that theory, so a detailed explication
of it would have been a digression from our main concern.
As a digression, it would have proven interesting -
perhaps too much so. A great deal of material has been
written on the picture theoryP to discuss it adequately
would have expanded the length of this dissertation
beyond any desirable point. Nevertheless, comments on
379 .
it inevitably crept into Part u in th . „




1 ,U l d ° n0t - to yet furtheropments here.
The question with which we beran onn i
, .
^ ca be asked very





* Wittgenstein's answer as vm’ we saw throughout thi--rh, was anything but brief. It involved him in the
“
tempt to interpret, in his own way, many concepts, such
as that of substance, which his contemporaries largely
ignored
. Both in the depth of his analysis, and in its
"b.i ead bh
, the ^rsotatne •? „ac us is an unusual work, it is the
brilliance of Wittgenstein's work as wen = - + .XA ’ ll as its influ-
ence on philosophy today, which iu«vH-ri; ‘l n justifies a work of this
length devoted to clarifying it.
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